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VABSTRACT
The Problem of Conditional Obligation
(September 1978)
Judith Wagner DeCew, B . A
. ,
University of Rochester
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
Various attempts to formalize a concept of condition-
al obligation within the standard deontic logic have led
to paradoxes, indicating that standard versions of deontic
logic are inadequate for expressing those obligations.
It has been suggested, most recently by P.S. Greenspan,
that the imposition of temporal restrictions on obligation
statements may provide solutions to these paradoxes. I
argue in Chapter I that Greenspan has not provided an ade-
quate theory of time and obligation nor a solution to the
paradoxes she discusses. Furthermore, I construct a more
careful theory of time relativized obligation than has
previously been presented. My proposal makes it clear
why the addition of temporal limits alone to the standard
versions of deontic logic can provide a solution to some,
but not all, of the problems associated with conditional
obligation
.
VI
Many of the difficulties associated with conditional
obligation in standard versions of deontic logic appear
to arise from the use of the material conditional connec-
tive in formalizations of sentences expressing those obli-
gations. And in Chapters II and III, I investigate the
possibility of employing a stronger conditional connective
to provide an acceptable way of expressing conditional ob-
ligations. Syntactic and semantic considerations lead me
to conclude that a mere change in the conditional connective
can not solve the problems confronted. Moreover, my argu-
ments in Chapter III illustrate the inadequacies of semantic
analyses for deontic logic, such as Jaakko Hintikka's and
Dagfin F^llesdal and Risto Hilpinnen's, based on the notion
of deontic perfection or ideality.
In Chapter IV, I present and evaluate David Lewis'
much more plausible semantic analysis for deontic logic and
theory of conditional obligation. I conclude that Lewis'
proposal is ultimately unsuccessful and emphasize that it
is, moreover, an analysis of a concept of conditional ought-
to-be .
In contrast, my focus is a concept of conditional
ought-to-do. In Chapter V, I present and discuss various
features of a theory of obligation developed by Richmond
Thomason within his indeterminist time model, and I attempt
to build an analogous theory of conditional ought-to-do
Vll
upon that branching time model. Although I recognize the
plausibility of Thomason's model for an analysis of con-
ditional obligation, and conclude that it is unlikely that
an adequate theory of conditional obligation can be devel-
oped without a semantic theory countenancing the concept
of an open future,. I detail serious difficulties which
arise for any theory of conditional ought-to-do built upon
Thomason's theory of obligation.
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INTRODUCTION
Standard versions of deontic logic developed by von
Wright, Aqvist, and others allow certain symbolizations
of sentences about what ought to be the case, what is per-
mitted, and what is forbidden. Unfortunately, however,
within the standard or minimal deontic logic 1 it is possi-
ble to derive various paradoxes. The most important and
interesting of these paradoxes indicate that the standard
deontic logic is inadequate for expressing statements of
conditional obligation.
As has often been pointed out, the natural candidate
for expressing conditional obligations of the form "Given
that p, it ought to be the case that q" (where p and q
2
are schematic sentence letters expressing possible states
of affairs) in the standard deontic logic leads to diffi-
culties. 0 (p 3 q) , where 0 is read "it ought to be the
case that," a symbolization originally proposed by von
. i 3Wright, follows if p is forbidden no matter what q is.
That is, we can prove O('ip) 3 0(p a q) . This formula
alone may be unobjectionable if we read it as asserting
that if vp is obligatory and compatible with one's other
obligations then 'ip v q is also. However, if 0(p 3 q) is
to be a representation of conditional obligation, then
the formula tells us that the forbidden conditionally
obligates one to anything
.
For example, assuming that one
IX
Xought not to lie, then lying conditionally obligates one
to blow up the universe or anything else. Surely this is
unsatisfactory
.
Furthermore, if standard deontic logic is extended
to include mixed formulas 4 then p = Oq will be a well formed
formula. But p = Oq, an alternative symbolization proposed
by A . N . Prior, is similarly inadequate for conditional
obligation sentences. For ^p => (p =, Oq) is valid. Yet if
p 3 °q is to be interpreted as indicating a conditional
obligation for q given that p then whatever is not the
case conditionally obligates one to anything. Thus the
provability of 0(%p) a 0(p => q) and %p 3 (p => 0q) shows that
the vacuous truth of a material implication with a false
antecedent poses a problem for both 0(p q) and p = Oq as
symbolizations for conditional obligations. In each case
too much is conditionally obligatory.
In addition, if either p ^ Oq or 0(p = q) serves as
our symbolization of conditional obligation we will be
forced to accept certain invalid inferences. For given
P 3 Oq then p & r => Oq holds for any r. Similarly, in the
standard deontic logic (SDL)
,
since p d q implies p & r 3 q,
then 0(p ^ q) 0(p & r => q) follows for any r.^ And yet
it may be that given condition p, q is obligatory, although
given condition p & r, q is not obligatory. For example,
given that Smith has borrowed $50 from Jones, then he is
obligated to pay Jones $50. But given that he has borrowed
XI
$50 from Jones and that Jones forgives the loan, he surely
is no longer obligated to pay Jones the $50. 7 in general
it is a distinguishing feature of conditional obligations,
or obligations dependent on conditions, that they may vary
as the conditions vary. To deny this is to misunderstand
the logic of what I take to be the most interesting concept
of conditional obligation.
The inadequacy of expressing conditional obligations
using 0(p 3 q) or p 3 Oq has been further emphasized by
Roderick Chisholm in the following way. He argues that
it is reasonable to agree that these four English sentences
are intuitively consistent: 8
(1) It ought to be that a certain man go to the
assistance of his neighbors.
(2) it ought to be that if he does go then he tell
them he is coming.
(3) If he does not go then he ought not to tell
them he is coming.
(4) He does not go.
Yet the natural symbolizations of these sentences lead to
a contradiction. For
(la) Og
( 2 a) O (g 3 t)
(3a) ^g 3 0(^t)
(4a) i>g
yield Ot by an application to (la) and (2a) of a valid
9detachment rule (axiom (2) of SDL ) , according to which
Xll
Op and O ( p 3 q) implies Oq. And (3a) and (4a) yield O('vt)
by modus ponens. Hence we can derive contradictory obliga-
tions from (la) - (4a) and this conflicts with another
principle of deontic logic that it is not true to say, of
any p, both that p ought to occur and ought not to occur.
The two principles appealed to above, the deontic
detachment principle and the principle of non-contradictory
obligations, are provable in SDL 10 and intuitively acceptable
as well. But if we agree to accept these two principles,
how can we explain the contradiction above? Apparently
the process of interpreting and formalizing sentences
(1) - (4) as (la) - (4a) was incorrect.
A natural move would be to claim that there is a scope
ambiguity in (2) and (3). Although the English sentences
appear to be formalizable most naturally as (la) - (4a)
,
one might argue that the second and third statements actual-
ly ought to be symbolized analogously. That is, one might
claim that both express conditional obligations and despite
the fact that in the English sentences the obligation oper-
ator governs the entire conditional in (2) and only the
consequent in (3)
,
in an adequate formalization the scope
of the deontic operator should be the same for both (2) and
(3). Thus we might suggest the following symbolization:
(la) Og
(2a) 0 (g ^ t)
(3b) 0(^g => M:)
xiii
(4a) o,g.
Now it appears that (la) and (2a) still yield Ot by the
deontic detachment rule but we can no longer derive O(Mz)
from (3b) and (4a)
. However the puzzle can not be solved
so easily. For the English sentences (1) - (4) are not
only consistent but also logically independent
.
12
None is
a logical consequence of the others. But (3b) is easily
deducible from (la) given the rule easily derivable in SDL
according to which p 3 q implies Op 3 Oq . 13 The paradoxes
of 0 ( p 3 q) plague us again. For no matter what r is, we
can derive 0(^g 3 r) from Og
. Clearly this symbolization
does not preserve the independence of the English sentences
(1) - (4) .
For the same reason, symbolizing our sentences as
(la) Og
( 2 b) g 3 ot
(3a) ^g ^ 0 ('Vt
)
(4a) ^g
or as
(la) Og
(2b) g => Ot
(3b) 0(^g => ^t)
(4a) ^g
will be unacceptable. For in both cases (2b) follows from
(4a)
.
Clearly the puzzle can not be solved merely by
XIV
paying close attention to the scope of the deontic opera-
tor. No symbolizations of (2) and (3) by means of
P Oq or 0 (p q) alone will adequately express Chisholm's
four sentences.
Sentence (3) expresses a special type of conditional
obligation sentence which Chisholm calls a contrary-to-
duty imperative. One ought to go to the assistance of his
neighbors. But given that he fails to fulfill that obliga-
tion he is obliged not to tell them he is coming. A con-
trary-to-duty imperative tells an agent what he ought to
do given that he has neglected his duty.
In general it is surely possible for condition p to
make q obligatory, for condition ^p to make %q obligatory,
for p to be unconditionally obligatory and yet for ^p to
occur. But we do not have any adequate formalization of
such a contrary-to-duty situation in standard versions of
14deontic logic.
In order to provide an acceptable way of expressing
Chisholm-type paradoxes, contrary-to-duty imperatives in
particular, and conditional obligations in general, we
might either (i) revise or restrict the traditional symboli-
zations 0(p 3 q) and p 3 Oq, perhaps by incorporating
temporal restrictions, or (ii) augment the standard deontic
logic with a new formalization and interpretation for
conditional obligation, perhaps a new conditional connective
XV
or a dyadic obligation operator, to escape the paradoxes
above
.
In this dissertation I shall evaluate the adequacy of
each of these moves. The first alternative has been sug-
gested by Lennart Aqvist, Wilfrid Sellars, John Robison,
Lawrence Powers, and P.S. Greenspan. The second has been
proposed by David Lewis, Bas van Fraassen, Bengt Hansson,
and Dagfin F011esdal and Risto Hilpinnen. I shall argue
that attempts to pursue (i) alone, to the extent that they
avoid or solve the paradoxes, do so at the expense of pro-
viding an analysis of a concept different from that con-
cept which I take to be conditional obligation. While I
conclude that (ii) is the most promising direction to pursue,
I suggest that the current analyses of that type need to be
revised to explicate that notion of conditional obligation
most crucial for normative ethics.
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CHAPTER I
One possible way of dealing with the paradoxes ex-
plained above and providing adequate expressions for con-
ditional obligations
, especially contrary-to-duty obliga-
tions, is to place temporal restrictions on our symboliza-
tions of conditional obligations. Such a time relativized
view is motivated by Lawrence Powers' examples in "Some
Deontic Logicians" (Nods
, December , 1967 ) . it is also ex-
plicitly suggested as a way of avoiding paradoxes of deontic
logic by Wilfrid Sellars, Lennart Aqvist, and most recently
by P.S. Greenspan in her 1972 Harvard PhD dissertation
Derived Obligation: Some Paradoxes Escaped" and her 1975
Journal of Philosophy paper "Conditional Oughts and Hypo-
thetical Imperatives." The idea is attractive because it
seems there can be no contradiction between an absolute
obligation to do p at a certain time and an obligation to
do vp which arises at a later time when a certain condition,
perhaps a violation of a prior duty, is fulfilled. Recog-
nition that certain obligations, notably those expressed
by contrary-to-duty imperatives, arise only after viola-
tion of a duty suggests that a proper characterization of
obligations relativized to times might block the derivation
of contradictory obligations. This view has indeed been
defended but no adequate and complete theory of temporal
restrictions on obligations has been formed.
1
2The most recent and explicit attempt to restrict
obligations temporally is P.s. Greenspan’s. I shall begin
by presenting Greenspan's proposal and explaining why she
does not provide an acceptable theory of time and obligation
nor an adequate escape from the paradoxes. Then building
on suggestions by Greenspan and Aqvist I work out a more
careful and complete theory of time relativized obligation
than has previously been set forth. My proposal makes it
clear why the addition of temporal limits on standard
symbolizations of conditional obligation statements alone
can provide a solution to some but not all of the problems
associated with conditional obligations, despite Aqvist 's
and Greenspan's claims to the contrary.
Greenspan s main project is twofold: (1) to provide
solutions to some of the paradoxes arising in the standard
system of deontic logic, and (2) to defend some form of a
factual detachment rule which allows inferences from 0(p 3
q) and p to Oq. Both (1) and (2) can be accomplished,
on her view, if proper temporal restrictions are placed
on the obligation statements.
Greenspan argues that we are rarely faced with situa-
tions in which we ought to perform one particular act.
Rather she claims that there are usually several options
or possible states of affairs which we may bring about.
3each of Which would be a way of discharging a particular
obligation. Thus she claims that the options model or the
formal symbolization 0(p v q) , has wide application. Fur-
thermore, since P v q is truth functionally equivalent to
"'P '' q <ln her symbol s, "”P * q) , she believes the formulae
0(P V q) and 0 (p =.q) may serve as models for conditional
obligation. It is unclear that the wide applicability of
0(p v q) or 0(n.p = q) implies anything whatsoever about
its appropriateness for expressions of conditional obliga-
tion. Surely the fact that the expression 0(p => q) contains
an obligation operator and a material conditional is not
sufficient reason to adopt it as a model for conditional
obligation. Nevertheless Greenspan says,
Indeed, the formula 0 (p -> q) and its vari-
ants may be stretched to fit any case in which
an obligation is conditional upon certain
facts—
—facts about the agent or his situation,
acts of other people, or what have you--as in
the statement:
(f) I ought to show up in court on
the 12th if I am able to do so
and the trial is set for that
day.
On this interpretation, of course, the condi-
tion, or 'if-clause,' is taken as falling with-
in the scope of the deontic operator.
. . .
in (f)
,
it ought to be the case that, if my
trial is set for the twelfth, and I am to
appear on that day, then I do so . . . And
since all or most obligations are conditional
in the sense just indicated--apply to persons
in virtue of their possession of certain features,
or the truth of certain descriptions of their
acts and circumstances—the "options"-model
appears to be applicable across-the-board. 2
4Yet Greenspan is well aware that, as we have shown,
the unrestricted formula 0(p 3 q) win not do as a symboli-
zation of conditional obligations. She proceeds to examine
unacceptable inferences which rely on and thus appear to
discredit an unrestricted form of the factual detachment
rule. It might seem that if there is an obligation to see
to it that q given that p, then if p is true, then one has
an obligation to see to it that q. For example, if one
has an obligation to show up in court if one swears to,
then the fact that one swears to appears to validate the
conclusion that one ought to show up in court. However,
Greenspan argues that the truth of p alone is insufficient
for detachment of the obligation that q. For suppose that
next month I shall receive a parking ticket. Then it seems
that it ought to be that if I get a ticket then I pay a
fine. Presumably we would like to detach the uncondition-
al obligation to pay the fine at least next month. But to
do so now, before I receive the parking ticket, seems wrong.
For my obligation now may be to avoid getting a ticket and
avoid paying a fine. The truth of the antecedent, that I
will in fact get a ticket, does not seem sufficient ground
for detaching an unconditional obligation statement that I
ought to pay a fine. Rather, Greenspan argues that such
obligations do not arise until it is too late to keep
their conditions from being fulfilled. Furthermore, they
5are no longer in force when it is too late to see to it
that their objects are fulfilled. Thus when q is obliga-
tory given p, according to Greenspan we need the "unalter
-
ability" of p, not merely the truth of p, to allow detach-
ment of Oq. The statement that p is unalterable means,
for Greenspan, unalterable for the agent at a certain time.
The proposal that conditions unalterable by an agent
are required for detachment of absolute obligations motivates
a non-traditional reinterpretation of the deontic operator
0. Greenspan suggests that we interpret 0 not as indicat-
ing what ought to be the case" but as giving directions
for choice, that is, as designating what ought to be brought
about. This reinterpretation of 0 requires the introduc-
tion of an agent relativization as well. Greenspan supposes
that any particular obligation statement or argument contain-
ing several such statements will express obligations that
a single given nonempty set of agents ought to bring about. 3
Thus she suggests we interpret 0(p => q) as indicating that
this given nonempty set of subjects ought to bring it about
that if p occurs then q does. Given this reinterpretation
it is natural to defend a version of Kant's "ought implies
can" principle. For what would be the point of directing
an agent that he ought to bring it about that he avoid
getting a ticket once he already has one? And once the
condition of getting a ticket is unalterable it seems quite
6right to direct him to pay a fine, since avoiding getting
a ticket is no longer a viable alternative. Hence Greenspan
proposes the following rules as acceptable: 4
(I) a factual detachment rule,
0(p ^ q)
-UP
Oq
where Up asserts p's unalterable truth (unalterable by the
agent) and where the statements of unalterability and obli-
gation all hold at the same time, and
(II) a modified Kantian principle,
Op ^Up & ^U'vp
where antecedent and consequent hold at the same time.
Greenspan asserts, then, that we may detach Oq from
0(p ^ q) (i) by the deontic detachment rule if Op holds at
the same time that 0(p = q) holds or (ii) by the factual
detachment rule (I) if Up holds at the same time that
0(p =3 q) holds. She concludes that 0(p => q) , read "the
(given) agent (s) ought to bring it about that if p then
q," is applicable to conditional obligation statements as
long as its application is restricted by principles (I) and
5(II) . Furthermore she argues that these rules "get us
out of Chisholm's paradox" ^ and other contrary-to-duty
puzzles. I shall argue that both these claims are mistaken.
7According to Greenspan the time limits imposed by
her "time-bound" view of obligation need not be explicit
but are actually built into her principles (I) and (n) , 7
If this is so, then Greenspan's description of her proposal
may be inaccurate. She has not merely imposed temporal
restrictions on obligation statements but has introduced
a new modal operator, unalterability
.
The concept of p's unalterable truth by an agent s
at a time t is left undefined by Greenspan. it seems
plausible to suppose that she means
(Op) p is unalterable for s at t = df s does not
have it in his power at t to bring about %p.
Unfortunately the concept of "having it in one's power"
may be no clearer than the concept of unalterability. But
if the concept of an agent having something in his power
is an assertion about what is physically possible for him
then we might say
(0
2 ) P is unalterable for s at t = it is
not physically possible at t for s to bring
about ^p.^
Apparently any time after p occurs we shall have not
only the truth of p but the unalterable truth of p as well.
But before p occurs we may have Up for s at t or MJp for s
8at t. If the former, then it is not physically possible
at t for s to bring about -up although it may be logically
possible for -up to occur. And in such cases the concept
of unalterability and Greenspan's use of it in principle
(I) appear to be most interesting.
For example, suppose that any time before Friday we
may say that Smith ought to bring it about that if he
accepts a job by Friday then he arrives for work on Monday.
Further, suppose that during the week Smith mails a letter
accepting the job. If we assume that Smith can not reach
a telephone or any other means to cancel his acceptance,
and cannot prevent the letter from reaching its destination,
then we may say that even when no acceptance has reached
Smith's future employers, still Smith's acceptance of the
offer is unalterable. At such times, according to (I),
we may conclude that Smith ought to bring it about that
he arrives for work on Monday. Clearly (I) allows detach-
ment of more obligations than the deontic detachment rule
and fewer than the unrestricted factual detachment rule.
Principle (I) also allows the following inference.
Suppose that on Monday, for example, we may say that Jones
ought to bring it about that if it rains Tuesday afternoon
then he closes the windows Tuesday morning. Suppose we
also agree that it is unalterable for Jones on Monday that
it will rain on Tuesday afternoon. Then we may conclude
9on Monday that Jones ought to close the windows Tuesday
morning. Principle (I), with its use of the conoept of
unal terability
,
is attractive because it allows acceptable
detachment of overriding obligations in cases where no de-
tachment was possible in SDL.
The principle, however, is clearly unacceptable. Ac-
cording to principle (I), o(p = q ) entails Oq if p . s truth
is unalterable at the time the ought statements are in fore,
Now it seems reasonable to grant, for example, that a given
agent s ought to bring it about that if he charges a $10
shirt at Macy's then he pays Macy
' s $10. Suppose further
that s does charge a $10 shirt at Macy's, so the condition
is unalterable. Then, according to (I) „e can conclude
that s ought to pay Macy's $10, where this is an absolute
or overriding obligation. Yet this conclusion is too strong
For even if it is unalterably true that s has charged the
shirt, a further condition might be sufficient to override
his obligation to pay Macy's for the shirt.
Greenspan proposes an entailment substitution rule,^
(III) Op & (~U(p & r) & ~U (~p & ~r) ) 3 0(p v r). 10
And given this rule we shall be able to conclude that on
her view if 0(p => q) holds then 0( (p & r) => q) follows even
in cases where ~0((p & r) 3 q)
.
To see this, suppose that
we grant the situation described above. S has charged a
10
$10 shirt at Macy's and s ought to bring it about that if
he charges the shirt then he pays Macy's $10, which we may
express by the formula 0(c o p). Suppose further that r
is the state of affairs that s returns the shirt. Then
as long as it is still possible for s to return or not
return the shirt we may derive 0(~c v ~r v p) , or equiva-
lently, 0 (~ (c & r) v p) and thus 0((c & r) op), that s
ought to bring it about that if he charges the shirt and
returns it then he pays Macy's $10. Surely this is wrong.
Utilization of the concept of unalterability does not
block invalid inferences from 0(p => q) to o((p&r) 3 q) .
Greenspan's reinterpreted formalization 0 (p => q) , com-
bined with her principles, is not applicable across the
board to conditional obligation statements which are meant
to assert what one really ought to do given certain states
of affairs. However successful she is at avoiding the para-
doxes, it is clear that her expression for conditional
obligation, 0 (p 3 q) , reinterpreted as an ought-to-do,
not an ought-to-be, captures some notion other than con-
ditional obligation as explained above. It can only express
a notion for which 0(p o q) 3 0((p & r) 3 q) does hold, with
certain restrictions.^
It is also clear that Greenspan has not provided an
adequate way out of Chisholm's paradox. She tells us,
11
Ko
c°ntra
^
iction can result from a time-b und ought-to-do version of his premises
i
f
K
“elr conditional oughts are both'
»„
t
wl'
hable
l
as he ass™es. With 'O’ read
- ?
aght to brin9 it about that," andu as He cannot alter the fact that " hispremises now should be understood as follows-
( 1 )
( 2 )
(3)
(4)
0 (he goes to the assistance of his
neighbors)
.
0 (he goes to their assistance 3
he tells them he is coming)
.
0 (he does not go to their assis-
tance 3 he does not tell them heis coming)
U(he does not go to their assistance).
*
* A
Whenever it is open to the agent to bringab
°^ comP°und
.
state of affairs, going-
9
and telling, that is what he ought to do, inpre erence to bringing about any object thatincludes not telling. At such times then
we can detach a prescription of the conse-quent m (2), but not in (3). On the otherhand, once his failure to go is beyond the
agent's control, he ought to focus his efforts
on not telling, instead. So at such times, wecan detach a prescription of the consequent in(3), but not in (2). Hence (2) and (3) can
never yield conflicting conclusions, but only
conclusions restricted to different times. 12
Greenspan's explanation of her solution to Chisholm's
paradox may be misleading. if we let g be a statement
variable for "he goes to the assistance of his neighbors"
and t for "he tells them he is coming," then Greenspan's
symbolization of Chisholm's sentences is:
(la) Og
(2a) +jno
(3b) 0 (~g 3 -
(4b) U(~g).
12
Then (la) and (2a) apparently yield ot by the deontic de-
tachment role and ,3b) and (4b, lead to 0(.t) by principle
(I), making it difficult to see how this solves Chisholm's
puzzle
.
However, Greenspan's detachment rules require that we
determine when the obligation and unalterability statements
hold. Thus it appears that her view is something much more
Plausible, perhaps the following. Suppose that some par-
ticular time, say Wednesday at 3:00, is when the given agent
will or will not go to assist his neighbors. Then before
Wednesday at 3:00 we can say
(la) Og
( 2a ) 0 (g 3 t
)
(3b) 0(~g 3 ~t)
(4a) ~g.
He will not go, but it is not yet unalterable that he will
not. These will not be inconsistent because (la) and (2a)
will yield Ot by the deontic detachment rule (since both
hold at the same time, in this case, before Wednesday at
3:00) and yet we cannot detach 0(%t) from (3b) and (4a).
However after Wednesday at 3:00, when he does not go, we
shall have
(la) Og
( 2 a) 0 (g 3 t)
(3b) 0 (~g 3 ~t)
13
(4b) U(~g).
in this case the four statements are inconsistent, since
according to principle (XI) 0g => ~U(~g), and rightly so on
Greenspan's view. For one can only be obligated to bring
about states of affairs which are not unalterable. Pre-
sumably Greenspan would say that after Wednesday at 3:00,
(la) is false. We cannot derive ot, therefore, but 0(~t)
follows from (3b) and (4b) and principle (I). Thus ot
holds only before Wednesday at 3:00 and 0(~t) only after
that time. On this interpretation, the conclusions are
restricted to different times" and the inconsistency pointed
out by Chisholm is avoided.
As a matter of fact, however, Greenspan must maintain
that on her view we can never derive 0(~t). 13 For on any
reasonable interpretation of Chisholm's case u(~g) holds
only after he does not go. Thus 0(~t), if detachable at
all, is only detachable at those times after he does not
go. But at such times detachment of 0(~t) violates principle
(II), since 0(~t) ^ ~U(t) & ~U(~t), and at the times in
question we can not have both ~U(t) and ~U(~t). After
Wednesday at 3:00 it is too late to tell or not tell his
neighbors he is coming. How then can Greenspan block de-
tachment of 0(~t) after Wednesday at 3:00? By pointing out
that at such times (3b)
, 0(~g s ~t) , no longer holds. This
14
13 S° "“Ce by (II > °<~9 => ~t) implies both
~u(~t) and
~U(t ), 14 and we have seen that after he does not go we
cannot have both. Thus Greenspan must maintain that ot
may be derived before Wednesday at 3:00 but that 0 (~t)
may never be derived Q-t-i i i • , , ,Still, Chisholm's paradox, the
derivation of inconsistent obligations, is blocked.
Promising as this solution sounds, it will not do for
two reasons. First, Greenspan's symbolizations do not
preserve the independence of Chisholm's four sentences.
Whenever it is possible for the agent not to tell his
neighbors he is coming, Og will imply 0 (~g o ~t) by Green-
span's principle (III), and thus (la) 3 (3b). Indeed,
at such times it will also be possible to derive Og 3
0( g 3 t) . Yet at no time does his obligation go to his
neighbors' assistance imply a conditional obligation to
tell or not to tell if he does not go. The general diffi-
culty is that for any state of affairs r which it is still
possible for the agent to bring about at the time Og holds,
Og will imply 0(~g 3 r)
,
and if the latter is to be an
expression for conditional obligation, as Greenspan claims,
then Og implies that the agent has a conditional obligation
to anything it is still possible for him to do. Appeal to
unalterability does not help Greenspan avoid this unwelcome
result
.
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Second, Greenspan restricts her discussion to argu-
ments in which the given obligation statements are taken
to be made at the same time. This restriction prevents
her from providing a consistent and insightful formulation
of Chisholm's paradox. For as we have seen, her statements
(1) - (4) (see quotation p. 11 ) cannot be held at the same
time. Given principle (II) „e can never assert Og and
U('ig) as true premises in the same argument, and for this
reason Greenspan cannot formulate any contrary-to-duty
situation consistently. This may be acceptable to Green-
span but I believe it is unhelpful. For Chisholm's point
is that his four sentences may be intuitively consistent
when valuated at the same time. The interesting question
is what our obligations are when we have neglected our
duty. Thus we want to formulate Chisholm's sentences con-
sistently so that we may understand that an agent does have
an obligation to bring about p and perhaps q, but that once
he fails to do p, it is obligatory for him to see to it
that 'iq
.
Greenspan has claimed to present a time-bound view
of obligation statements, but in addition has supplemented
SDL by the introduction of a new modal operator, unalter-
ability
,
and suitable principles governing detachment of
obligations. Despite the plausibility of her point that
detachment of obligations from avoidable conditions is
16
acceptable, her proposal is clearly unsatisfactory. It
may be, however, that another way of temporally restrict-
ing obligation statements can accomplish what we wish.
Greenspan did not provide a way of designating the times
particular obligation statements are binding.
Thus our next project shall be to make a specific proposal
about relativizing ought statements to times, hoping that
once we can specify the time at which an obligation is in
effect and the time at which it is violated, we will have
natural and non-paradoxical way of expressing obligations
which arise as a result of past violations. Our aim is to
determine whether temporal relativizations provide a theory
which allows us to escape the contrary-to-duty paradoxes
while providing a consistent symbolization of Chisholm’s
four sentences as independent statements and also provid-
ing an analysis of a concept of conditional obligation which
will allow conditional obligations to change as conditions
vary.
Let us first suppose that time can be partitioned
into small units of unspecified length, which we may
designate by
* •' t
n
* • • Second, let us retain
Greenspan's reading of the deontic operator 0 as expressing
what an agent ought to do. While some obligations may be
in effect for a single one of our units of time, it is
likely that most obligations will stand for a span of time
17
including many of these time units. Hence it would be
appropriate to designate nonempty sets of consecutive units
of time, say by T, ,T ,T m ,
1 23’ ’ *' TN " • • during which obliga-
tions will be binding. Nevertheless, our exposition will
be simplified and the points we make will be equally force-
ful if we restrict ourselves to expressions of obligations
which hold for single units of time.
Thus we might begin by introducing the following sym-
bolism:
to be read ”s ought (has the obligation) at t
±
to bring
it about that p," where s names an agent, t
±
one of our
time units, and p is a schematic sentence letter for a
possible state of affairs.
With this symbolism we may make the following type
of distinction. Suppose, for example, that Smith borrows
$25 from Jones at noon on Monday. Then if p stands for
paying Jones $25, and for some time on Tuesday, and s
for Smith, we may say
0
s
,
t
1
(p) -
And if Jones, kind fellow that he is, releases Smith from
his $25 debt on Wednesday, then if t
2
names some time on
Thursday, we may say
18
s, t
2
(P) .
This enriched symbolization is still not adequate for our
purposes as it stands, however. Recall that one of our
goals is to be able to distinguish conditional obligations
“ particular obligations arising from neglect of our duties
from absolute obligations. Thus we shall need to temporally'
relativize not only obligation statements, but also our
possible states of affairs, in order to be able to desig-
nate the times at which contrary- to-duty obligations arise.
For example, if Smith robs Jones, although he ought
not, then Smith's contrary-to-duty obligation to make amends
to Jones arises only after the robbery. Designation of a
time at which Smith's contrary-to-duty obligation is bind-
ing depends upon and is relative to the time of the robbery.
Now it is important to note that conditional obliga-
tions often arise from particular actions, as in an obliga-
tion to return a book if one has borrowed it. But condi-
tional obligations may also arise from possible states of
affairs which are not actions. For example, on the condi-
tion that lightning strikes a neighbor's house and sets it
on fire, one has an obligation to help the neighbor. Still,
it may sometimes be difficult to designate single units of
time at which possible states of affairs may be said to
hold. Moreover, all our arguments will apply even if we
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restrict our attention to acts. So let us locus on possi-
ble states of affairs which are acts and agree that we may
later augment our language to include expressions for all
possible states of affairs if „e wish.
We would like, then, to have a formal language with-
in which we can symbolize sentences about acts brought about
by particular agents at particular times. Suppose we let
S and X range over agents named by s , ,s",s'"
. Fur _
thermore, let R and Q be predicate variables for two-place
predicate letters A,B,C,.
. . which we shall use to form
symbolic sentences expressing relations between agents and
units of time. Then we may say, for example, if s' names
Smith and expresses »s helps a neighbor at t.» and
t
l
stands for noon on Friday, that
will serve as a symbolization for the statement that Smith
helps a neighbor at noon on Friday. in general, we shall
say that any formula of the form R will be a well formeds
, 1
expression of our formal language.
Moreover, any formula of the form
will also be a well formed formula of our language, and
20
such a formula win express an obligation had by an agent
at a time. We may read it (rather awkwardly) as assert-
ing that s has at t. the obligation to see to it that x
bears the relation R to t 17 M
.
. Now we shall be able tQ s^_
bolize Smith’s obligation at noon on Friday to see to it
that Jones helps a neighbor at 1:00 on Friday as
0
s\t. (As’’,t >
where s’ names Smith, s" names Jones,
^ stands for noon
Friday, t
2
for 1:00 Friday, and where is our symbolic
expression for ”s helps a neighbor at t ”
i
We may define the rest of our well formed formulas
inductively by saying
(i) if
(J) is a wff then ^tj) is a wff,
and
(ii) if (p and $ are wffs, then (p & ^ , <p v ip
,
$ D and $ E ip are wffs.
The obligation statements we are formalizing indicate
what an agent ought to do
,
and so should yield prescriptions
about what it is possible for an agent to do, in some sense
of possible." Often it may not even be physically possible
for an agent to see to some obligations. For example, it
may be that it is not physically possible for Smith to see
to it at any time that Jones help a neighbor at that time
or any other time. Jones' actions may be beyond Smith's
21
control
genuine
so if we wish our obligation statements to yield
prescriptions about what an agent ought to do, it
seems reasonable to begin by restricting
those formulas for which (for any s,x,t.
our attention to
tj,R)
( 1 )
°-V-t ’ X .
Moreover, given that we can now make explicit both the time
at which an ought judgment holds and the time at which
the specific obligation ought to be fulfilled, it seems
reasonable to specify the relationship between the two times
Although statements about what ought to be may be timeless-
ly true, in general statements about what an agent ought to
do will not be. It will at the very least be odd to require
for example, that at some time today Smith ought to see to
it that he repays Jones yesterday. Let us formalize this
intuition by adopting the minimal condition that (for any
/R)
where t
i ^ t.. is read "the time unit t± occurs before or
at the same time as t ^ " Similarly, for statements about
negative, conjunctive, and disjunctive obligations, let us
require that
( 3 ) 0
s,t ^ (Rs
, t
t . < t
22
(4) O
.
(RS t +- & Q , ) 3 t < 1s
' 1
s
'
t
^
s f t, £ t-
*i* V
and
(5) C>
^ (Rs,t.-s,t. VQ ) t vt. < t.
Furthermore, it is rpa^nn^Kio .../ ^ e so able to maintain that
<6) 0
s,t. (Rs,t > = "Ps,t MRS
,
t .>
where P
where
,t. 1S read "it is permissible for s at t "i i ' and
(7) P
s t (RS t >
3 t. s t..
' i
s ' j 1 3
Permissions of negations, conjunctions, and disjunctions
will be formalizable analogously to (3) , (4) , and (5) .
Let us also accept the following time relativized
axioms for well formed formulas of our system, while con-
tinuing to maintain the temporal restrictions we have given
(Al) 0S/t (<j>) ^ *0 %((j))
i i
(A2) °
s ,t. (cJ)
3 ^ & °
s t . ^
3
°s t.
(iJj)
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and
(A 3 ) °
S
,
t . ^ V %(j)) .
Our rule of interference, (Rl)
, will be modus ponens.
Now, given this formal language, how are we to for-
malize conditional obligations? it appears that a time
relativized version of p = 0q is doomed. For we shall be
able to prove -vr
= (r = n tr,s,t
i
lK
s,t
i °s,t j
<Q
s,t
k
)) ' And if
Rs
'fi
°
s
-t^ (2s,t
k
’ ls to be a symbolization for condi-
tional obligations, the old paradox recurs in a time
relativized form. For whatever relation R that s does not
bear to q yields a conditional obligation for s to bear
any relation Q to any time q such that t . s q. In the
contrary-to-duty case, if for some s, t
m .
and q, where
m ~ i* °s,t ^« Rs, t .> bolds and yet R , thenm i s
,
°s,t. ^s,t. ^ follows for any s, t. and t where t. < t
,Ik J k 3 ^ k
even if MD (Q ) is true.
' j
S,tk
Can a time relativized version of 0 (p => q) fare any
better? I think it can when we understand some natural
time restrictions that may be imposed on this type of com-
pound obligation for expressions of conditional obligation.
In the standard system of deontic logic, it was the
provability of O^p => 0(p => q) which made us view 0 (p => q) as
inadequate as a formalization of conditional obligation
(see page ix)
.
And given the time relativized axioms (Al) -
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(A3, it appears that in our time relativized deontic logic
we will be able to prove
(8) 0 Oj ( R ,S/t. v s,t. ; u s t (R. , =3 Q )1
D
S
' i s ' t j
s 't
k '
If so then we win indeed find 0^ (r^
unsatisfactory as a formalization of conditional obligation
For it seems that then if s has an obligation at t, to bear
the relation to t it ^ + \ +.u
j l 6 V then it will follow that
whenever the forbidden, R
, does ho1(, = .s,t.' s has a condition-
"1 °bligation t. to bear Iny relation Q to any time t
later than t..
l
However, it seems to me that we can and should deny
(8). We can show it will not follow when o (r =, q
symbolizes conditional obligations once we re^ognizXnd
make explicit some appealing and implicit time restrictions
on those obligations. For it is natural to say that if s
has some absolute obligation then any conditional obligation
arising from or generated by fulfillment of this obligation
or its negation can only be incurred by s after this obliga-
tion or its negation is discharged. For example, I have an
obligation today not to rob Smith tomorrow. Once I have
robbed Smith tomorrow, then after that time I have the con-
ditional obligation to repay him. Thus we may say that a
formula of the form 0 (R = Q ) symbolizes aS
' 1
S
'
t
j
S 't
k
sentence expressing a conditional obligation provided
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<9> °
8
' t i
(Vt
j
3 Q
s.tk
) => tj < tiS tk ,
that is, only if t., the time of the obligation statement,
is strictly after the time tj that the condition holds.
Our enriched symbolism, with this added restriction, gives
US a way of making clear the time relationships implicit
in conditional obligations. And every formula in our time
relativized deontic logic with any implication for condi-
tional obligations must not only follow from our axioms and
principles but accord with the stipulated time restrictions
as well. Surely it is now clear that (8) violates the lat-
ter
‘ WVt 3 Qs,tk ) ' as a symbolization for condi-
tional obligation, will not follow from 0
s
n,(R ), for
in the latter it must be that t. <: t
. and iAhe former we
must have t. < t^
, which is impossible if t. < ti " j *
1 t aPPears then that the imposition of natural time
restrictions has given us a formalization for conditional
obligations which is immune to one of the basic difficul-
ties that arises with an analogous, non-time-relativized
and standard deontic logic. Let us now investigate whether
or not 0
s
,
t <
R
Sft
3 Q
s t
sub 3 ect to the restrictions
i J ' k
that tj < t^ t^, is susceptible to other contrary-to-duty
problems and paradoxes.
The type of contrary-to-duty puzzle discussed by Chis-
holm in "Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic,"
and Aqvist in "A Note on Commitment," has been presented
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in the following general way. it seems that for some pos-
sible states of affairs p and q, the following four state-
ment forms may be consistent:
(10) it ought to be that p.
(11) Given p it ought to be that q.
(12) Given %p it ought to be that %q.
(13) %p.
Yet as we have seen, formalizations of these
sentences in standard deontic logic lead to
four English
contradictions
or entailments that seem incorrect or both. And even if
we rephrase (10, - (13, in terms of what an agent ought
to do we still seem to have four English sentences which
may be logically consistent and mutually independent.
For example, suppose that no one should swim in the
reservoir supplying town water and thus Smith ought not
swim in the reservoir. But suppose Smith does swim in the
reservoir and that anyone who swims in the reservoir is
then required by a court order to spend a certain number of
hours cleaning the grounds surrounding the reservoir. How-
ever, if Smith did not swim in the reservoir and receive
this penalty he ought not to have cleaned up the grounds
since it would be inappropriate to trespass on town proper-
ty and others were hired to do that cleaning. Then it would
be reasonable to assert each of the following four sentences
(14) Smith ought not to swim in the reservoir.
(15) Given that Smith swims in the reservoir.
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he ought to clean the surrounding grounds.
(16) Given that Smith does not swim in thereservoir, he ought not clean the sur-rounding grounds.
(17) Smith swims in the reservoir.
we wish to show that with our time relativised deontic logic
we can symbolize these four sentences (a) as consistent
statements and (b) as pairwise independent statements.
Let us suggest the following as an adequate formaliza-
tron of (14) - (17), where W
g>t
^
symbolizes "s swims in the
reservoir at g", symbolizes "s cleans the reservoir
grounds at g", s' names Smith, and t
]_
names the time at
which Smith in fact swims in the reservoir:
(14') (t.Mt.Mt. < t
x
s t. s t. = 0
s , jt Mws , t >)
(15') (t. ) (t.) (t ) (t.
3
'
'“k' fc i ^
0
S ', ti
<W
s',t. = Cs',t >>1 3 k
US') (t.) ( tj ) (tk ) (t < t. * tk =
°s',t <"Ws',t, = ^Cs',t, >>
(17 ’>
“s', tl
-
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It seems that there is an implicit assumption in ( 17 )
that smith swims in the reservoir at a particular time,
which we may designate by V the name of one unit of time.
However, although we may infer by universal instantiation
from (14')
(18) (t
i ) (t i < t
^ 0
s' ,t. MWs',t >>'
that Smith ought not at any t. earlier than
^ swim in the
reservoir at t^ the time he does swim, the more general
obligation expressed by (14') appears to be true as well
and I suggest that that is what (14) asserts. In general,
at an^ time before the swimming takes place we wish to as-
sert that Smith ought not swim at any future time. The
conditional obligations expressed in (15') and (16') I also
take to be general or standing obligations of a sort. it
is not merely true that after Smith in fact swims he must
clean the grounds around the reservoir. We may also inter-
pret (15) as claiming that at any time t^, if Smith has
been swimming in the reservoir at an earlier time he then
ought to clean the grounds. And we may interpret (16) as
indicating that at any time Smith ought not clean the grounds
if he has not been swimming at an earlier time.
If I am correct that (14') - (17') adequately express
- (17), then we do have a symbolizationand symbolize (14)
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in which none of the four statements implies any other.
For the specific occurrence of Smith’s swimming at does
not entail the general conditional obligation in effect any
time after a swimming for Smith to clean the grounds. Thus
(17’) does not imply (15'). Nor will (14’) imply (16 ,,
Since in (14’) t
± i t. and in (16') we require that t <
V We have preserved the independence of (14) - ( 17 ).
Furthermore, (14') - M7n ,
'
'
^
' are mutually consistent.
We may, as was indicated above, infer from (14') that
(18) (t
i } (t. < t. 0 % (w ))
Similarly we may use universal instantiation to infer from
(15') that
(19) (t
i>
(t
k>
(t
l
< tf S tk =
°s’,t
i
(W
s',t
1
= C
s',t
k
)>
and from (16') that
(20) (t.) (t
k ) (t x < t. S tk =
0
s s
) .
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But unless we wish to defend a factual detachment rule
according to which 0 (r d 0 w us,t
i S,t .
Q
s ,t
k
> & R
s, t . imply
°s,t
i
(Q
s,t
k
) ' and 1 think we should not, we can not infer
°s'-t
i
(C
s',t
k
) from < 17 ') and (19). And it does not appear
that any time relativised version of the deontic detachment
rule Op and 0 (p -> q) implies Oq would apply to (18) and (20)
since the relationship between t
±
and
^
in (18) is incon-
sistent with that in (20)
We have proposed a symbolization for conditional obli-
gations which is attractive because when restricted tempor-
ally as we have suggested, it is immune to some standard
paradoxes of the analogous symbolization in SDL, and looks
like it will give us a way of avoiding the Chisholm- type
contrary-to-duty imperative puzzle.
Unfortunately, however, there are versions of the lat-
ter puzzle which our symbolization still cannot handle.
First, in proposing temporal restrictions we have also
reinterpreted the deontic operator O from an ought-to-be
to an ought-to-do. But this reinterpretation is so narrow
that it does not allow symbolization of versions of the
puzzle like the following:
(21) Jones ought not to rob Brown.
(22) Given that Jones does rob Brown, it ought
to be that he be punished for robbing
Brown
.
(23) Given that Jones does not rob Brown,
it ought to be that he not be punished
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for robbing Brown.
(24) Jones robs Brown.
It may be that (22) does not express a contrary-to-duty im-
perative because it does not tell Jones what he ought to do
once he has neglected his duty and robbed Brown, certainly
It does not tell us that Jones ought to see to it that he
himself is punished for the robbery. Rather. (22, tells us
what ought to be the case once Jones has robbed Brown.
Thus we might not worry about this version of the puzzle
nor feel the need for a solution for it because our concern
only with those obligation statements most crucial for
ormative ethics, that is, those which prescribe action
for a given agent. Nevertheless, this version of the puzzle
presents a reasonable and consistent set of deontic sentences
which we cannot symbolize adequately because we have no pro-
vision for combining our time restrictions with statements
about what ought to be.
Second, and perhaps more devastating to our proposal,
our symbolization appears to be inadequate for Chisholm's
own example and others like it. Chisholm's example, unlike
the example just discussed, might be transformed into our
ought-to-do language as follows:
(1) A certain man ought to see to it that he
go to the assistance of his neighbors.
(2) Given that he does go he ought to see to
it that he tell them he is coming.
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(3>
serto^hVr 3 n0t 90 he OU9ht to
coming.
^ h<3 "0t tel1 them he is
(4) He does not go.
Suppose we let s' name our man and let G
g be our
symbolic expression for "s goes to the assistance of his
neighbors at g", and let T^ symbolize "he tells his
neighbors he is coming at t."' Suppose also that if our
man goes to assist his neighbors, there is a particular
time at which he goes. Then we may let designate the
time at which he would go if he were to to, and may say
that he does not go to help them at V Then we might try
to formalize (1) - ( 4 ) as
(lc) (t
x
) (t.) (t. < t
x
& t. « t. =
°s' t (G S' t >>
' 1
s
(2 °) (t.)<t.)(t
k )(t < t. * tk =
°s',t < Gs',t = Ts',t>>
(3c) (t.)
(
tj ) (tk ) (t. < t. S tk
°s',t.<"Gs',t. = "Ts',t >>1 J k
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<40 V3
s , (V
But a closer look at ,2c, and ,3c, shows that the very tem-
poral restrictions which appeared so natural and useful are
devastating in this example. For normally „e understand
,2,
to mean that if he does go he ought to tell them he is com-
ing before he goes. Thus we require that
^ i t . Yet we
have already restricted our time relativised version of
0,P - q, for sentences of conditional obligation so that in
<20 tj 4 ti i tk and hence t. < V Thus the restrictions
we presented which were so appealing are strong enough to
block some unwelcome results but too strong to allow a sym-
bolization of all four sentences in Chisholm’s very own
example
.
The difficulty we have met does not arise solely with
Chisholm example. For we are similarly unable to symbolize
the following sentences which we might want to assert if a
certain man. Smith, ought to go to New York City and can
only get there by plane.
(25) Smith ought to go to New York City.
(26) Given that he goes, he ought to buy
a plane ticket.
(27) Given that he does not go, he ought notbuy a plane ticket.
(28) He does not go.
Normally we understand (26) to mean that Smith ought
to buy the ticket before he goes. But in general our
symbolic apparatus can not provide a formalization of
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conditional obligations such as Chisholm's (2, and
,26, a-boVe, Where a given condition gives rise to an earlier obli-gate. Perhaps we should take another look at statements
Uke these to determine whether or not they are genuine con-
ditional Obligation statements, that is, whether or not ob-
ligations can be in effect due to future conditions, if so
,
then we have not solved all the puzzles of contrary-to-duty’
imperatives
.
Finally, although a time relativized version of
0(P = q) => 0((p & r) = q) will not always hold, it still ap-
pears that as long as the relevant times are related properly
we will be able to prove some invalid inferences in our time
relativized deontic logic. Specifically we shall have
<29)
‘V (V (V 'V (t i < M t,
"i
< *** ^
= 0
s, ti
<R
s,t, = «s ,t,»
=*
3
0_ J. ( (R & S ) 3 Q ) )s
'
t
A S,t . s,t ' ys,t )] *1 3 m ' k
Neither Greenspan's use of the concept of unalterability
nor our proposed time relativizations can completely block
inferences of this form. Those supplements to SDL do not
change most inferences allowed by use of the material condi-
tional. It seems that we must seek a symbolization for con-
ditional obligation statements which does not rely on the
standard material implication.
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CHAPTER II
Many Of the difficulties that anise when we attest
to symbolize statements of conditional obligation by means
Of the formulas 0(p 3 a ) or ™ ri^ q) p d 0q may be traced to the
material conditional connective. The connective appears
to be too weak for our purposes since it allows inferences
we wish to block if these conditional expressions are to
symbolize sentences of conditional obligation. And we have
now seen that the imposition of temporal restrictions on
obligation statements will not be sufficient to block
those invalid inferences. There is clearly a real need
for a stronger conditional expression for conditional
obligation sentences.
Brian Chellas has argued in "Conditional Obligation"
“ ^ggl^l- The°ry and Semantic Analysis
, edited by Stenlund
that the best approach for understanding conditional obli-
gation divorces questions of obligation and conditionality.
For then the relationship between the notions of obliga-
tion in conditional and non-conditional contexts and be-
tween the notions of conditionality in deontic and non-
deontic contexts may be made explicit. Richmond Thomason
argues similarly in an unpublished manuscript "Deontic
Logic as Founded on Tense Logic", that a proper theory of
conditional obligation will separate a theory of the con-
ditional and a theory of obligation. For the present we
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Shall be following their suggestion, focusing f irst on the
notion of conditionality.
Surely entailment or strict implication, written
P q and interpreted in the usual way, provides a stronger
conditional connective than material implication. Thus
we might consider utilising it in a formalisation of con-
ditional obligation. 1 Analogs of 0(p = q , and p 3 0q prQ.
vide natural candidates, and hence we shall first consider
the plausibility of
(30) p =* Oq
as a way of expressing conditional obligation statements.
It is probably simplest to treat the expression Oq as
"unbroken"
, "unanalysable" statement variable standing
for English sentences of the form "it ought to be the case
that q". Given this analysis, p =» Oq will be a formal
expression for sentences of the form "it is necessarily
the case that given p, it ought to be that q". And p ^ Oq
may be treated as a well formed formula of the standard
alethic modal systems, where p and Oq are statement vari-
ables in those systems, since the symbol 0 will not func-
tion as a predicate letter or operator.
Then even in the weakest modal system T 2 we shall not
be able to derive
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(31)
d (p ^ 0q) ,
which is as we would wish. However(32)
CKp 3 (p r)
holds for any r
,
3
and so in particular
(33)
CKp d (p 0q)
for any q. On this analysis, then, an impossible
condition generates a conditional obligation to any-
thing. it is difficult to have definite intuitions about
what obligations (if any) arise given impossible condi-
tions. And so we might not be terribly troubled by ( 33 ).
But
(34)
(p =£ q) 3 (p & r =*> g)
is valid m T and so in particular we shall have
(35)
(p =» Oq) 3 (p & r ^ Oq) .
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And hence if p => 0q is to be a symbolization for condi-
tional Obligation it Will fan to provide expressions
for conditional obligations which change when conditions
change
.
Perhaps p * Oq would be a more plausible symboliza-
tion for conditional obligation if we altered our analysis
of it. Instead of treating Oq as a simple statement
variable, we might take p and q to be statement variables
for possible states of affairs and O to be a deontic
operator read "it is obligatory that". But then p * 0q
can no longer be viewed as a well formed formula of the
alethic modal logic system T. However we might augment
the system T in the following way to form a formal system
within which P ^ Oq is a well formed expression.
We might propose that the language of our new system,
call it OT, be the language of the propositional calculus,
PC, plus the deontic operator 0 and the modal operator .
Then we might describe the well formed formulas of OT.
Single statement variables will be atomic formulas of OT.
And for any wffs 0 and ip of OT,
^0
Ocf>
0
0 & \p
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<t> v i
p
<l>
D ip
and
cf)
= ip
will be wffs of OT ThiQ ^ o• s is a very rich language, for
it allows mixed formulas, that is, formulas containing
deontic and/or modal components as well as non-deontic,
non-modal components (for example Dip s .Op)
, and
iterated modal formulas (such as DOp)
. (Contrast SDL,
see Appendix I.) This is just as we wish, of course,
for P * 0q, equivalently Q (p = Oq)
,
win certainly be a
well formed formula of OT.
It seems reasonable that the axioms of OT should at
the very least include all the axioms of T and SDL. Thus
we might propose
(0T1) Dp 3 p
(0T2) D(p d q) d (Qp 3 Qg)
(0T3) Op 3 ^O^p
(0T4) 0(p 3 q) & Op 3 Oq.
Then in addition to the rules of PC and a rule of replace-
ment (0T5) according to which the result of uniformly
replacing any variable in any formula provable in OT by
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any wff of OT is itself provable in OT, we shall have
(0T6) If a formula f
OT, then Of is
is provable in
provable in OT,
and
0T7>
OT ^
ls Provable in, then <#> is provable in OT.
But even given this minimal description of the
formal system OT, in which 0 functions as a deontic
operator, we find that whether or not OT is objection-
able on other grounds.
(36) Op d (p =* oq)
and
(37) (p => Oq) 3 (p&r=^Oq)
will still be derivable in OT by applications of (0T5)
,
(0T6)
,
(0T7 ) , and (0T2)
.
P ^ Oq is unsuitable even when
analysed as a formula of the augmented language OT.
Furthermore, regardless of the formal system within
which we analyse the formula p ^ Oq, it appears that we
shall not be able to use p ^ Oq to symbolize conditional
obligation statements with factual conditions. For it
would seem that a factual condition cannot entail a
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normative statement. And if p expresses a non. nQrmative
state of affairs and oq expresses an obligation that g
^ ^ di“iCUlt t0 former could^imply the latter. Sure ly we would not wish
example, that it is a necessary truth that when a promise
is made then there is an obligation to keep the promise,
for it is possible to make a promise that ought not to
have been made, such as a promise to murder, or to make a
promise and be released from that promise, and so on. m
such cases the obligation to keep the promise will not
follow. And thus the symbolization p * 0g, which asserts
a necessary connection between a condition and the re-
sulting obligation is too strong an expression for what
seem to be paradigm cases of conditional obligation
statements.
If, on the other hand, we consider
(38) 0 (p =}, q)
as our formalization for conditional obligation, where p
symbolizes the condition and g symbolizes whatever is con-
ditionally obligatory, it is difficult to understand what
any conditional obligation sentence expresses. Apparently
(38) says that what is obligatory is that p entail q.
But suppose, for example, that I have a conditional obli-
gation to call my sister given that I have promised to
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call her. Then Khy should it ^ Qbiigatory
relationship between my promising and my ^ g
necessary one ? What is obliga tory is that I call my
sister once I have promised to, not that there be a
necessary conditional connection wbetween my promising anddoing so. it seems that (38) fails' r to capture the mean-
ing of the conditional obligation sentence.
Furthermore, if „e appeal again to the system OT
within which
,38, is a well formed expression and 0
functions as a deontic operator, it is clear that
(39) 0(p =* q) d 0(p & r =* q)
is provable. 6 Thus (38) can only symbolise sentences
for which augmented conditions do not override conditional
obligations
.
I have argued that neither p =* 0q nor o(p
=* q)
alone can be adequate as a symbolization for all the con-
ditional obligation sentences we wish to expresss. Yet
one might argue that sentences expressing conditional
obligations are ambiguous and that if we used both p =,> Oq
and 0(p =»q) we might be able to provide adequate formal-
izations for the sentences in question. It is unquestion-
able that sentences of English which we use to make state-
ments of conditional obligation are ambiguous. For
example, both the second and third sentences in Chisholm's
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puzzle (see Introduction, p.xii) appear to indicate ^ditional Obligations and yet the scope of the deontic
operator in each one is different. And it isa a an open
question whether or not an adequate symbolization of them
should reflect that difference or not. m other words,
difficult to determine whether different formali-
sations are appropriate for the two sentences or whether
the scope difference in the English sentences can be
ignored and the same symbolization used for both. if
different conditional obligation sentences are indeed
most appropriately expressed by different formalizations,
then any differences in the scope of the deontic operator
in the English sentences might be a guide for determining
which symbolization is suitable for a particular English
sentence. But it is only a guide. There may be other
features of the English sentences which would help deter-
mine the appropriate symbolization. And to single out
all such features would be a nearly impossible task and
beyond the scope of this dissertation. However if we
admit that we may need more than one formula to express
adequately the conditional obligation sentences we wish
to formalize, then we must investigate whether or not
P ^ Oq and 0(p ^ q) together could be sufficient for our
task
.
Even without providing criteria for determining which
sentences could be adequately expressed by which formulas.
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xt seems clear that p * Og and 0(p * g) alone wiu ^
stiff ice. Neither proposal allows expression of those
conditional obligations which may no longer hold given
an augmented condition. furthermore, strict implication
13 t0° Str°ng 3 C°nneCtiVe ** °ur purposes. Any con-
ditional obligation sentence in the form of p e> 0q indi-
cates that there is a necessary connection between the
condition and the obligation conditional upon that con-
dition. And any sentence in the form of 0(p* q , indi _
cates an entailment that is obligatory. And yet in the
most common, paradigm, examples of conditional obligation
sentences there is neither relationship. Sure ly there
is no logical entailment between borrowing money and re-
paying it which makes the latter obligatory given the
former. Nor is it obligatory that the relationship be-
tween borrowing and repaying be a necessary one. And
thus a contingent conditional obligation to repay borrowed
money, and others like it, can not be formalized by means
of P40q or 0(p*q). The sentences for which these
formulas may be appropriate do not include the most in-
teresting ones which may or may not be true depending on
the circumstances.
Perhaps a more plausible connective to consider using
in formalizing conditional obligation statements is the
subjunctive conditional represented by >. Robert Stalnaker,
m "A Theory of Conditionals" in Studies in Logical Theory.
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pP . 98 _U2f first
proposed and defended a theory of conditionals which pro-
vrded a formal system and semantical apparatus for state-
ments rnvolving his conditional connective. 7 The basic
conditional expression he considers, p > q is a co .
factual statement read "if p were the case thgn q^
be the case". Lennart Aqvist has suggested (in "A Note
Commitment
, Philosophical Studies 14 (1963), p. 24 )
that an adequate notion of commitment may be designated
by Pig, where we let "pig denote some relation of impli-
cation that is stricter than material implication but
weaker than strict implication." stalnaker
' s subjunc-
tive conditional satisfies this condition. Thus let us
next consider using this connective and the semantics
Stalnaker provides for it.
We might first evaluate the acceptability of
(40) p > Oq
as an expression for conditional obligation statements.
If we again treat Oq as an "unbroken",
"unanalysable"
statement variable which serves as a formalization for
sentences of the form "q is obligatory", then we might
analyse (40) as a formula well formed in Stalnaker 's
system and read it as "if p were the case then it would
be the case that q is obligatory". This proposed analysis
is attractive for several reasons.
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First, although vp
= (p = r) holds, (p = r) =
,
>does not in Stalnaker ' s The converse of (S9)
(see note 7) is invalid u. Hence we shall not be able to
prove %n d ( r, > y.\ jand so m particular we will not have
(41) tp
= (p > 0q) _
Thus we can avoid the paradoxical conclusion that whatever
- not the case yields a conditional obligation to anything.
Second, since P > q => ( <p s r) > q) is an invaUd
formula in Stalnaker's system wp \ji-\-\bc , e w ll not be able to
prove
(42) (p > Oq) d ( (p & r) > 0q)>
The counterfactual conditional connective apparently pro-
vides a symbolization according to which conditional obli-
gations may change as conditions vary.
Third, although the negation of p = Oq does not cap-
ture the negation of the conditional obligation sentence
"if P then it ought to be that q", the negation of p > 0g
does seem to be a fair translation of the negation of "if
P then it ought to be that q"
. For any reasonable nega-
tion of a conditional obligation sentence must assert
that the obligation no longer holds under the given condi-
tion. Yet if conditional obligation statements are
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symbolized by means of p = 0q thgn ^ ^ ^
sentence statin, your conditional oblivion to call your
mother if she is ill is merely an assertion that your
mother is ill and you are not obligated to call her
Whereas given P > Og as the symbolization tor the sentence
the negation becomes the much more plausible "if yoUr
mother were ill then you would nQt be ^^
her"
.
Fourth, If p > Oq, understood as a formula in stal-
naker's language, serves as our formalization for con-
ditional obligation statements then we may have a way of
formulating Chisholm's four sentences consistently and
independently. if we understand both sentence ( 2 ) and
sentence (3) as expressing conditional obligations, then
we may write
(la) Og
(2d) g > ot
(3d) ^g > 0(%t)
(4a) ^g.
As we have seen above (cf. (41)), (4a) does not imply
(2d). And (la) does not imply (3d). Neither the obli-
gation to go nor the agent's failure to go implies that
he would have any obligation whatsoever if he were to go
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or not to go. This formalization of the puzzle appar .
ently yields four independent sentences.
Moreover, by (S9) (see footnote 6 ), (2) implies
(43) g 3 ot
and (3d) implies
(44) %g 3 O('vt)
And although (4a) and (44) yield O(vt) by modus ponens,
we can not derive Oft) from (la) and (43). Thus „e can
avoid a derivation of the inconsistent obligation state
ments which was possible given the formalisation of
Chisholm's sentences using 0 (p = q) and p = Oq.
Although P > Oq is thus a very plausible candidate
for our project, it still appears to fall short of our
expectations. First, using the subjunctive conditional
connective we have given a symbolization of Chisholm's
puzzle as four consistent and independent sentences.
Nevertheless our symbolization is somewhat unsettling.
For as was pointed out, ^g > 0(it) implies ^g 13 0(vt)
Thus from (3d) and (4a) we can derive 0(vt). And this
may be objectionable. For the man’s obligation was to go
to help his neighbors. And given fulfillment of this
obligation he has an obligation to tell them he is coming
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Thus it seems odd that we can deri,^ve an absolute obli-
gation for him not to tell fhom ul t e he is coming. it i s
especially odd if we recognize that we may derive o(-vt)
only When (4a) holds. And yet once (4a) holds, it is no
longer possible to discharge the obligation to tell in the
sense intended in Chisholm's example. For telling or not
telling presumably is to take place before going or not
going. Thus given the proposed symbolization we may de-
rive an absolute obligation not to tell when it is no
longer possible to fulfill the obligation in any mean-
ingful way.
Second, although
(45) %n r> (P > Oq)
is not provable in Stalnaker's system, still D„p , or
equivalently
„«p, will be a sufficient condition to imply
P > Oq. That is, any impossible condition will imply a
conditional obligation to anything. As mentioned above,
it is difficult to have settled intuitions about whether
impossible conditions can generate any obligations at all.
Since one type of impossible condition, a self contradic-
tory one, implies any consequent it may seem reasonable
to allow impossible conditions to imply any conditional
obligation. My own tentative intuition is that it would
be preferable to have no conditional obligations follow
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from impossible conditions. However, „e
certain changes in the formal system and
the subjunctive conditional to block the
might stipulate
semantics for
conclusion that
(46) Ckp ^ (p > 0q)
.
And so I do not feel the validity of ,46, in Stacker's
system should be viewed as a reason to abandon the ap-
proach we are considering.
third oddity which arises when using p > Oq as
our formalization for conditional obligation statements
is that
(47) (p & q) o (p > g )
is provable in Stalnaker’s formal system. 9 Thus in par-
ticular if condition P holds and Oq is true then p > 0q
follows. Any condition that is true yields a conditional
obligation to any absolute obligation that holds. If Oq
is true for any state of affairs q, then any fact makes
it conditionally obligatory. Given that q is absolutely
obligatory it may not seem objectionable to find that q
is conditionally obligatory given any true condition.
But it is at least odd. For then we have not captured
any special relationship between the condition and the
conditional obligation in such cases. And in general it
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m that there is some rather unique relationship,
Whxch we have seen can not be material or strict implica.
txon, that holds between conditions ana the oblations
generated by them.
tion
A much more serious di
P > Oq is evident when
fficulty with the symboliza-
we examine
(48) ( (p > q) & vq) d
This formula is also aerivable in Stalnaker's
Thus we shall be able to prove
system.
(4 9) ( (p > Qq) & 'vOq) => 'vp.
Ana if p > 0q is to express conditional obligation state-
ments then ,49) tells us for example that if an agent has
a conditional obligation to repent if he sins and has no
absolute obligation to repent then it follows that he does
not sin. This is clearly untenable. Surely the antece-
dent may be true and the consequent false. We must be
able to express all of the following in some consistent
manner: that a state of affairs q is not absolutely oblig-
atory, but that q is conditionally obligatory given con-
dition p and that p is true. However no such situation
can be expressed consistently if p > Oq is our formaliza-
tion for conditional obligation within Stalnaker's system.
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We might believe, however th^i «
-
„ n
'
at OUr attemPt to analyse
P Oq as a formula of ialnaker s system was misguided.
Perhaps that analysis obscured impor tant features of
obligation and we would be more successful if we considered
P > Og as a formalization within which 0 functions as adeontic operator.
unfortunately, however, although we have an axiomatic
system governing > and an axiomatic system for 0 when ap-
plied to material conditional statements, no formal system
has been developed which combines the connective > and the
deontic operator 0. There x-ra +-kare thus no straightforward
syntactic methods available for determining whether cer-
tain formulas involving both > and 0, and analogous to
the paradoxical formulas of SDL extended to include
mixed formulas, are true or false.
However, in order to evaluate the adequacy of p > 0q,
we might attempt to develop an extension of SDL which
would provide the syntactic apparatus we are lacking. To
begin, we might supplement the basis logic, BL, of SDL by
incorporating the connective > in the language of BL, ap-
propriate rules for forming well formed formulas, includ-
ing mixed formulas, involving >, and Stalnaker's axioms
governing >. Given the latter, certain other symbols
will have to be incorporated in the language. 10 Thus we
lght simply take as our augmented basis logic Stalnaker’s
logic for the connective >. in Stalnaker's system
m
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validity can be defined in +-h Q
„.
thS USUal “d he has shownhis system to be complete in the sense theeat every validformula is a theorem. Hence ift seems satisfactory as an
augmented basis loaic <
• (Compare Hansson's description ofBL, see Appendix I.)
We might form an augmented deontic logic, call it 0Sfrom s analogously to the formation of SDL from BL, by
adding the deontic operator o to the language of s, and
adding „ffs of the form Of where f is a formula of s.
The axioms, in addition to those of s, win be the axioms
We shall have a rule of replacement allowing
uniform substitution of wffe of os for variables in formu-
las provable in OS to yield formulas provable in OS, and
a rule according to which if a formula f is provable in S,
then Of is provable in OS. clearly p > 0g will be a well
formed formula of OS
.
Unfortunately, even given our new formal system OS,
in which 0 functions on its own as a deontic operator,
P > Oq can not be adequate for expressing all sentences
of conditional obligation. For as long as we maintain
Stalnaker
' s axioms for the subjunctive conditional, now
applicable to formulas including the deontic operator 0
by the replacement rule, we must still accept
(49) ( (p > Oq) & %0q) d o,p.
^
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indeed, as long as we maintain that a version of (s9)
holds, namely that
(50) (p > 0q) = ( p = 0q) (
and it seems we must, it does not appear that we can avoid
the provability of ( 49 ) Hence we are again left with the
unwelcome result that if p > Oq is to serve as a symboli-
zation for conditional obligation, then we cannot formalize
case m which q is not absolutely obligatory, but is
conditionally obligatory given condition p and that p is
true. And surely such cases are common in normative ethics
and are the basis for a major portion of the conditional
obligation sentences we wish to formalize. I may now have
no absolute obligation to take a book to the library, but
it may be that if I do borrow a book from the library then
I am conditionally obligated to take back the book. it
is consistent with thp^p 4- k -a j- t a ^ i_rnese that I do borrow a book from the
library. Yet using p > Oq we can not symbolize these
1 7
sentences
.
We have noted that the subjunctive conditional is
midway in strength between strict implication and material
implication, that is,
(51) (P =^> q) => (p > q) d ( p 3 q )
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,n
om
merited system OS.) 13 And it •
np„. .
13 thS °nly conditional con-ective we have considered thus rUS far whlch blocks certainferences we wish to avoid ^. aven the unacceptability
P > Oq, then, it is natural to consider
(52 0 (p > q)
as a formal expression for conditional oblication.
^ °rder ^ analySS °<» > 0) we need to view it as a
well formed formula of a formalr language allowing ex-
pressions involving bof h fh Q , .t the subjunctive conditional > and
the deontic operator 0. it is natural to refer again to
the system OS described above. We might also want to
choose additional plausible looking axioms combining >
and 0. For example, we might want to add as an axiom
(53) 0(p > q) = (Op > Oq) 14
If 0(p > q) serves as our expression for conditional
obligation, then according to (53), a conditional obli-
gation for q given p implies that if p were absolutely
obligatory then q would be absolutely obligatory. Thus,
for example, a conditional obligation to keep a promise
given that it is made implies that if it were obligatory
to make the promise then it would be obligatory to keep it.
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This in turn implies that if it h= „t,is obligatory to make thePromise then it is obligatory to keep it. If it is not0 19at°ry tD thS this entire materialimplication is true hn-t- 1- 1-, = +. ^that does not seem objectionable
in a contrary-to-duty case, (53, says that a con-
ditional obligation to repent diver, = •g ven a sin, which we would
represent by 0(s > r,
, imp i ies 0s > 0r
, ^ ^ if
were obligatory to sin then it would be obligatory to
repent. And given Os , Or, it will follow that Os = Or
an obligation to sin materially implies an obligation to
repent. The falsity of the antecedent forces the truth
of OS 3 Or, but since Os 3 Or has no implication in terms
of conditional obligation „
,
its vacuous truth when it has
a false antecedent seems unproblematic.
It is thus at least plausible to add (53) to OS.
Furthermore, its addition is advantageous if o(p > q)
is to be our symbolization for conditional obligation
since it provides a straightforward rule for detachment
of unconditional obligations from conditional ones. For
whenever q is conditionally obligatory given p and p
itself is obligatory then we may detach an absolute obli-
gation for q. That is,
(54) 0 (p > q)
Op
Oq
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will be a valid inference since ofn , .
, .
°(P > q) will imply 0p > 0qand this m turn yields Op = 0q An anni •- application of modus
ponens then justifies the conclusion. we may want to de-tach Oq even
-ore often than (54, allows, but (54, pro-
vides at least a minimal detactaent rule which could be
supplemented.
Given the formal system OS it is appropriate to con-
sider certain formulas analogous to those which caused
difficulty for the symbolization 0 (p = q) . In particular,
if 0 (p > q) is our symbolization for conditional obligation
we hope
(55) 0(^ p ) 0 (p > q)
is not derivable, since we do not want the forbidden to
conditionally obligate one to anything. Given the axio-
matic system as presented above we find that 0(ip) implies
nothing whatsoever about the truth of 0( P > q) . Although
OKp> does imply 0 (p = q), as we have seen, there is no
implication from 0(p = q, to 0( P > q) . An assumption of
the negation of (55) does not lead to an inconsistency.
When we consider
(56) 0 (p > q) d 0( (p & r) > q)
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we find that the obligatoriness of p > „ imDliP q p es nothing
whatsoever about the obligatoriness of (p & r) > q
Furthermore, when we use o,p > q) to symboli^
Chisholm's four sentencest , we can produce in many „ays
satisfactory formalization proposed thus far for
that puzzle. Let us again suppose that both sentences
,
2
,
and
,3, express conditional obligations. Then we may have
(la) Og
(2e) 0 ( g > t)
( 3e) 0 (%g > %t
)
(4a) ^g.
As pointed out above, (la) does not imply (3e)
. And it
seems clear that (4a) does not imply (2e) . ig is not a
sufficient condition to yield the modalized counterfactual
conditional in (2e)
. This is as we wish since the fact
that he does not go does not imply a conditional obliga-
tion to tell or not tell given that he does go. Thus we
apparently have a symbolization of four independent sen-
tences. Also (2e) implies Og > ot by (53) and this im-
plies Og = ot. Similarly, (3e) implies O(ig) > 0 (vt)
and this yields O(-ig) = O(vt). Thus from (la) and (2e)
we may derive 0(t) but we can not derive 0(^t) from (3e)
and (4a)
,
and hence we do not have the inconsistency
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pointed out by Chisholm. Moreover that
n .. .
°V
' we can derive
but not OK-M ^
PP°Sed to bein9 able to derive
bUt n0t ° (t> fr°ra symbolization on page 49
,seems quite correct. por it is riaht- 4-ght to say that his
obligation is to go to his neighbors’ assistsyuu° ance, and to
is coming. He has no absolute obligation
tell them he is coming, however, although he ought
not to tell given that he does not go.
It appears, then, that the formula 0(p > q) provides
expressing sentences of conditional obligation
which is immune to the difficulties which arose for any
of the other symbolizations we have considered. Encour-
aged as we are by these findings, it is difficult to be
completely satisfied at this point with 0 (p > q , . We
may wonder what English sentence provides an acceptable
translation of expressions in the form 0 (p > q ) . Are
we to read 0( P > q) as asserting that g
factual conditional is obligatory? And if so, what does
that mean? Moreover, how are we to determine the truth
value of substitution instances of 0 (p > q , ? The syn _
tactic apparatus provided by OS may show that certain in-
ferences will not follow from the formula 0(p > q ) . But
it does not help us determine whether or not those English
sentences which we believe express true conditional obli-
gations will be true when symbolized in the form 0(p > q) .
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in order to confi™ our conclusion about p , Qq
0<P " q) ' and P > P-vide a more comp lete evalua-
tlCn ° f ° (P > q) by diS
— to these questions,
we
—t seek se.antic analyses tor these for.al egressions.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II
TetZTf TtriTlzn—
^
10 (1959K
g
pp.°2
f
3:“^e^; Philoso^S
n
sSdies
PCq' which is read "p comi?f . 9t We defi^obligatory given p" a s us to q" or "q is
cates strict implication Howp^6^116 arrow indi-lndicating his- debt to Krinke ? he adds a noteif the underlying alethic modal
°
r P°lntln9 out that
enough (S5) then his proposa /f f 13 StrongHit. p. 26.) The process? < 12 . inadequate. ( 0p.
Lennart Aqvist (in
P
"A
P
Note on £
ritlclzed carefully by
iHHi Studies 14 (1963) pn 2 2^°™
ltm®nt", Philosoph-
proposal for conditional permission
3
??
hls
.
an® log°us
Nicholas Rescher's
"Conditional £ criticized inLogic", Philosophical Studies 13 n«?f10n in DeonticAnderson abandoned his-5FI5I£a i pioposll. PP ' 1-6 '
ysis for
e
co^ftoent
G
or
H
cond?tTo
i9f™ Sed an anal-
"Deontic Logic and the Then S® 1 obli?ation in
Deontic Logic: ?„trll“ry °! Editions" , ( in
Hilpinnen, ed.). hA ' AY Systematic Readinqs,
as follows: defines a neiT3i5HH5-0pi?Ho?-g
Q( p/q) = df Sc(p, Oq) s I0(p » q)
,
2^ tha(qp," S ,^?d^ ^“gPand ^case that q,
Sc(p, Oq)
= df Q( p 3 0q) s, 0p s Oip.
Hence his proposal can be expressed as
Q (p/q ) = df D(p = Oq) & «p & <Kp s iD(p 3 q)
o^ig of cond“
the ^5?^y oT^
of a?l l ° conditional obligation in terms
^
. .
lethic modal logic and deontic loaic. In what
our concept^ ?he
futili^ ° f such approaches for
each of Anderson 'q
lplclsms 1 develop below show thatfc^acn r s and von Wright's proposals areultimately unsatisfactory for our purposes?
suaaest?
e
^h?e
and0ring hiS original Proposal Andersongg s t at p -> Oq may be adequate as a symbolizationfor commitment if the arrow is interpreted
63
64
2
.
3.
4.
5.
m the sense of his system P ,op. cit., p. 6
.) m that ( Reply to Rescher"problem posed by vacuous truth^/i^^ aV° id thewith a false antecedent Hm tde cond itionalto prove . owever we are still able
(p "* °q) 3 (p & r 0q) .
for our concept of conditional obligation?
deqUate
f^rsfleveLpea^y^^r
r
<SOmetimes called M)
,
propositional calculus
"(PC^
W1Sf
rh
1S
i
^ullt from the
the language of pc fnrr^-t-p * •
T
u
S l anguage of t is
"it is necessarily thfcase that"'^^01 readare the axioms of pc as wpH a ^ The axioms of t
modal axioms which can be stated ^ 5°
llowin9 two
ment variables p and q,
m terms of state-
(Tl)
.Dp 3 p
aad (T2) 0(p P q) o (Qp , ,0q)
,
a replacement rule. (T 3 ^ ,
tion according to which 'fo/anv^
16
°f
necess ita-j axen, tor a y formula * of T
(T4) lf
*7 4> then
^ p<j)
.
The stronger modal svstemc: o c/i ^ _
_
by adding additional axioms io T.'
f°rmed
“J s' rrssrLs-v p IP 3 r) ) is a theorem of T bv mt,„%P s (P 3 r) follows by (T2) and (T3). * n
By applications of (T3)
,
(T4)
,
and (T2)
.
s.
h
s*s.“ J”’-s‘p"s r„‘„ '-.s'?;.*: ?»t
s;r”r,vr\' “s «* »'= %,UT/ and so @(vp) a Q(p 3 0q) by (0T2) and (0T5)
.
the axiomi
3
of
'
pc
P 3 ( (p & r) 3 0cf) follows from
n ? ,
P
,
C
' (0T6)
' and (0T5), and so
n n
3
n
P & r) 13 °g }) bY (0T7). Hence0(p 3 Oq) a D((p & r) o Oq) by (0T2) and (0T5)
.
65
10 .
11 .
12 .
(55)
(56)
(57
)
( S 8
(S9)
(S10)
ll(p3q)on(f n c v.» . .
follows from the rules of pp
P
^
V
?
ble in 0T since it
<OT5). Thus by (o^and (OT5 ° >',n!°T2> and
and (OT5) we 'have 0™=
q)
“ S° by (0T4 >
equivalently, 0( P=;>q)
(P
= 0f,p
&
3 ™
connective^ if- ^ hiS -^itlonal
(51) 'Qp =V “ > Sta“t variables,
(52) <*p = df
P P
P => q - (Qp 3 Oq)
H(P = q) a (p > g)
°P => (P > q) p Mp > %q)
P > (q v r) 3 ( p > q) v ( p > r)(p > q) => ( P a q)
where and <> are thi^ecessitv^
V
}
'
°Pera
(^?; ™e in£ere“ce rules are
P°Sslbllity
'
*
=> J- ) modus ponsns
note U)
2> the rUle ° f necessitate. (See (T4)
,
of subjunctive
"^condition a ?
Vi
^
G<^ a Similar a^lysis
Harvard Uni^rsufP^f^^.^erfact^,
Thus^we^hive^n^p
1
! tp
aXi
?? £°
r any r by (s4 > •
tpTr^ Hr HTiifr tfnTe
cessi -
for any r.
(
^>
(
r)
> ^
^e?neaM Mp " q, qby nts9) Pandqh' ™^and (p & wq >, wh l Ph i > possible enCS <P & q)
E.q.
, Cl, <>, cf. (S5), (S6), in note 6, for example.
(49) follows from (S4)
, (S9) and the replacement rule.
p
t
=>
1
Oa
n°W
Roih
ar that w® meet the same difficulty with
? / t P > Oq and p => Oq imply p 3 Oq. Thuseither serves as our symbolization for conditional
66
13.
14.
obligation then we must- *.detachment rule, since trSth^Z general factual
°f Oq. And as Greenspan J P
lm
?lies truth(see Chapter I, pp 9 _ 10) «, P
er suasively argued,
tachment of too manv nn^ ^ 3 rule aHows de-
David Lewis makes the same*
°bligations
-
expianation, on page 102^^^
ee p. 44, note 6, (S6) and (S9)
This has been
of Commitment"
PP- 17-37.
suggested by Hans Lenk
'
I teory and Decision 9
in "Varieties
(1978)
,
C H A P T E R III
standard deontic logic discussed tbus ^ ^or without temporal restr-io+--Ctl°ns
' and the sterns within
“ we analysed alternative conditional obligation
33 USlng StriCt lmplication or a subjunctive con-ditional, have all been presented **
.
P as axiomatic systems.
is noteworthy that for several years deontic logic
was viewed purely syntactically. The adequacy of an
axiomatic system was tested by deriving theorems from a
set of axioms, translating those theorems into sentences
°f English and judging the intuitive plausibility of
those sentences. The difficulties of thi=t s approach are
now well known. choice of a set of axioms is often
achieved merely by trial and error. Moreover, transla-
txons of formulas into English often involve ambiguous
expressions such as •'implies",
"requires", and "commits"
which make it difficult to understand the English sen-
tences and thus to determine how intuitively acceptable
their formal counterparts are as principles of deontic
logic.
For these reasons the adaptation of the semantics
for alethic modal logic provided by Kripke to deontic
logic has been a welcome advance. Model theory provides
systematic way of interpreting deontic formulas and
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jUd9in9 thSir
“^abUity based on their assigned
meanings.
in Chapter II we found that p * Oq, o(p „ q) , and
p
;.
oq were unsati
—^ formali2ations for condltional
igation and that 0(p > q ) appeared to be more accept-
able when analysed in the syntactic system OS. However
at is difficult and perhaps impossible to evaluate the
alize 0 (p > q), without any semantic apparatus. Por many
complex formulas of OS, such as substitution instances
of the proposed axioms, it is difficult to find a mean-
ingful and understandable translation into English with
which to evaluate their acceptability as axioms in an
augmented deontic loaic Anrig * d without any semantic ap-
paratus we have no systematic way of comparing alterna-
tive axiomatic bases. Furthermore, to determine the
truth value of instances of 0(p > q, we need a semantic
interpretation of that formula. Thus it is essential
that we provide semantic analyses for the formalizations
we are considering to confirm the unacceptability of
P Oq, 0 (p =i> q) , and p > oq, and to complete our evalu-
ation of 0 (p > q) .
Jaakko Hintikka was one of the first of several modal
logicians to present semantical theories for deontic
logic. Moreover, in "Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic",
he addresses in particular what he calls the problem
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by the notion of commitment. That is, he asks
what can be meant by saying that a certaln ^ ^
P commits one to acting in a certain way, q . 1
The phrase
"conditional obligation" has often been
used to refer to any obligation arising from any state
of affarrs, whether that state of affairs is an act or
-t. And the term "cogent" usually refers in par-
ticular to those conditional obligations which an agent
incurs based on his nr-or her own actions. clearly. Hintikka
make use of this conventional distinction,
indeed, his description of what he calls the problem of
the notion of comment indicates that his focus is what
we would call the problem of conditional obligation.
Hintikka suggests that his model theoretical interpreta-
tion of deontic logic shows that the traditional formal-
izations in deontic logic can be used to express at least
some commitments or conditional obligations without being
paradoxical. I shall argue to the contrary that 0(p 3 q )
and p 3 0q are inappropriate for expressing conditional
obligation or commitment sentences even when interpreted
with Hintikka 's semantics. However I go on to appeal to
his semantic interpretation to complete the evaluation
° f P * °q ' 0(P
- 1), p > Oq, and 0 (p > q) as symboli-
zations for conditional obligation sentences.
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FOr Hintikka
' State™ —t what is obligatory orpermitted are taken to be statements not about what people
actually do or fail
.
.
' Ut 3bOUt what they do and should
- a possible would where an oblivions are fulfilled.
These expressions are thus oounterfactual and contain an
implicit reference to alternative worlds. The basic notionin Hintikka semantics for deontic logic, then, is the
notion of a deontic alternative to a given world, a kind
of "deontically perfect world". A deontically perfect
alternative to a world, the actual world, for example, is
defined by Hintikka as a world in which all obligations
nmg in the actual world, as well as any further ob-
ligations obtaining in the deontic alternatives, are ful-
filled. Moreover, according to Hintikka, whatever is per-
missible in the real world obtains in a deontic alternative.
Since not all permissions in the real world can be made
use of in the same world, (as when p and not-p are both
permissible in the actual world), we must consider more
than one deontic alternative to a given world. In particu-
lar, if w
2
is a deontic alternative to Hintikka pro-
poses the following conditions:
(i) If Op is true at w
x
then p is true at w
2 ,
(ii) If Op is true at w then p is true at w
,2
dii) If Op is true at Wl then Op is true at w
2
-
We may focus on (ii) and (iii) since taken together they
imply (i)
.
Furthermore, according to Hintikka,
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(iv) (pp i s true at w =
alternative to w 1 and n 1L Ifi 1S a de°ntici a p is true at w.
)
and (V ) op is true at w 3 (3 W \ ( •
1
alternative to
^ and & ii ^ at
Hintikka' s description of deontio alternates asdeontically perfect worlds is a or- mproblematic one and we
shall return to discus +- 4uj- us it m more detailu r i. However if we
suppose for the prespn-t-esent that we can understand and use the
notron of a deontically perfect alternative to a world, we^ SXamine Hintikka ' S ttat a world theoretic inter-
pretatxon provides a firm foundation for traditional sym-
bolizations for conditional obligation.
Hintikka makes a distinction between logical conse-
quence and deontic consequence.
„ is a • nq logical consequence
t'f P just in case p s q holds ,n i , that is, just in case p and
-q are not both true, whereas q is a deontic onM a consequence
Of P just in case 0(p =, q, holds, that is, just in case
P and vq are not both true in any deontically perfect al-
ternative. Given this distinction, it is clear that the
two candidates in standard deontic logic (extended to in-
clude mixed formulas) for formulating commitments or con-
tional obligations,
( 57 ) o (p d q)
and (58) p s Oq
are not equivalent.
Rather than focusing on one of these, Hintikka be-
lieves it is an inescapable conclusion that " our commonplace
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notion of commitment is intrinsic!!cally ambiguous between
renderings" 2 and possibly still others. Thus he
maintains that sene sentences expressing counts and
conditional obligations may be formalized uslng Q(p
_
while others are best symbolized by p = 0q . He believes
semantic interDrpf^f i nn uP etat o shows the paradoxes of
derived obligation to be "but particular cases of the
Paradoxes of implication, and hence devoid of special
interest for a student of deontic logic." 3
According to Hintikka,
(59) 0(%p) ? 0 ( p 3 q)
and (60) Op d 0(q => p)
are indeed valid, however,
ss s“ecr
.
worlds
, the appearance of a paradox icconsiderably dimished. in [59] it is tniP +-osay that P cannot be realized i^ a deontlcluvperfect world without realizing q because p cannot be so realized simpliciter? m ?601 acannot be realized in a deontically perfect worldwithout realizing p, for p has to be realized inany such perfect world in the first place ThCsthe paradoxes' lose their sting against our in-
preSse^!? * q > 1 ' prOTid
"
d realise ^hat
nal fill?
<
E
ont
f
lns * At worst we have a resid-u i eeimg of awkwardness which can be tracedto the same sources as the usual 'paradoxes' ofentailment (implication). 4
*u r
Similarly,
(61) ^p g, (p ^ oq)
is valid in Hintikka 's system. Yet he claims that "what
creates the appearance of paradox here is not so much the
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*,r“9“
...
_ th„
,
material implication ..5 » -'" M whatever the motivation
or desiring a stronger connective, pragmatic or other-
wise, Hintikka nevertheless claims that there are manydeontic notions for which n ^ np Oq, With material implica-
tion, serves well.
The world theory interpretations Hintikka gives for
(57) and (58) do provide one way of understanding those
formulas
, as well as (59), ,60, and (61), to be non-
paradoxical. However the interprotatinn *ui-erpretat o does not tie
those formulas to any concent- of „ ,
.
cept conditional obligation
or commitment, And if (57) and ,53) are to serve as
symbolizations for commitment, then it seems guite clear
that Hintikka can not deny that by ,59, a forbidden act
commits one to everything, by (60) evervfhty yt ing commits one
to an obligatory act, and by (61) the realization of
whatever is not in fact realized commits one to everything.
And these are the paradoxes Hintikka claims his interpre-
tation avoids. Hintikka 's interpretation does show that
—
that interpretation the relevant formulas are unproble-
matic. Rut his interpretation alone does not justify
using those formulas for symbolizations of conditional
obligation or commitment. In fact, given his interpretation,
it is difficult to understand why ,57) and ,58) are even
likely candidates for symbolizations of commitment.
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Moreover, Hintikka 's semantic analysis does notb
;°
C
;
thS deriVati°n ° f fences we have discussed
mUSt be invalld «
- < 5 B, are to serve as
expressions of commitment. por if „ . . „
„ k
°
l p logically implies Oqhen P ‘ r l0giCally 0,. « P and .oq can notboth be true, then p s r and
.0q can not both be true.^ if q is a deontic consequence of p, then q is a
deontic consequence of P s r . That is
,
if p and ^ ^
not true in any deontically perfect world then p s r and
-q can not be true in any of those worlds. Thus on
Hlntikka view if either ( 57 ) or ( 58 ) is a symbolization
for commitment, then if p commits one to q, then P * r
commits one to q for any q. On his view changing con-
ditions do not give rise to changing commitments.
It is clear that Hintikka 's interpretation, though it
may be helpful in assessing the acceptability of deontic
statements, does not alone transform ( 57 ) and ( 58 ) into
satisfactory symbolizations for commitment. Hintikka him-
self notes in particular that if p is forbidden then in
such "unusual circumstances" ( 57 ) will not be useful for
the purpose at hand. For if p is forbidden „e can not
have any way of determining what p implies in a deontically
perfect world; since no transgressions occur in deontically
perfect worlds, p can not occur in such a world at all.
But surely it is not at all uncommon for agents to do the
forbidden in the actual world. And we have stressed that
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an adequate theory of normative ethics will a-n direct agentsto act m certain ways given th P ir 4.y 9 e transgressions. Thesedirections, or contrary-to-duty imperatives, are what we
Should like our deontic logic to be able to express.
Whatever other deontic notions (57) and (58) may express
adequately, they will not do for expressions of commit-
ment or conditional obligation, particularly contrary-to-
duty obligations, even when given Hintikka's model theo-
retie interpretation.
Although Hintikka's semantic analysis fails to trans-
form 0(p = q) and P = Oq into suitable formalizations
for the sentences we wish to symbolize, nevertheless it
may help us evaluate the other expressions we have con-
sidered. I think it can be used to confirm the conclu-
sions of Chapter II that p =* Og o (v n) a *t 4f ^ q) , and p > Oq can
not serve as the symbolizations we desire.
First, we noted that any conditional
tence in the form p => Oq would indicate a
obligation sen-
necessary con-
nection between the condition and the conditional obliga-
tion. And since it seems clear that factual conditions
can not entail normative statements, p ^ Oq is a poor
symbolization for conditional obligation sentences. if
we apply the Kripke semantics for alethic modal logic and
Hintikka's semantics for deontic formulas according to
which
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(62) op is true at w. = D ^ Q .deontic al ternaf i /J true at every
feet world P“-
“ the m°St natUral
- “» confirm these'results
For consider
(63) Oq o 00q
,
a formula in our system OT AnaY rn . d suppose we are evalu-
atmg this formula with respect to „
, the realr cn world
ThSn WS mi9ht haVe 0q —
-t V thus q true at ail
c alternatives to the real world, although Doq1S falSe 31 V F°r an valuation of Ooq presumably
requires determining the truth value of Oq at every
world which is an alternative to „
r
_ And even^thou^h q1S trUS 3t 311 dSOntlc alternatives to w
f , there is no
ce that q will be true at all deontic alternatives
w
to every alternative of the real world. Thus if ^
is an alternative to „
r
, then q may be true at all the
"
deontic alternatives of „
r
but false at some deontically
perfect world with respect to w
Since (63) will not hold, then even if 0g is true,
we will not always be able to affirm
(3 0) p Oq.
For (30) can be interpreted as saying that in all worlds
"i- if P is true at w. then Oq is true at w., that is, q
is true at all deontically perfect worlds with respect
to wr But as we have seen, even if Oq is true at the
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deontic alternatives to a given world^ ?
r
not foiiow that q h°ids «
-
—
alternatives
£*3* alternative where p holds. Thus if p ig ^
l
Wl and "
2 " Wl 15 ^ altSrnati
- where p is truehSn 5 ^ ^ ^
- - -
-ontie alternatives of wbut false at some deontically perform ^
1
Y P ect world with respect
to w
2
.
xample, it may be that in W;L Smith has received a
manuscript from lores and Writes lores promising to return
Xt
' ^ PreSUmably
-
“l ought to return it, and
so in deontically perfect worlds with respect to w
,
Smith sends the manuscript bach to Jones. It also'may be
that in w
2 . Smith, believing that he has been sent the
manuscript, writes to Jones promising to return it. How-
ever suppose that in w
2 Smith never did have the manuscript;
Jones still has the paper. Then there is no reason to
believe that Smith keeps his promise in the deontic alter-
natives to w
2 , and thus ought to return the manuscript in
w
2 , even though he has made the promise in Presumably
it is physically impossible for him to return the manu-
script in the deontic alternatives of w
2
* And although
Hintikka does not specify all the relevant details about
deontically perfect alternatives, it is plausible to as-
sume that in such worlds agents do not perform acts they
are physically unable to perform. But more generally, in
this case failure to keep the promise does not appear to
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be at all incompatible with deontic perfection. Hence
we can not conclude that Smith keeps the promise i„ allthe deontic alternatives of w 6
2 '
With respect to 0 (n -*» rr\(P * q) ' a semantic analysis using
the Kripke semantics for strict- • n .t ict implication and Hintikka's
eontic semantics in the most obvious way shows that
0(P ** q> iS true at the
-rid just in case p * q istrue at all the deontically perfect worlds with respectf w
r
. But P * q is true in some deontic alternative toV
-X Say ' ^st in case p . q is true in all the alterna-
tives to w
x
. if we assume we aj.e evaluat . ng the formula
in S
5
so that every world is an alternative to every other
world, and agree that deontic alternatives are possible
worlds, then 0(p * q , is true just in case p a q is true
every world, that is, just in case p => q holds. And
surely any symbolization for any type of obligation sen-
tence, conditional or otherwise, which implies Op 5 p is
unacceptable.
And finally, when we consider p > Oq as our formaliza-
tion we again confirm our conclusion that it is unaccep-
table. For when we interpret p > Oq using the basic
Hintikka-type semantics for the deontic operator o and
Stalnaker's semantics for the subjunctive conditional, we
find that there are many conditional obligation sentences
we believe to be true that we can not express formally as
true sentences. For applying Stalnaker's semantics first,
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to evaluate the truth value of p > 0q (assuming p ispossible)
, we must consider the woria ciQsest ^^
IT
1" t0 the aCtUal
’— *1 and
-true, ana if not, P > 0qisfalse
. In order to evalu-
ate the truth of Og at w, we must again appeal to the
assigning truth values to deontic formulas
according to which Op is true at a world just in case p
- true at every deontic alternative to that world. Then
Oq will be trnp t? , i
1' he world most similar to the
real world where p is trnp •P ue, just m case q is true at all
the deontic alternatives of w .
But we can see that, for example, „e can not express
a true conditional obligation for an agent to repent if
he sms. For if „e let s > or express Smith's conditional
obligation to repent if he sins, then this expression can
never be true. We must first consider the possible world
most similar to the actual world in which Smith sins, and
then determine whether or not Smith repents in all the
deontic alternatives to that closest world in which he sins.
When we do this we inescapably face some of the dif-
ficulties of the standard Hintikka-type deontic semantics.
We might wonder, for example, whether Smith will even
exist in the deontic alternatives to the real world. Ap-
parently on Hintikka's analysis if Smith has any obligations
at all then he will exist in deontic alternatives to see to
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their fulfillment. That is if n
fl„ . .
S
' l °P 13 true then p is ful _U6d ^ 911 the
alternatives. Hence i f ful .
t of P entails Smith's existence then Smith will
exrst in all the deontic alternatives. Nevertheless, we
might ask whether Smith exists inm those alternatives asthe same type of person as he is in1 l the actual world. if,in the real world, he is fhot e type of person who never
makes reparation for nacf .
.
P st injustices, will this be com-
patible with deontic idealitv"?Y- Suppose we imagine that
the deontic semantics are restricted (although present!,
they are not) m such a way that Smith exists in deontic
alternatives as much like himself as is consistent with
the deontic ideality of those worlds.
Then, given that on the deontic semantic analysis we
are utilising the deontic alternatives are "deontically
perfect worlds" with respect to the world where Smith sins,
it is clear that it is not true at all those worlds that
Smith repents. indeed. Smith does not sin or repent at
any of those deontically perfect worlds. Thus s > Or is
false in this example
.
7
And p > Oq will be false given Stalnaker's and Hin-
tikka's semantic interpretations whenever the conditional
obligation is incompatible with deontic ideality. Thus in
Chisholm's puzzle we may express an agent's conditional
obligation to tell his neighbors he is coming given that
he goes to their assistance, but we can not express his
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... go ,
“ ”““ ion* 1 °bu”““ •*«•...
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g 0 ( .t). Given the semantical interpretations
- o and > that we have been considerinq, that formula
ays be false. The agent does not fail to tell in^ rSleVant
— ives. And hence the symbol-ization we proposed on page „ presgnted
font sentences as formally consistent and independent, but
not all true when analyzed usinny g these semantic theories.
It has often been pointed out that a major difficulty
Wlth
semantics for the counterfactual con-
ditional is the problem of determining a similarity order-
ing of possible worlds in order to establish the closest
world in which the condition holds. However the problem
we have just discussed does not turn on the ambiguity of
the similarity relation. Rather, the basic deontic world
theory analysis, with its appeal to deontically perfect
alternatives, is at fault. We must conclude that p > 0q
is unsatisfactory as an expression for conditional obli-
gation statements if it is interpreted semantically as
above. And we have seen that given Stalnaker’s axiomatic
system for the subjunctive conditional it is formally
inadequate as well.
Given Hintikka's deontic interpretation we have been
able to reaffirm our view that p =* Oq, 0(p =* q) , and p > Oq
can not serve as acceptable formalizations for conditional
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obligations. However, 0 (n > ro(P q) 18 not susceptible to
similar formal difficulties. Nevertheless. semantic
Jiysis Coates that there are ob . ecUons ^
<p > q) as our formal expression as well.
First
, if we again apply the semanfi’ny n antic analysis pro-
Vided by Stalnaker for > and Hintikka's semantics for o,
lf P 1S trUS ln S°me World and q is also true in that
world, then the subjunctive conditional statement
_ p >is true in that world Thnc -p• us lf P and q are both true in
the deontic alternatives with respect to some given world,
then 0 (p > q) is true in that world. it appears, then,
that on this analysis too much will be conditionally
obligatory.
It might be replied that if
the deontic alternatives to some
nature of these alternatives, p
P and q are both true in
world, then given the
and q are both consistent
with deontic perfection and hence the truth of o(p > q )
for such states of affairs is unobjectionable. Neverthe-
less, it must be admitted that 0(p > q , win then express
true conditional obligation statements between unobjec-
tionable but also sometimes unrelated states of affairs.
A second and much more serious difficulty is that we
can find examples which show that given these semantic
analyses for > and 0, conditional obligation sentences
symbolized by 0(p > q) may turn out to be false when we
believe them to be true. For example, suppose s stands for
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Srnith sins" and fnr "cm-ij-u1U r ro Smith repents'' j_uents * °n the proposed
analysis we would symbolic Smith , s conditional
to repent if he sins by 0 ,s > r,
. To evaluate thfi^
value of 0(s > r) we must determine whether or not s > r
the counter factual conditional within the scope of the
deontic operator, holds at all the deontic alternatives
to the actual world. At this point the semantic analysis
gets more complicated. For according to an extended
version of Stalnaker's semantics for the subjunctive
conditional, s > r is true at some deontic alternative
to the real world, say, just in case the consequent r
IS true at the world most similar to Wl where the ante-
cedent s holds. Thus we must determine the truth of r at
worlds most similar to deontic alternatives of the real
world.
Let us again assume that Smith exists in the deontic
alternatives to the actual world as much like himself as
is consistent with the deontic ideality of those worlds.
Then clearly in the deontic alternatives to the actual
world he neither sins nor repents. Neither is compatible
with deontic perfection. But then what reason do we have
or could we have for believing that in those worlds most
similar to the deontic alternatives (of the real world)
m which he does sin that he repents? We might be tempted
to conclude that the worlds most similar to deontically
ideal alternatives in which he does sin are deontically
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m
perfect except for his sinning (and any other
—Yhi~'
6 bSSt W°rldS in Which ^ sins, and conclude thatthose worlds Smith does repent for his sins. However
that conclusion is clearly unjustified, for it is tanta-
m°Unt ^ “ aSSUmPti0n that similarity is measured with
respect to goodness, and of course such *an assumption can
not be made.
It seems just as reasonable to conclude that Smith
does not repent in the worlds most similar to the deon-
tically ideal alternatives where he sins. For suppose w
as a deontic alternative to the real world. Then Smith
'
neither sins nor repents in Hence a world w, in
which Smith sins and repents may be less similar to w
than a world „
3
„hich is just like
^ except that^
sins and does not repent there. In any case we have no
clear way of determining which of „
2 and w 3 is more simi-
lar to w
2 . we can not merely count the number of proper-
ties that each of „
2
and «
3
has in common with w^ since
in both cases the number will be infinite. And any intui-
tive argument that one of «
2
or „
3
is more similar to
than the other will apparently appeal to features about
Smith as he exists in deontic alternatives that are left
undetermined by Hintikka's deontic semantics. Hence we
are not justified in concluding that the semantics guar-
antees that Smith repents in all worlds most similar to
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deontic alternatives where he sins a a •ms. And without this
rr we oan not assert the truth ° f ° <s > — itUSi
- the—
-antics for the obliga-ion operator and the subjunctive conditional.
Clearly, an appli cation of these
to evaluate instances of formula 0( P > q , requires two
world relativizations and is extremely cumbersome. it
" alS°' beCaUSS °f thS a^uity of the similarity rela-
tion required for the interpretation of the counterfactual
conditional, diffipnit +-~ .etermme the truth value of
some instances of o,p > q, . But it seems clear ^ ^ ^least some cases, a conditional obligation sentence will
be true although its formal counterpart as an instance of
°(p > q) will be false.
our discussions in this chapter have forced us to face
some of the difficulties of Hintikka's deontically perfect
world semantics. What is deontic perfection? Can we make
sense of the notion? Is it even a consistent concept as
used in Hintikka's theory? Apparently not. Hintikka
tells us that all obligations of the real world will be
fulfilled in its deontically perfect alternatives. But
then how can "good Samaritan" obligations to help criminals,
for example, be fulfilled in deontic alternatives if
people always behave as they ought in those worlds? Further-
more, we may ask who is in these worlds? will each deontic
alternative of a given world have the same inhabitants?
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WiU inhabUantS ° f Pe^ect alternatives bethe same type of people as they are in the given world.
Htntrtha gives us little information for answering these
questions
.
Moreover, as we have clearly emphasized, an analysis
Of deontrc alternatives as deontically perfect is blatantly
inappropriate for an analysis of those conditional obli-
gations which are contrary-to-duty
. For example, Smith
gation to repair the harm done. Yet no account at all
can be given of obligations to make reparation using
Hintikka's deontically perfect world semantics; acts of
reparation are not fulfilled in deontically perfect al-
ternatives and so on his analysis are not obligatory.
Since a major aim of our project is to provide a symboliza-
tion and analysis which can account for contrary-to-duty
obligations, we must revise Hintikka's deontic semantics.
One natural revision, which has been suggested by
F011esdal and Hilpinnen 8 and by Bengt Hansson, 9 is
(roughly) to maintain the same interpretation as Hintikka’s
for formulas of the form Op, but to introduce a new dyadic
obligation operator, 0(p/r)
,
for conditional obligation
sentences. According to F011esdal and Hilpinnen, 0(p/r)
means that p is true in all (possible) worlds in which r
IS true, and which resemble deontically perfect
much as possible." 10
worlds as
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First, all of the difficulties which arise for
Hintihha.s theory of unconditional oblrgat ion will retain
problems on this intpmrof •erpretation. For ex^mnio'-’i a ple there will
consistent way of maintaining that there can be
•'good Samaritan., obligations to those who have committed
morally forbidden acts.
Second
,
if the notion of a deontically perfect world
is problematic and vague then -hho 4. •, t e notion of an "almost
deontically perfect" world is even less helpful. An ex-
tension of Hintikka
' s semantics in this way is not as
easily managed as Frfllesdal, Hilpinnen, and Hansson would
have us believe. How are we to understand the description
that these deontic alternatives
"resemble deontically per-
fect worlds as much as possible" except for the truth of
the condition? How extensively will these worlds alf£er
the given world and from deontically perfect worlds?
What will these worlds be like? To emphasize the diffi-
culties of this proposed extension of Hintikka’ s semantics,
let us consider the following example.
Suppose Smith has a conditional obligation to buy his
wife some medicine since he has lost her full medicine
bottle. Suppose also that he has promised to buy a friend
a book and so has a conditional obligation to buy the book.
Let us suppose further that he does not have enough money
to buy both the medicine and the book, although he can buy
Since he cannot fulfill both conditional
one or the other.
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obligations we may wish to deny that he has both condi-
tional obligations. But presumably we would want to sayhS d°eS ^ ^ 1SaSt
conditional obligations.
Perhaps the obligation to replace the lost medicine,
-nee it would provide the most utility, or be the most
stringent Prima facie duty, or whatever (depending on the
“"a 1 thSOry ”e Yet if we extend Hintikka's
theory to apply to conditional obligations as proposed
above, then Smith has this conditional obligation gust in
case he buys the medicine in all those deontic alternatives
which are deontically perfect except for his loss of the
medicine and any other changes required by that loss.
Is fulfillment of that conditional obligation even
compatible with the degree of deontic perfection in those
worlds? if „e answer no, on the grounds that Smith
must then break his promise and not buy the book, then we
appear to have a counterexample against the proposal.
Thus advocates of the proposal will have to argue that
buying the medicine is compatible with the deontic perfec-
tion m these alternatives. But how can a proponent of
this view support such an argument?
He might first say that Smith is richer in the rele
vant alternatives and so can buy both the book and the
medicine. However it seems implausible that anything in
the vague description of these deontic alternatives as
deontically perfect except for the loss of the medicine
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assures us that th-ic „ SO. Even if we adopted the sgestion made earlier that Hinti^s semantics be supple_
merited with the assumption that the agent exists i n thede°ntlC alternatives
•• Uta himself as is consistent
” thS reqU1SltS deont
- ideality, it seems implausible
that we could be assured that Smith would be richer in
the deontic alternatives merely because he has also
promised the friend to buy him a book.
Second, a proponent might argue that Smith never
makes the promise to buy the book in the deontic alterna-
thus It IS compatible in the almost-deontically
perfect worlds for him to hnv ^ • .0 bUY the medicme. But on what
grounds can he claim Smith never *.umakes the promise in the
deontic alternatives? Making the promise is not incompat-
ible with deontic perfection. it is fulfillment of the
promise that is incompatible with fulfillment of the con-
ditional obligation to buy the medicine. And if the advo-
cate gives this as a reason to claim that Smith never
makes the promise in the relevant alternatives he is ap-
pealing to a characterization of the deontic alternatives
not only modified to accomodate the truth of the condition,
but also tailored in terms of what insures that fulfill-
ment of the conditional obligation is compatible with the
near-deontic perfection of the alternatives. However since
the semantic analysis directs us to determine the truth of
a conditional obligation based on whether or not it is
90
fulfilled in all the deontic alternatives then to be non-
circular we need a clear characterization of those alterna-
tives independently of whatever is compatible with ful _
flllment of the obligation.
our example shows that the modification in Hintikka's
semantics appealing to
..nearly deontically perfect worlds"
presented above is much more problematic than it appears
way of determining whether or not in the
case just described Smith buys the medicine in all those
orlds in which he loses the medicine and which are other-
wise as deontically perfect as possible. The concept of
an almost-perfect deontic alternative is too vague to
provide an adequate foundation for an analysis of con-
ditional obligation.
David Lewis has proposed a deontic semantics which
differs from Hintikka’s more radically than the proposal
we have just discussed and thus it may be more plausible
.
11
He abandons the notion of deontically perfect worlds alto-
gether. Lewis' semantic insight is to evaluate a formula
Op at a world by reference to deontic alternatives, but
to characterize deontic alternatives differently. On his
view we imagine that the deontic alternatives of a world
can be ranked according to some unspecified moral princi-
ple or set of moral principles. Then a formula Op will be
true just in case p is true at the "best" deontic alterna-
tives. Lewis also proposes a dyadic obligation primitive
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for conditional obligation, accompanied fcy a
analysts in terms of
-best- worlds. This type of sug_
gestion will be teleological ^ ^ ^
t7 WU1 ^ defin- * of goodness , although
° f g00d^'“—
-— independently
9 tness, may be left undetermined in the formal
analysis. This approach, with an ^ ^than "deontically perfect-" unri^P ect worlds may provide a more
plausible framework within which ton n analyze conditional
obligations in general and especially .P iaU contrary- to-duty
obligations
.
12
Let us pause at this point to clarify the notion of
conditional obligation we are attempting to analyze. Our
work thus far has shown that we are focusing on a concept
for which (i) there is a non-trivial connection between
conditional obligations and their conditions; on our view
it will not follow that everything or nothing is condi-
tionally obligatory, (ii) conditional obligations may no
longer hold if overriding conditions hold, (iii) further
conditions may reinstate (and override again, etc.) the
original conditional obligation, <iv) truth of the con-
dition alone does not justify detachment of an unconditional
obligation from a conditional one, (v) contrary-to-duty
obligations are a type of conditional obligation, and (vi)
sentences in the form of Chisholm's four sentences, where
the second and third are both taken to be conditional
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obligation sentences, may be trulv ™ •* J
-Y/ consistently and
independently expressed at the same time.
».
lB tll< ch>pi>r
" ““
connective alone can not transform either 0 (p = q) or
P = °q into an expression for a notion of conditional ob-ligation which satisfiesbr the above conditions n- .Lo
* It appears,
then, that we must develoo a •P ew obligation operator for
our concept of conditional obligation.
interestingly, David Lewis' proposal satisfies many
of the above conditions. Nevertheless, satisfaction of
the six conditions above does not narrow down a notion of
conditional obligation sufficiently. For Lewis explicitly
presents his analysis of conditional obligation as an
analysis of a conditional ought-to-be. Yet even if it
2iHht to be that there is no illness in the world, it may
be that no individual oucfht to do anything in particular
to see to it that there is no illness in the world.
Our hope is to develop a symbolization and analysis
for a concept which satisfies the six conditions above
(and perhaps others) and which is, moreover, a conditional
ought-to-do, as opposed to a conditional ought-to-be
.
13
There may be other concepts of conditional obligation sat
isfying different conditions from those specified above.
However I believe that we have intuitions about a concept
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WhlCh dOSS SatiSfy 311 th°- conditions and that it is£2- concept which is most important for normatlve^in Chapter IV we shall car.ft.Uy explain and evaluate
S the°ry
' WhlCh sat isf ies so many of the conditions
have focused upon, although it provides an ana! •t' v
-
lu b lysis of
a concept of conditional ought-to-be.
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CHAPTER IV
David Lewis proposes ^ _
ln„. .
P 3 a semantxc analysis for deonticcm Chapter 5 of his recent book Counterfactuals
.
“ ;rr
is
.
based on a~tic^
Lintikka ' s
, namely f-ha-t- -ft a formulas of the form 0p
deontic alternatives of that world. However Lewis pro-poses a novel interpretation of deontic alternatives. He
assumes that deontic alternatives of a given world may be
ed based on their comparative goodness. 1 He says.
t™rlds hpIrhaos rI f^enCe °rderin9
standpoints Sf dif?J ferent frora the
custom in deontic logic i°shali =
AS iS
& SOp rC he
£BrhP P- r^r° „i
there &
capacity foT “ a s^erhuma^or calm, sympathetic imnart-i'ai
contemplation of alternative possTbUrUesIt does not matter. We can build in the
on otheL??
anY ° f thSSe foun<^ations, or
Intuitively, we may imagine the deontic alternatives
a given world w^ as arranged in a system of spheres
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of accessibility around w Th e a „1- accessibility relation13 that °f "bein9 evaluable from .
. Thus „ .
.
n the deontic al-
-natives may be viewed as part of a system of spheresO evaluability
; each world or deontic alternative in the^ ^ ^ SPhSreS
-— or ranked by the un-
specified Standards of evaluation that give rise to the
ordering from the standpoint of »r
Tf the preference ordering fL the standpoint of w13 3^ °rdering
' that is
' - reflexive, transitive
'
and °°nneCted
' the" a™
*2 i- tetter than a world^
th respect to W]
_
gust in case some sphere contains w
3
but not w
3 . The idea is that spheres closer to the center
of the system contain worlds that are better, or are
ranked higher, with respect to the preference ordering.
Moreover, worlds which differ only in respects which are
wholly irrelevant to their comparative goodness, or for
which relevant differences are balanced out, will be tied
'n thS Preference ordering, and thus will occupy compar-
able positions in the system of spheres.
Given this description, we might be tempted to view
the system of spheres as centered or weakly centered.
Centering means that for each world i,
LL\\*\ SPh\re around i; and that wouldmean that each world is, from its own
standpoint, the best of all possible
w
?ak centering means that eachworld i belongs to the innermost nonempty
sphere around i; and that would mean now
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that each world i
o
Point, at least one of^h^K °Wn stand ~° f t e best worlds
.
3
But, Lewis correctly notes,
it is quite cle^r-
reason) is the source of
What (within
ordering, that ours f, f
°“r Preference
one of the best possible worlds
"®31 belng
Thus the system of spheres has a
will not h °
n C°"Parative goodnessbe centered or weakly centered.
Lewis suggests that it i <=
i
tUral to impose a normal-
con ltion on the system of spheres. That is wew ,- 0 u . lcl : l / mayto grant that some world is evaluable from every
world, or, more clearly, that every world is such that
some world is evaluable from it. This condition is reason-
tron does not hold nothing is obligatory and everything
IS permitted.
Lewis leaves open the question of whether or not to
condition of universality which specifies that every
world is evaluable from every other world, xf we impose
universality then we abandon evaluability restrictions.
Similarly, Lewis leaves open the question of whether
or not to accept absoluteness. if absoluteness does hold,
then whatever relation there is between two worlds with
respect to one world, holds between them with respect to
any other world. That is, the relative goodness of
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eoritic
vllJ „„ v„, iomWl11 bS abS° 1Ute;
alternatives will have theSamS PrSferenCe ^ th. standpoint 0 f ever,
world. As Lewis points mu-o t, an ordering of worlds accord-
rr
the amount of utiuty in the w°rid wui~
v
6 S Same fr°m the StandP° int «ny world. However an
ordering based, for example, on the extent the inhabitants
° 3 “°rld °bSy thS laWS ° f ^e ruling god in the given
world will differ from the standpoint of different worlds
with different gods.
It is an asset of Lewis' semantic analysis for obli-
gation statements that the criterion used for ranking
the deontic alternatives is left unspecified. However if
we assume that whatever criterion is used will be an ob-
jective moral standard of some kind, then it will be rea-
sonable to accept both universality and absoluteness.
Nevertheless, Lewis' formal theory does not commit us to
doing so.
Lewis explicitly states that he is proposing an analy-
Sis of obligation as what ought-to-be the case.
. Obligation
' is here used in a specialimpersonal sense. What is obligatory
'
(conditionally or unconditionally) is
what ought to be the case, whether or
not anyone in particular is obligated
to see to it. Personal obligations
may or may not follow from these imper-
sonal obligations
.
5
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One formulation of Lewis' theory about what ought
to be the case is:
(64) Op (read "it is obligatory that
P") is true at w e
1(3w
j
} (w
j
is evaluable from
the standpoint of w.)
& ii) p holds at all worlds that
are best from the standpoint
of w.
.
i
This interpretation, however, can only be applied if
Lewis' Limit assumption holds, that is, if there is an
innermost nonempty sphere relative to each world contain-
ing all the worlds which are best from the standpoint of
that world, and Lewis is careful to explain that we can
not assume that the Limit Assumption does hold. "We
might have an infinite ascent to better and better worlds,
and no innermost sphere containing best worlds of all.
For every world there would be a sphere small enough to
exclude it, so the intersection of all nonempty spheres
would be empty.
Thus, if there are no best worlds with respect to
W
i' but rather an infinite ascent to better and better
worlds, then Lewis proposes
w . E
i
(65) Op is true at
i) ( 3 Wj ) (Wj is evaluable from
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& ii)
We might rephrase the
and have
the standpoint of w.)
P holds throughout all worlds
which are sufficiently good
from the standpoint of w
.
second clause more perspicuously
(66) Op is true at w. =
( B w j
)
{(Wj is evaluable from
the standpoint of w.) &
<V (»k is at least tis good as w
from the standpoint of w. =>
P is true at w
R )]
.
For conditional obligation sentences (also about
at ought to be the case) of the form "Given that p, it
ought to be the case that g, (which I shall symbolize
P « q) , Lewis provides an analysis of a deontic primitive
analogous to ,64) which depends on the Limit Assumption-
(67) p w q is true at w. =
l
i) M3w.) (w. is evaluable from
w
i
s P is true at w
.
)
or ii) ( 3 w
^
) (w_. is evaluable from
w
i
& P is true at w
. ) & q
holds at all the worlds where
p holds which are best from
the standpoint of w .
l
And we might reformulate (67) in a manner similar to
our reformulation of (64). Thus
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(68) p o* q is true at w
1) M3w.) (Wj is evaluable from
w
i
& P is true at w
.
)
or 11 ) (3w.) (<Wj is evaluable from
2 i
p is true at v s <v <wk isat least as good as w from the
standpoint of s p i s true
at w
k
D 5 is true at w
R )
l
If we assume that since we are assessing moral ob-
lation, universality and absoluteness do hold and hence
every world is evaluable from every other world, and the
relative ranking of worlds will be the same frQm ^
point of every world, then we may restate (66) and
(68) as
and
(69) Op is true (3w
i ) [ (p i s true at w ) &
(Wj
)
^W
j
'‘
s at least as good as
w
i
D P is true at w^)J
(70) p <> q is true =
i) ^(3w.) (p is true at w. )
°r n) (3w
i ) { (p is true at v^) &
(w^) (v\^ is at least as good as w. &
P is true at w, ^ q i s true at wj j
It is readily apparent that if (70) is our analysis of
conditional obligation then any impossible condition yields
a conditional obligation to anything. We may recall that
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the same result followed for not°)
' P => °q (cf
.
p. 39)
and for (40} s ~ , '
th .
<PP- 51-52). Lewis is well aware of
tf
1S rSSUlt
' and 18 not sure whether an impossible condi-gn generates all or no conditional obligations. Thus
“ PrSSentS tW° C°nditi0nal
analyses from which
e may choose. Hl? alternativg primitive ^
igation sentences has an analysis exactly Uke (70)
except that the conditional obligation sentence is false
rather than true whenever n i o •P s impossible no matter what
q is. i find the latter prefershio iP able (see p. 51) and so
shall focus on Lewis' alternaf-}vQ • • •nati e primitive, namely,
(71) p a? q is true =
(^Wi) { (p is true at w. &
i
q is true at w.) &
(W j
)
^
W
j
at least as good as
w
i
& P is true at w. ^ q i s
true at w.) ] .
This proposal of Lewis' for conditional obligation
sentences is a particularly plausible one for several
reasons. First, even if p <*<j, it will not generally fol-
low that p & ro»q. That is, even if there is a world
where p and q hold such that all equally or higher ranked
worlds are such that both p and q hold in them, there is
no guarantee that there will be a world where p s r and
q hold and for which p s r and q all hold in all equally
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good or better worlds T+-- xu . it may be hp=;f
P does, but not when bofch p & f ^
" t0 h°ld When
second, p cte>q i s a primitive and is not defined in
IT
^ the—— operator. Thus I
ligat
rUlSS f°r faCtUal
of unconditional ob-
^ °m COndlti°nal °n
- -
- we need
accept a principle justi fying tactual detachment otan unconditional oblivion based on the truth of the
condition alonp T +- would be appealing if we could prQ _pose some rule for relating conditional and unconditional
obligations
, but we may one; no such
is imposed by the semantic analysis.
For this reason a symbolization of Chisholm's sen-
tences (interpreted as sentences about what ought to bethe case) as
and
(la) Og
(2f
) g t
( 3f ) o.g 0=^ t
(4a) %g .
where the second
according to ( 71 )
is better for the
and third formalizations are interpreted
/ is appealing. We might think that it
agent to go and tell than merely to go to
aid his neighbors, and hence believe that if there is a
world where he goes such that he goes in all better worlds.
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then surely there iq = t7/^ , ,
that he
WherS ^ 9063 ^ tell. suchgoes and tells in all worlds at least as a
rpV»no •
C S S gOOd.
nothing in the formal settles assures us of this
. The
"P 1Catl°n dSPendS °n the P-ticular criterion of good-ness used fnr ^ „ 1 •
*"» »i.
J-y left unspecified.
help I"
3
' eVSn " therS " 3 W° rld Where thS
-- to
P his neighbors which is such that he also goes in
all worlds as central or more central in the system of
spheres, there is no assurance that the ere will be a world
9068 and tSllS ^ 311“ within the sphere containing
that world. Nor win it follow that there is a world
where he neither goes nor tells such that he neither
goes nor tells in all equally or higher ranked worlds.
And the fact that he goes to help them in the real world
implies nothing whatsoever about what happens in better
worlds. The four formalisations are truly independent on
this formal analysis.
But is the symbolization proposed above consistent?
We might be tempted to conclude that from a conditional
obligation for q given p that we can detach an obligation
for q. For we might think that if there is a world where
both p and q are true such that in all equally good or
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b6tter worUs P and g -— then there is surely a
good or better worlds But th
6qU Y
taken f
3 rSaS°ning wou ld be mis-
be b
W°rldS WhSre P ^ alS° tr
-' ***even etter worlds where d is *.? 13 not and neither is
*3* Thus q <34. t dooc • ,
0(%t) .
nGt yiSld 0t
-9
- M: yield
We have already noted that truth of the condition is
Lewis’ view for detachment of an uncondi-lonal obligation. Thus ,4a, and ,3f, do not yield 0,vt
,
mg in a certain order ind-io^+-^
' l dlCate nothing whatsoever about
how worlds in which he fails to f0n , ur tell (whether or not he
goes) appear in the ordering.
Thus even if (la) and (2f) together yield Ot we will
not have the inconsistency noted by Chisholm. Neverthe-
less it is interesting to ask whether or not (la, and
<2f> do, on this view, lead to ot. Suppose there is a
world where the man goes to help his neighbors such that
goes in all worlds at least as good. And suppose
further that there is a world in which he goes and tells
such that he tells in all equally good or better worlds
in which he goes. Then it follows that there is a point
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at which equally or higher ranked Morlds
_ ^ ^that he tells an them. Thus we apparently can aff irm a
eontic detachment principle
( 72 ) p ^ q
Op
Oq
usinq Lewis' analysis. And even with this
principle we have found that Chisholm's sentences are not
inconsistent given the formalisations above.
Another nice feature of Lewis' proposal is that we
can compare deontic alternatives. Clearly proposals which
classified all deontic alternatives as deontically perfect,
or Which distinguished perfect and near-perfect alterna-
tives, were found to be inadequate. As Lewis says,
• d
*
;
* division of worlds into thei eal and less-than-ideal will not meetour needs. We must use more complicatedvalue structures that somehow bear infor-matron^bout comparisons or gradations of
In our example from pages 87-90 we could not determine
whether or not Smith bought a new bottle of medicine
for his wife in all deontic alternatives which were
deontically ideal except for his loss of the medicine
(and other changes required by the loss). However, on
Lewis' view, we need not determine whether or not certain
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tates of affairs are compatible with
of d„o
°me Va9ue ™ountdeontic perfection. Rather wen , can consider al l ^
~ I
1
—- *—
- -s the medicine
“
and ha
“ WhlCh ^ ^ ^ ^end the booh
he has JT
thS m0neY t0 ^ mediClne and thS b°°k
- Th
-
he b
C°nditl
-al obligation to buy the medicine if
uys rt rn those alternatives in which he loses it and
I"
are SUffiCient^ —
- H°mE££ative ranking ofeontic alternatives. And this ranking is determined only
when we iffiSsanS^ superimpose a definite principle or
set of principles for ordering the deontic alternatives.
^ ^ seems clear, then fhat- t_ • .
' t at Lewis Proposal is super-
for to others we have examined. But it is appropriate to
ma 6 eValuati
''e comments and also to analyze two re-
cent criticisms of Lewis' theory of conditional oblige-
tion.
In Chapter III we notpd 4-v-ua-i-e that given Hintikka's inter-
pretation of deontic operators
(63) Oq ^ []Oq
does not hold. Interestingly, given Lewis' semantic analy-
sis for obligation the truth of (63) turns on his absolute-
ness and universality conditions. if absoluteness does
not hold, then the ordering of deontic alternatives may
differ from world to world and so q might be true at all
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the best worlds with respect to w but falsp ,
.
r
z t e at some bestworld with respect to w
n ^ w an1 r r' alternative of w
Hence, (63) will not be valid.
However, if we adopt absoluteness and universality
and maintain that the ordering of deontic alternatives
'
- the same from the standpoint of every world, and that
every world is evaluable from the standpoint of every
other world, then (63, is valid and so we can see that
this version of Lewis' semantic analysis is notictrysi equivalent
to Hintikka For oq is true at w
r
gust in case there
18 8 W°rld
'
“1 Say ' -Stable from „
r ,
and such that qis true at all worlds at least ac;s good as w^ from the
ndpoint of Wj
.. Thus if absoluteness and universality
hold, then for every world it is true that there is a
world evaluable from w.
, namely w such that •! x i» n q is true
at all worlds at least as good as it is.
What are the implications of the truth of (63)? it
appears that
( 29
)
p Oq
(alternatively. Dip * Oq„
, will be true for any p if 0q
is true. Thus it seems that a factual condition can, on
Lewis’ view (assuming absoluteness and universality)
—
tai1 an obligation statement; yet we have argued that
such an entailment is clearly implausible.
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f
*
lthOUgh (29) is true according to Lewis' semanticsor a ethic and deontic Logic when we assume absolutenessand universality
(2g)—
'
is not true
any p and any q. Thus the provabilit-P ability of (29) j_nthe special case when Oq i s trn«
’ th°Ugh Perhaps odd, may
a harmless consequence of the theory.
Th
TO "" thiS
' n°tiCe
— < 29 > implies p 3 0g
fi
"
" <29) ^ and P iS —
-ue we may derive Og.
r
Ce <29> 13 ^ ^ °g - -ue then derivation of 0gin this instance is unsurprising.
Second, since the bailment in ,29, will hold only
q 13 °bligatory Eer.ee. truth of (29) in such a case
-rely indicates that if q is ob ligatory then any^
tion entails that it is obligatory. And although I find
this result odd, it seems no more peculiar than the analo-
gous result in alethic modal logic, that necessary truths
are entailed by any factual or contingent statements, as
is clear from
(73) Oq s- 0 (p 5 Qq) .
AS long as (29) has no implication in terms of con-
ditional obligation, as we have argued it can not, then
its truth when Oq is true may be harmless. And if we
find the result worrisome we might block it by restricting
Lewis' system (although he does not) so that iterated
Ill
modalities ate not allowed. This type of restriction ^imposed by Bengt Hansson on his deontic systems. 8
a more serious peculiarity of Lewis' view turns on
his analysis in terms of best worlds. We have pointed out
even if P » q, it will not generally follow that
P ‘ r q ' H°WeVer there still be cases in which
P* q imPUeS Plt ”)q “ Lewis ' analysis even though we
believe the English sentence corresponding to the former
to be true and that corresponding to the latter to be false
For example, it seems reasonable to assert that
(74) Given that Smith promises to mailJones an application form, then itought to be that he mail
'
a form toJon0s
.
and to deny that
Given that Smith promises to mailJones an application form and thathe hand carries one to Smith, thenit ought to be that he mail a formto Jones.
In other words it is reasonable to claim that the second
condition, bringing a form in person, overrides the con-
ditional obligation to mail one.
^ seems to me that on Lewis' view, if (74) is
true then (75) must be true as well. To see this, suppose
we agree that given Smith's promise it is better for him
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7wh2
nq JOneS an aPPliCati°n ln Person th^ to mail one,
Jones outweighs any inoonvenience to Smith. Then we may
say that worlds in which Smith promlses ^^ _
mans one, and also hand carries one to Jones, are better
than worlds in which he merely promises to mail a form andd°eS S
°\ ThUS “ iS — -at there is a world in
Which Smith promises to mail Jones an application such
that all worlds at least as good in which he promises are
such that he does mail a form to Jones, then it will fol-
low that there is a world in which Smith promises to mail
and also carries one to Jones such that in all
equally good or better worlds in which both conditions
hold he mails a form to Jones.
The point of the example can be generalized, if, ac-
cording to whatever standard of goodness is adopted, given
a certain condition an additional condition is better than
what is conditionally obligatory, then on Lewis' analysis,
whatever is conditionally obligatory given the original
condition will be conditionally obligatory given the aug-
mented condition. And yet surely augmented conditions
which are better as well as those which are worse can over-
ride a conditional obligation.^
Lewis' proposal has also been criticized recently by
Holly Goldman in "David Lewis' Semantics for Deontic
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Logics and by Alan HcMichagi ^ „ Too Much ^ a ^Thing: A Problem in Deontic Logic - 11
r
According to both
man and McMichael, Lewis' ranking of deontic alterna-
ith respect to goodness leads to difficulties
Both argue
^
that Lewis
• analysls is toQ strong
. ^tional obligation sentences we believe to be true turn
out to be false on his analysis r *-. Let us evaluate these
criticisms in turn.
Goldman critiri 7pccizes a version of Lewis' theory of
conditional obligation according to which
(76) P q is true at world i =
"(A) there are no evaluable worlds
in which p i s true,
or (B) some p & q world is better
from the standpoint of i than
anY P & not-q world ." 12
Her criticism is as follows:
;hic'S iCati°n to actaa l cases shows thatthis definition fails to ascribe truth to
are nh
entS
?
f conditiona l obligation whichobviously true, because it fails to takeadequate account of the affect of contingentfeatures of the world on such obligations
tomorrow
1 Pp°miS<
f
to return a borrowed book
. Clearly
, if i do not return the booktomorrow, I ought to apologize. But now con-ider possible worlds in which I do not re-turn the book tomorrow. it is better, other
i
ng GqUal/ not to break a Promise.Thus the best worlds in which I fail to returnthe book tomorrow are surely worlds in whichdo not thereby break a promise: either because
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tomorrow, or because ^
promise before
a promise in the first
made such
either of these worlds
P
^o?h :
BUt ln
by my apologizinq for
°t ing is gained
book. So it appears th^r
returnin9 the
which I do notrfr at a world in
apologize (eg a book and do not
been released f™ 1 m which I have
as good as any world^in
10
^
3
^
1S at 16331
return the book wV which 1 do not
statement "If t de ? apologize. The
ou°t°to
r0
^
[76]
.
b
Nevertheless°this 9statemfifis
0 "
not be r“e“el"f^ WU1
The most notable feature of Goldman's counterexample
" thS C°nditi°nal obligation sentence she suggests,
<77)
then fe n°L return the b°°k tomorrow,I ought to apologize
is only true in this world given T ukj.L_Lu that I have made the
promise. She argues that (77) is false on Lewis' analy-
sis since his analysis ignores contingent features of the
world such as the facts that I win not be released from
the promise and have made the promise. But analogously,
her sentence (77) ignores those very same features and is
true only when they are. The crucial point on Lewis'
analysis is to restrict one's attention to deontic alter-
natives where the condition holds. Then we determine
what would be best in those circumstances. Goldman's
sentence (77), however, forces us to focus on the wrong
set of deontic alternatives. It appears, then, that what
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9°es wrong is not Lewis' theory but rather that the sen-tence expressing the conditional obirgation misleadingly
o7mT
d
T°
nS WhlCh arS Clearly necessar
^ f°t the truth
and thus, justifiably, for the proper restriction
or deontic alternatives inm the semantic analysis.
In Goldman 1 s Gx^inni a • .pe ample, if p stands for "i promise tQ
return the book tomorrow" and r for "t dr,l I o not return the
ook tomorrow and q for "I ought to apologize," then we
would say that p & r conditionally obligates one to q and
"P & r dOSS n0t
' And these Just the results we would
achieve on Lewis' theory. On his view the conditional ob-
ligation may change when the conditions change. His theory
is carefully designed to accommodate that fact. But the
result is, of course, that careful specification of con-
ditions is required for accurate evaluation of condition-
al obligation sentences.
Goldman is aware of this sort of reply to her objec-
tion. She says,
?7fii
m
hv
ht attempt to defend definition
"If T
that the conditional sentence
T
1
,,
1
. Vot return the book tomorrow, thenI ought to apologize," is merely a short-hand way of expressing what the speakerreally means, which is more adequately ex-pressed by the following statement: "if
and
3
!*5 pro“sed
,
to return a book tomorrow,
and r d
n
°y released from that promise,
I do not return the book, then I oughtto apologize." The only version of the ori-
statement which is completely immune
sort of argument I have just advancedwould require an antecedent describing all
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the features of tho
affect the suitabili^v o?
W°rld Which
But no speaker of ordTn^ ^ apolo9izing
.
utters the original
"
lnary English who
to express a s 1 ntence intends it
extended antecedent--an
C
^aining SUCh anmay refer to indefim>^i ntecedent which
of which would be known facts ' fewdefence of [76] fails f>
hlm
’ Thus this
The defense raises the particularly difficult prob _
" of distinguishing conditional and unconditional obli-gations. And Goldman’s reply mayP Y be even ”>ore pressing
than indicated here. For suppose we agai
„ ^defend Lewis as suggested above by arguing that Goldman’s
sentence (77) is an inadequate expression of the condi-
tional obligation; the antecedent, or condition, needs
to be supplemented in order to k.be a true conditional ob-
ligation sentence. But then, why not argue analogously
that for any sentence of the form Op there are certain
background conditions which must be true if op is to be
true, and these too must be incorporated into the oblige-
n sentence if it is to be true? For example it may be
ntly false to claim it is obligatory not to kill, al-
though if the killing is not in self defense it may be
obligatory not to kill. if this argument is allowed then
appears that there can be no true unconditional obliga-
tion statements, but merely sentences of conditional ob-
ligation. Yet we have been maintaining that there is a
distinction between conditional and unconditional
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obligations. Thus we discover that Goldman is correct-
we can not require that conditional obligation
d
SUPPlemented "
- *> ^— *.
-sanction betweencon ltional and unconditional obligation sentences to
collapse
.
interestingly,, it seems clear to me that in Goldman's
example the conditional obligation is conditional not only
°n not returning the booh but also on promising to return
The sentence makes no true statement of conditional
obligation unless we take account of the assumption that
I have promised either by adding it to the antecedent as
a conjunct or by accounting for i t hici t m some other way.
Similarly, Lewis' analysis requires that we incorporate
act of the promise. And whether or not "all the
features of the actual world which affect the Stability
of my apologizing " 15 must be included in the antecedent,
it seems that the fact i-hat- t u-,C th^t I have promised surely must
be included.
But I see no way of justifying this view, nor do I
see any way of distinguishing those features which must be
included in the antecedent of the conditional obligation
sentence. it is hardly fair to stipulate that we must
include exactly those features which, when included in
analysis, yield intuitively acceptable results about
the truth of the relevant conditional obligation sentence.
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-* « .
.«o„,
ot Lewis' theory.
Historically, deontic logic, with its tripartite
division between the obligatory, possible, and for.
bidden, developed at about the same time as other logi-
cians and ethicists. developed formulations of act-utili-
tananism separating duties, right acts, and wrong acts
The latter formulations generally distinguish a duty
or obligation as the (possible, act of the avails
£ii-2££Aves which produces (or would produce, maximal
utility. The background conditions are built into the
structure of specifying alternative acts.
For our project I have emphasized that I do not be-
lieve there is a way of specifying exactly which condi-
tions must be included in the antecedent of a condition-
al obligation sentence. Nevertheless, a plausible way of
keeping track of relevant (and then also irrelevant)
background conditions on an obligation or conditional
ligation is to build into the semantics certain restric-
tions narrowing accessible deontic alternatives. In
particular, temporal restrictions may mark off many of
the relevant conditions. For as time passes certain
background conditions come to be true, and these should
be held fixed in our theory. Goldman's sentence (77,
is true at a certain time, namely at a time at which she
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as promised to return the book and has not been reused
rom the promise. Thus incorporating into the semantic
apparatus a temporai reference to reject the tact that (77)as true at a particular time may help the semantic analy-
sts more accurately evaluate obligation sentences. These
comments provide only a rough introduction to the type of
proposal we shall investigate in Chapter V.
It was clear from our discussion in Chapter 1 that
statements about what agents conditionally or uncondition-
ally ought to do can be expressed most clearly by retir-
ing that such statements be relativized to both times and
agents. Thus in developing an analysis for a concept of
conditional ought-to-do, we must augment it with time and
agent relativizations
. And it may be that in so doing we
gain the ability to make a clearer distinction between con-
ditional and unconditional obligations. For what made it
appear that the distinction between conditional and un-
conditional obligation sentences could not be made was
the sweepingly general character of the latter. Nearly
every example one can give of an unconditional or absolute
obligation sentence seems to be implicitly conditional
upon the situation. Yet if all obligation statements are
relativized to agents and times then while we may not
truthfully claim that it is unconditionally obligatory
that one not kill, we may truthfully say that agent s
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(unconditionally, ought not kill at tiffle t ^ ^
references to agent and time may specify the situation
carefully enough to assure us that the obligation state-
ment has (as we have been assuming it has, a truth value.
xceptions due to extenuating circumstances will have noplace. We shall exnlnro *-u •is suggestion more carefully inChapter V.
nother recent criticism of Lewis' analysis of con-
ditional obligation has been presented by Alan McMichael.
He also argues that Lewis' analysis is too strong; true
conditional obligation sentences will be false on Lewis'
account. He says.
I am inclined to believe that there is agood, perhaps happiness is such a qoodwhich may exist in amounts of any size'But if i am right, then all of the usualexamples of conditional obligation to
Lewises
truy“Condi t ion^"consider
baf , Tthat^ SSS.SS'.S'returns the loot (p 1071 conresses and
,,
than but ln which Jesse robs
the ££ confessing and returningloot (Mij) J. *,,. This is so becausem some such world w'
, there will be
enough extra good to counterbalance the
of
S
w
nCe
rn L C°nfeSsion and surpass the goods
which
°tbe
^
words / since there is a goodmay exist in amounts of any size, thelack of a confession puts no bound on thegoodness of the worlds in which Jesse robsthe bank. Consequently, Lewis's truth-
condition yields the undesirable result
^
rUS that given that Jesse robsthe bank it ought to be that he confesses andreturns the loot
.
16
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McMichael s point is that although Lewis believes
his theory to be general insofar as it is suitable for
any plausible ordering of the deontic alternatives, his
theory is unacceptable for theories which are consistent
With the view that there is a good which may exist in
amounts of any size. Lewis has proposed a teleological
analysis. Obligation and conditional obligation are de-
fined in terms of the best worlds. The criterion for dif-
ferentiating best worlds is an independent one. And this
criterion may be one for which there are no limits to the
values or goodness of best worlds.
Lewis is well aware that there may be, in this deon-
tic context, an ascent to better and better worlds which
is unlimited. (Cf. his discussion of the Limit Assumption,
PP ‘ 97 ‘ 3 ° f Counterfactuals)
. Thus the criticism is not
merely that worlds may be better without limit, but, more
strongly, that even worlds in which p and a,q hold, for
any p and q, may get better without limit. Hence there
is no point at which all the higher ranked worlds where
P is true are worlds where p and q are true. Thus p
never yields a conditional obligation to q for any p and q.
We might have expected Lewis to reply to McMichael
that the better and better p and %q worlds are somehow
excluded from consideration in the analysis by his evalua
bility restrictions. McMichael claims that references to
standpoint and evaluability are dispensable if we are
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* 09“ °bli—
• —P* the notion of aworld being evaluable from another world could be made
m0re SPeCiflC
-
^ «
2 could be said to be
evaluable from the standpoint of a world w, just in casew
2
ls sufficiently similar" to w mh1* T en worlds which
1
.
fer fr°m 3117 ° thSr W°rld °nl^ ins°far as more good
them, would not be deemed
"sufficiently similar "
Lewrs does not take this line, however.
Lewis responds to McMichael's objection 1 ’ by granting
that his semantic analysis does produce the results
cMichael claims it produces when applied to a "strange
doctrine" like the one McMichael suggests. But he main-
tains that this is the fault of the ethical doctrine ap-
pealed to, not his semantic analysis. He believes it is a
virtue of his analysis that when applied to what he con-
siders is a "strange" (counterintuitive?) doctrine, the
theory produces "strange" (counterintuitive?) results.
The "strange doctrine" Lewis claims McMichael appeals
to is characterized by Lewis as "radical utilitarianism,
stark and unqualified," a view for which "agreement with
our ordinary ethical thought is not its strong point."
surely this characterization of McMichael 's theoretical
point is oversimplified and thus misleading. Certainly
one may be a dogmatic utilitarian and believe that what
case is whatever maximizes utility, and
ought to be the
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maintain
,h« ^
:i;:;r
“»
-— -
. „ «.ex sts m amounts of ^ •any sue and which, „hen added to
"'7^ the"— - - "goodness ordering,
" " ^ 90°d "
- pleasure, this hedonistic
assertion is a natural one tor many utilitarians, indeed,it has been associated with utilitari*ans since Mill. Butthe assumption is consistent for non-hedonistic utilitari-
ans as well. Por a non-hedonist who believes that whatever
ought to be is determined in terms of the agood may define
the good as love of beauty, truth, sympathetic impart ial
approval, knowledge, justice, love of virtue, or may even
actenze it as a simple, non-natural quality ( Cf. Lewis'
description of the goodness ranking for deontic alternatives
quoted in the beginning of this chapter,
. And for each of
these is it not reasonable to grant that it may exist in
amounts of any size? Even philosophers such as Brentano
and Moore who denied that there is always a straightforward
relationship between the value of a whole and the values of
its parts, agree that there is a good which may exist in
amounts of varying size.
When Lewis admits that deontic alternatives may be
ranked according to some standard of good, then he is ac-
knowledging that there is a standard of good which exists
in unlimited amounts and McMichael
' s point follows. The
argument is not restricted to "radical utilitarianism" or
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even hedonism.
Given the dif ficnl ^
sis of obi •
associated with Lewis' analy-S ligation in terms nf k x.° best w°rlds
, we shall begina new approach to the nmKi
chan b
™ C°nditi°-1 obligation inC pter V. Timp 1 i“ again a pivotal role in this
approach.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
1 .
2
3,
8 .
9.
10 .
11
.
12
.
Bas van Fraassen, in "Th^ ro-gation," Journal of Ph-iioc Conditional obli-
PP- 1 ( 1972 )ligation which is similar to ^ ? f oondi tional 'ob-however, relies on ^ ^ l*ewis . van Fraassen
(
"items of unspecifled Satoc!' ?f
derin9 of blues'
at worlds rather than an order
* “at are ^SliTed
van Fraassen
's ordering of values °f
worlds
-~GlW
possible to derive an ordering S to W°rlds ' ifc isselves (see Lewis, CounteltocI I he worlds them-Lewis' analysis is pp - 103 - 4 ).
van Fraassen
-s (see Lewis p toil
Sp®cial case of
since rejected his theory- of
1
°vli
an Fraassen has
C°“''' J^Htnal^oL^hil^ If^^^t-s
Lewis, David, Counter factua 1 R
. p . 96>
Ibid., p. 97
.
4
* Ibid., p . 97.
5. Ibid., footnote, p. loo.
6
. Ibid
.
, p. 98.
7. Lewis, David,
Logic,'"Tl:
''SemantiC Anal
^Ses *>* Dyadic Deontic
^Semantic^nalyses^lor'^yadic
oIontoc^Loglcf
Ibis feature of Lewis 1 tivcjfom t,. i
others but I know of no oSS? wllttof T1C ?d bythe criticism. itten articulation of
Mind 86 (April, 1977), pp. 242-248.
I^HlYsis 38 (March, 1978), pp. 83-84.
version'
^ollhele^a
such thafan^-^
if there is a world
a "°rld where 9 holds If and onlymer where p and q hold and such fh^t-no world where p and -vq hold is as high Sr higher
125
126
13.
14.
15.
16.
m the ranking than it is.
Goldman, op. cit
.
.
p.
Goldman, op. cit
.. pp .
Ibid
., p. 247.
McMichael
, Alan, "Toolem in deontic loqic "Q A z> !
247.
247-248
.
much of a good thing:
Analysis 38 (1978),
a
PP-
17. Lewis
,
(1978)
David, "Reply to McMichael
PP- 85-86. Analysis 38
prob-
83-
CHAPTER V
in Chapter I we developed a language for expressing
t lme relativised obligation sentences by appealing to
ts of time which were assumed to be ordered linearly.
That is
, we assumed that given anv +-
•
y-Lve y two times t and t
i f
*"1 ^ then t, < t or -i- <r +1 2 t 2 t i* However for many
Philosophical purposes a non-linear temporal model may be
-re illuminating. In particular A.N. Prior first sug-
gested, and Richmond Thomason has developed, an indeter-
°r branching ti— structure as a model for tense
logic
.
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takSn int° account in reckoningt truth values of tensed formulas. 1
The fundamental semantic idea behind this model theoretic
technique is
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a given formal
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1 formulas at
taken by that formula at other\imes^ValUeS
in two unpublished manuscripts,
"Deontic Logic as
Founded on Tense Logic" and "nDn 4--Deontic Logic and Freedom ofChoree rn Moral Deliberation," Thomason extends his inde-
terminist temporal model structure to provide a semantic
analysis for certain formulas taken to express obligation
statements. Thomason suggests that difficulties which
arose in early deontic logic relevant to ethical questions
such as questions relating to relational oughts can only
be solved with a combined tense and deontic language. He
also claims in particular that his theory provides solu-
tions to those difficulties
.
3
Although Thomason does not
go on to discuss this claim, it is an intriguing and chal-
lenging one. In this chapter we shall attempt to build a
theory of conditional ought-to-do on his indeterminist time
model
.
Thomason first distinguishes between two uses of
"ought." The deliberative use is appropriate for advis-
ing or deliberating while the judgmental ought is appro-
priate for passing judgment or wishing. This distinction
can be illustrated with an example.
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The ought of judgment thus arises from a wider set of
alternatives than the ought of deliberation. To a record-
ing angel who is judging me with respect to the alterna-
tives that have been open to me at 1:45 it is clear that I
ought to return the notes at 2:00. But the deliberative
ought is determined from a narrower set of alternatives,
namely those actually open to me or in my power at the
time. Thus at 1:45 it is false to say I (deliberatively)
ought to return the notes. A deliberative ought must be
possible for me in some sense of "possible."
The terms "deliberative" and "judgmental" suggest that
Thomason's distinction might be very like the traditional
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distinction between what ought to be and what an agent^ to do.* However given Thomason , s
^
the ought
-to-do. Perhaps the deliberative use is appro-
priate tor situations in which one is choosing what to do
” various alternatives that are in fact open at the
tlme WhUe the jUdgmental
- suitable for evaluation
° f
^H2lib__to^Jiave__bee^i_done at instants in the past.
If so, then it would seem that an analysis of the judg-
mental use of "ought" could be developed in terms of the
deliberative use of "oucrht- » T andeed, Thomason suggests
that this is so
.
6
Whether or- no+- +-u •n not this development can be
carried out successfully is an open question at this
Point. still, if this rough characterisation of Thomason's
uses of ought is accurate and time provides a way of
drawing the distinction, then clearly we must focus on
the deliberative use of "ought" to develop meaningful pre-
scriptions about how an agent ought to act.
Our concern, then, is with the deliberative use of
ought for which certain alternatives which might have
been open to me are no longer available. Some are ruled
out by physical circumstances, perhaps others by psycho-
logical factors. But the main point is that many are
ruled out as unavailable options as time passes. Hence we
may begin to see the plausibility of building a theory of
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conditional °ught-to-do on the indeterminisUc ^^
according to which available alternatives may vary from
time to time.
Thomason's formal semantics is based on a theory in
which time may branch toward the future. There may be
two times, both in the future with respect to a given
time, that are temporally unrelated to each other. These
two times, then, are on different
"branches" of the time
Structure. If we assume that time may be partitioned
into discrete units we may have treelike structures
as m the following finite illustration:
y 2
Y
3
n
At a there are four possible future courses of events or
scenarios
. At $ 1 and 3 2 there are two future scenarios.
We may designate the instants by Greek letters to empha-
size that they are non-linear units of time. According to
Thomason "the fact that instants
^
and 3 2 are incomparable
signifies that realization of
^
will exclude those
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alternatives in which B, is realised,..’ Presumably if
„and b 2 are incomparable then it will not be the case that
^1 = 6 2 or that B, < B 2 or that B 2 < Bl . This theory of
time "allows certain future alternatives that formerly
were open to become extinguished with the flow of time," 8
just what we require for-• r an analysis of the ought
of deliberation.
Thomason begins with a nonempty set K of (non-linear,
discrete times, or "reference points" at which formulas
Will be evaluated, ordered by a relation < (to be inter-
preted as an "earlier than" relation.) Then a temporal
-Structure is defined as a pair <K, <), where the
most important condition of the structure is that for all
B, Y e K, if 3 < y and a < y , then B < y or y < B or
B = Y. This condition assures us that time can not branch
into the past. Moreover, < is transitive, that is, if
a < 6 and B < y, then a < y. Finally, Thomason requires
9that for all a e K, there is a B e K such that a < B.
A history h on a model structure is a subset of K
such that
1) for all a, 6 £ h, if a f 3 then a < 6 or 3 < a
,
and
2 ) if g is any subset of K such that for all
a
' 3 £ g, then a < 3 or 3 < a, then g = h if h c g
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A history is a maximal chain on a structure, that is, a
nr
“r“ 31' "•
“*« «“»
»
.... ,r:;rr™y~ -• nee time branches only toward thefuture
, then,
„„ represents the set of scenarios open at a
- may locus on a subset of Thomason's formal languaglincluding atomic sentence variables P,Q r
'
, and
sentence connectives
, F (for future tense) ^ q ^
obligation), a valuation V assigns truth-values vh (A) to
formulas A of the given language L at an instant /relative
to a history h in H
a
. V> defines the truth-value taXen
^ A at a, erovided that history h includes what will hap-
pen after Thus the valuation function gives the truth-
value of A at a time assuming that a certain course of
events will come to pass. This valuation function is de-
fined by induction on the complexity of A. For an atomic
sentence letter P,
(78) Vh (p) = V (P)a a v ' '
and, for example, for a formula A,
(79) vN%A) = T iff Vh (A) = Fu a
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Thomason captures Prior
tense by defining
' s "Ockhamist" theory of the future
( 80 ) v ( FA ) = T iff xrh , tv xa V g(A) - T for some 3 e h
such that a <
h
" thSre 13 m°re than one course of events h in H
V
a
(A) will not reflect the unqualified truth-value V <*,
taken by A at a. Thus Thomason defines V
a
(A) using van
Fraassen's method of truth-value gaps:
(81, V
a
(A) = T iff Vh(A) = T for all h £ H
a '
(82) V
a
(A) = F iff V*(A> = F for all h c H
and
un<3efined otherwise.
These truth definitions which allow for truth value gaps
are especially useful for the semantic analysis of future
tense statements. They provide a formal development of
the view that "future contingent" statements
true nor false.
are neither
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In order to provide a semantic analysis for the
deontic operator o, interpreted deliberativelyf
introduces a model^tructure <K, <, s> where S is a re-
lation between instants and histories such that if aSh
then h c V The sen?anticL deten^ S is used to inter-
pret the deontic operator 0
. Thomason says,
•'intuitively
the meaning of aSh is that h represents a future course of
events at instant a that would be an acceptable moral
Choice... Those histories related by s to an instant a
form the ough^set of a. Thomason's semantic rule for the
deontic operator, interpreted deliberative^
, is
(84) V
a
(0A) = T iff V9(A) = T for all g
such that aSg,
or equivalently.
V
a
(0A) = T iff (g) (aSg D (A) = T)
,
With V
a^
0A
^ defined using (81) - (83).
This analysis gives 0 an S^like structure. 11 The
truth-value of a formula 0A with respect to a history h
and a time a depends solely upon the truth-value of A at
a in those histories in the ought set of a. The history
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°”"T
"" u
- "
•> ’ <« «> . ~K
„s,then V (OA) = t fnr an u
“ — e H
a
and hence V
a
(OA) = T
. when
Xt iS "0t thS C3Se that V
«
<A) T f°r 311 5 such that uSg
then V
a
(OA) - P for all h e H
a
and hence V
a
(OA) = F
. Ob-
ligation statements will thus be either true or false
When we supervaluate according to (81) - (83)
, a formula
OA will never lack truth-value. Thus for any history h,
V„(OA) - T iff (OA) = T, and so (84) reduces to
(85) V
a
(OA) = T iff (g) (aSg c (A) = T)
.
The idea is apparently that OA is true at a in every
alternative future which represents a morally acceptable
course of events from the point of view of a. That is, A
would be true in all morally acceptable histories contain-
ing a if those histories were actual, regardless of which
course of events does follow.
But upon reflection this explanation (and thus (84)
and (85)) does not appear to be as clear as it may at
first have seemed. For in evaluating a formula OA at a
time a we merely check the truth-value of A at_a. Thus
it is difficult to see how any future alternatives, even
those which are morally acceptable, are relevant to the
analysis
.
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Indeed
, for a sentence variable p> ^^ Qf ^
;
“ S SOlSly
— ^—•!«. of P a t similar _
/' " 13 n0t at°miC ' tUt COntains future tense opera-
°rs the evaluation of OA at a stiff depends onfy on thetruth—value of a at fhaf ,,
_ __that same t .imp There i Qmer s no reference
different time and thus again reference to future af-
ternatives is irrelevant. Thus if A contains no
tense operators, then
(86 ) (a) (V (OA e A) = t)
.
12
We do not wish to affirm in general that whatever is
Obligatory is true
.
13
Hence a formalization of straight-
forward obligation statements may not be symbolized using
OA, where A is atomic or has no future tense operators,
m Thomason's system, contrary to what we may have be-
lieved and what Thomason suggests in some examples
.
14
Rather, Thomason's formal expression of the English sen-
tence "I ought to pay," for example, must employ a future
tense operator. if P stands for „ r pay< „ he must^
as the formalization, OFF. Then "I ought to pay" is true
at a time a just in case every morally acceptable history
through a is such that there is a time on it after a when
I pay. Using this formalization we may truly say that I
ought to pay is true at a even though it is not true that
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I pay at a, which is as we wish.
This does seem to be Thomason's intention and perhaps
it shows one way of understanding his claim that deontic
logic is intimately tied to and reliant upon tense logic
The interesting obligation sentences in his system are of
the form OFA. And OFA may be true when FA lacks truth-
15
value
.
However we still seem to have a difficulty,
son uses as examples of English sentences which
obligations that we wish to formalize.
For Thoma-
express
( 87 ) George provides transportation Saturday,
and
(88) I ought to give you $50 tomorrow.
Thomason says.
To take an example, let A correspond to
I will give you $50 tomorrow' and sup-pose that I owe you the money, have pro-
mised to give it to you, and can do so
—
there are scenarios ahead of me on which
I pay you the money tomorrow. Then I
would want to say that OA is true—
I
ought to give you the money tomorrow
—
and so every scenario in my ought set is
such that on that scenario I do give
you the money tomorrow. 16
Although indexicals such as "tomorrow" or "now" pose spe-
cial problems, it does seem that we would like to symbolize
sentences such as
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(89) I ought to pay you Saturday at 3:00
(where we even include a calendar date it the reference
to Saturday is ambiguous. Let us assume for our examples
that we need not add reference to a calendar date., flnd
there does not appear to be an adequate symbolization for
(89) available in Thomason's system.
Imagine that ,89, is true at „. If we first attempt
to let the atomic sentence letter P stand for »i pay you
Saturday at 3:00" and use OP as the symbolization for
(89). as seems to be suggested by Thomason in his example
above, then (86) holds in this case. With this symboliza-
tion it follows from (89, that it is true at a that I pay
you Saturday at 3:00, which, given my fallibility, may
clearly be false.
It is natural, then, to attempt to symbolize (89) by
using the future tense operator F so that (86) will not
hold.
(90) FOP
is an implausible candidate. For we wish to assert the
truth of (89) at a and so wish to consider the ought set
or morally acceptable histories open at g
, whereas (90) is
true at a just in case
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(91) <h) (h e H 3 (33) (B E h s a < 3 &
(g) (3Sg 3 v^(P) = T ) ) )
,
that is, just in case on every history through a there is
features. Hence we might try to syrabolize (M) u
(92) OFP
where P stands for either "I pay you" or '! pay you Satur _
day at 3:00. "
Consider first that p corresponds to "I pay you . ..
Then if (92) symbolizes "I ought to pay you " as we have
argued above, it can not be adequate as a formalization
for (89). These two English sentences are not equivalent
and so identical symbolizations can not be satisfactory.
The difficulty seems to be that even though (92) indicates
that in each history which is morally acceptable at a
there is a later time at which I pay you, nothing in sym-
bolization (92) captures what is expressed in the English
sentence, namely that it is on Saturday at 3:00 that I
ought to fulfill the obligation.
Suppose then that P stands for "I pay you Saturday
at 3:00." Then (92) is true at a just in case
141
(g) (aSg
=3 (36) (B e g & a < g & v-[(p) = T) )
that is, jUBt in case all histories which are morally ac-
later than a at which it is true that- tat I pay you Saturday
at 3:00.
This suggested symbolization (92) is closer to what
We would like than the previous ones and also seems in
with Thomason s view. However we may still ask how
we are to evaluate vf CP, - T if P stands for '! pay you
Saturday at 3:00." Thomason addresses this difficulty in
a footnote:
videsV° think ° f (2 ' 4) [' Ge°rge pro-ldes transportation on Saturday'] astrue at any time if and only if 'Georqeprovides transportation' is true onSaturday. 1
7
Analogously, for a given history, "i pay you Saturday at
3:00" is true at any time in the history just in case "I
pay you is true at 3:00 on Saturday in that history.
Notably, we can not express this in Thomason's language.
For P symbolizes "I pay you Saturday at 3:00" but we have
no symbol for "I pay you." More importantly, we have no
way of referring to Saturday at 3:00. It is what we
might call (recalling a phrase of Thomason's) a "clock-time"
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and is not a time in the sense that a, B , and T
are times.. For eaoh of a
, g , and Y . . . is an
occurring in at most one position in the branching time
structure. yet presumably there is a i
_ „
Y 13 tlme corresponding
to Saturday at 3
-on in , .y r J. o in every history open at a.
Unfortunately there is no way of formulating in
Thomason's language the general principle which he advo-
cates in the footnote,
reverting to let P stand
pay you Saturday at 3:00
ing
If we attempt to formulate it by
for ”1 pay you" and p for "i
then it appears that he is say
(94) (a) (Vh (p,)
a 3 T iff V^(p) = T)
.
But (94) is not well formed
out above, Saturday at 3:00
that a, $, and y . . . are
reference for the valuation
in his language. As pointed
is not a time in the sense
times; it can not serve as a
of P.
Despite the inadequacy of his language for express-
ing the principle, the intuition behind it is a plausible
one, and is commonly appealed to in explanations of the
truth of such time-relativized sentences. However, if „e
accept
(92) OFP
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where P corresponds to "t1 Pay you Saturday at 3:00" as
a symbolization for
(89) I ought to pay you Saturday at 3 : 00,
and accept the intuition underlying Thomason's informally
Stated principle, then we are forced to an unacceptable
consequence
.
T_
Whenever V (OFP) iq 4-™^ *true then for every g such that
aSg there is a (3
, B e g , a c B , such that v|(P) = T
,
(see (93)). since aSg we know that g s h/ Thus P must
have a truth-value at a in g. According to Thomason's
principle, applied with respect to a history, if p ri
pay you Saturday at 3:00") is true at a time in that
history, then P is true at any time in that history.
Hence, if V^(OFP) = T
,
then if we let g
x
be a history
such that aSgir there is a tj £ gi such that v^fP) = T .
And so by Thomason's principle as stated above
,
V 1 (P) = T .
But notably P is an atomic sentence variable. And so
according to (78), the truth-value of P at a time relative
to a history is just its value at that time. Thus we
have V (P) = T.
a
In sum, if V
a
(OFP) = T, and hence V
a
(OFP) = T, then if
(92) OFP
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symbolizes
(89) I ought to pay you Saturday at 3:00
where P stands for "I pay you Saturday at 3 ^., ±t ^
lows that by appealing to Thomson's informally stated
principle we can derive V (p) = m „ T
a ' I£ I ought to pay
you Saturday at 3:00" is true at Q then pay you
day at 3:00" is true at a. This is clearly an unaccept-
able consequence.
One might suggest that Thomason should not have used
as examples sentences like (87) and ( 88 )
.
For if we re-
strict our attention to sentences of the form "I ought to
Pay you," Thomason's proposal is immune to the difficulty
above. His theory is unproblematic as long as we are
careful to understand that the atomic sentence variables
P. Q, R, . . . can not symbolize English sentences which
contain references to particular clock-times such as Satur
day at 3:00. However I believe we should have a symboli-
zation and semantic analysis for sentences like (89) and
Thomason's examples indicate that he believes so as well.
One might also suggest that Thomason drop the principle he
has stated informally in a footnote. However if we are
to symbolize sentences of the form of (89) then some
version of the principle is crucial and I have claimed it
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is plausible as well. Yet tI see no way of formulating itplausibly in Thomason’s system.
There may be a way of preserving Thomason's system
and U, symbolizing sentences of the form of
,89) (2)
maintaining and formalizing the intuitive idea underlying
his informally stated principle, and (9) avoiding the
difficulty presented above, and I explore that possibili-
ty in Appendix II. But for the remainder of this chapter
be careful to recall that we must restrict the
English sentences which may be symbolized by atomic sen-
tence variables (thereby restricting the obligation sen-
tences of English that we may express) in Thomason’s
language by excluding those sentences which contain a
reference to a particular date and time.
We have made no attempt thus far to provide any
agential references in our semantic analysis for obliga-
tion sentences. Thomason presents ( 84 ) as the semantic
rule for the deliberative use of "ought," but he has not
incorporated any reference to the agent for which the
obligation may be said to hold. Rather, he has presented
a one-person theory; that is, he has assumed that the
obligation statements hold for a single agent. However
Thomason is well aware that different agents have different
obligations in the deliberative sense
.
18
Thus it will not
do to refer to a general, impersonal ought set at a time.
146
Rather, at any given instant, every individual has his orher own ought set. Thomson takes this suggestion in theillustration we gave on page 138. He savq ir^ • tie ys there that he
gives the $50 in every scenario u-Y in his ought set. Thus
it is his ought set that is used to determine what he
ought to do. At another point he claims, more specifi-
cally that "everyone should have his or her own ought
set.
Thus we might amend Thomason's (84) to state that OA
is at a time in a history fo^^gent just in case
A is true at that time in all scenarios which are accept-
able moral choices for_that_aaent (that is, those scena-
rios in the aaentjs ought set) at that time. Thus if s
is a variable ranging over agents named by s’,s"
and S
s
is a relation between instants and histories such
that if aS
s
g then g e V and, intuitively, g is in the
ought set for s at a, then we might state (84) as
(95) v
s
,
a
(0A) T iff (g) (as g o vg (A) = T)
.
a
However, valuations of non-deontic sentences of the
language are determined solely with respect to times and
histones. Ultimately, using (81) - (83), every formula
is evaluated solely with respect to a time. To maintain
this feature for obligation sentences it is preferable to
147
define truth-value
but of the form 0
s
tively ) obligatory
we shall have
S for sentences, not of the form Oh,
A, which may be read "A is (delibera-
for s or "s ought to see A." 20 Then
(96) V!>sA > T iff (g) (aS
gg
d V^(A) = t)
where h is irrelevant.
Let us now attempt to develop an analogous semantic
analysis for conditional obligation as an ought-to-do and
deliberative ought, and let us attempt to formulate it for
sentences of the form "Smith is conditionally obligated to
repent given his sin
fic clock-times.
where no mention is made to speci
Thomason's truth definition for unconditional obliga-
tion sentences tells us that A is obligatory for s at a
lust in case A is true in all those histories which are
morally acceptable for s at a. Thus, recalling other
analyses of conditronal obligation that we have discussed,
we might wish to say that C is conditionally obligatory
given B for s at a just in case C holds in all those
histories which are morally acceptable for s at a and in
which condition B holds.
This proposal will not do, however. At any given
time a there is, on Thomason's view, a set of histories
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Which are morally acceptable for s at „r a, namely s's ought
e at a. Thus, for example, if it is true at a that s
ght not to sin, it is true that s does not sin in all
those histories in his ought set. But then there can not
e a subset of those histories in which he sins. Hence
is vacuously tru, that any C is conditionally obliga-
givcn that s sins. On this proposal the for-
bidden conditionally obligates one to anything.
We might attempt to block vacuous truth of condition-
al obligation sentences by altering the above proposal to
say that C is conditionally obligatory given B for s at a
lust in case (i) c holds in all those histories which are
morally acceptable for s at a and in which condition B holds,
and <ii, there is at least one history morally acceptable for
s at a in which condition B holds. But this proposal is
also flagrantly inadequate. For as in the case above,
there will be no acceptable histories for s at a in which
s sins (assuming s ought not to sin at a) and so we can
not express a true conditional obligation at a for s to
P t for a sin. No contrary-to-duty obligations will be
true on this analysis since in those cases condition (ii)
can not be satisfied.
To avoid these unwelcome results let us try another
approach. We might rather sloppily say that C is condi-
tionally obligatory given B for agent s at time a just in
149
case c is true in every a-history in which there is a
time such that condition B is true then and which is i„
the agent's ought set with respect to that time.
To clarify this intuitive idea, let us consider an
example. Let us suppose Smith now ought not to sin. His
ought set now contains no future scenarios in which he
sins. But we wish to maintain now that he ought to repent
if he does sin. Thus it seems reasonable to claim that
once Smith does sin he repents in all the histories in
his ought set at the time of his sinning. After his sin
those histories in which he does not sin are no longer
available; they have been bypassed. The morally accept-
able futures available to him at the time of his sinning
are such that he repents in them. A proposal based on
this intuitive idea is clearly more plausible than our
first proposals and will capitalize on the feature of the
branching time model that available alternatives may vary
from time to time.
More specifically, if s is a variable ranging over
agents, and a and 3 range over times or instants, and f,
g, and h are variables ranging over histories, then for
formulas B and C we might suggest
(97) V
a
(0
s
(B/C)) = T iff
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<g)<6H(g e H
a
s 9 * H
b
& V9(b) = t, =
( f
)
(BS
s
f = (C) = T},
which is equivalent to
V
a
( 0
s
(B/C) } = T iff
(g) (3H (g e H
a & g e h 3 &
v|( B ) = T) 3
Vg(OC) = T) }
.
On this proposal, like Thomason's (84), conditional obli-
gation statements will not lack truth value when we super-
valuate using (81) - (83). Hence h is irrelevant again.
Unfortunately, if this proposal is intended recursive-
ly, and is thus intended to apply to any formulas B and C,
it is unsuitable for at least two reasons. As before,
the interesting cases will be those for which C and per-
haps B as well, are future tense formulas which lack truth-
value. And yet if we try to symbolize Chisholm's sentence
that it is now true that if a certain man goes to the as-
sistance of his neighbors he is conditionally obligated to
tell them he is coming, where s' names the man, and G and
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T abbreviate "s'
tells them he is
goes to assist his neighbors"
coming," using
and I
(98) O
s
,(FG/FT)
we can see two major problems.
First, the analysis tells us that at every time and
history at which the condition is true the acceptable
moral histories at those times are such that FT is true
then. Thus all histories morally acceptable at a time
when the condition holds are such that there is a later
time when s' tells them he is coming. And yet clearly we
would like our analysis to allow us to assert that Chis-
holm's sentence is true and that the conditional obliga-
tion. telling, may occur before the condition, going.
Given (97) we can not symbolize true conditional obliga-
tion sentences for which the conditional obligation is to
occur before the condition. 22
Second, the analysis in (97) directs us to every
history g and time 3 such that g e H and g e H anda 3
V
3
(FG) = T. But if FG is true at any particular time 3
m g, because G is true at a particular time y later than
3 , then surely FG is true at many other times in history g.
We wish to look at the histories which are morally accept-
able at those times when he goes, that is, when G is true.
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but not at all those times when it is true that he will
go, that is. When FG is true. Us ing , 97) we are forced
to focus on too many times at which a given formula ex-
pressing the condition is true.
appears to me, then, that the general truth defi-
nition (97) can not, capture the intuitive idea we are
trying to express about conditional obligation sentences
However, even if (97, fails as a general definition, we
might propose that for atomic sentence variables P and Q
(") v
a
(O
s
(P/Q)) = t iff V^(P) = T d
(f) (aS
s
F d V*(Q) = T )
And in the more interesting cases,
( 10 °) v (0 (P/FQ)) = T iff Vh (P) = T 3
(f) [aS
g
f 3 (3y) (a < y & f e &
V (Q) = T) ]
and
(1 °1) V^(O
s
(FP/FQ)
) = T iff
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(g) (6) { (g e & g e Hr & a < g &
v
p (P) = T) D
(f) [3S
s
f d (3 Y ) (a < y & f e h &
Y
V
y
(Q) = T)]).
Some diagrams may help us illustrate (101). suppose
that at a Smith has an obligation to return $100 if he
should steal it. Surely his ought set at a contains no
histones in which he steals the money since he ought not
to steal it.
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However, if s corresponds to "Smith steals $ 100 " and R
to "Smith returns 5100," then consider a particular his-
tory
9l through a and a time 3, on that history such thatV S) = T ' ThSn SVery History f in Smith's ought set
with respect to 3, is such that there is some instant y
such that V f (R) = t.
a-ought set
3-^-ought set
Again
,
in the final valuation the history of evaluation,
h, is irrelevant. Moreover, since we are proposing an
analysis of conditional ought-to-do, it is in line with
our earlier discussions (Chapter I, p. 21 and Appendix II,
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P- 204) to require that a < Y in (100) and (101)>
If the condition obligation in question ig tQ
stoien money or to repent tor a sin then presumably ^
returning comes after thp> •ne stealing and the reDPnf^.c i Penting comes
a ter the sinning, and so we have B < y. However if we do
not require this relationship between B and y, then our
analysis is appl icable to cases Ufce chisholm , s ^^
the conditional obligation for the agent to tell his
neighbors he is coming should be fulfilled before he goes
to help them. Thus we appear to avoid the first difficul-
ty discussed with respect to ( 97 )
.
Furthermore, if we restrict the sentences symbolized
by the atomic sentence variables P, Q, R . .
. to those
English sentences which are such that if ever true in a
history, they are true only once in that history, then
these proposals avoid the second difficulty associated
with (97)
.
23
But (99) - (100) allow statements of conditional ob-
ligation to be true vacuously. For example, for the most
interesting case, (101), if there is no history g and
time B such that g s H
a & g e Hg s a < B & v|(P) = t,
then O (FP/FQ) will be vacuously true for any Q. Thus an
impossible condition, a condition which is not true in
any possible alternative future, yields a conditional
obligation to anything. Hence we might amend (99) - (101)
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as we amended Lewis. proposal (from (7Q) tQ (?1) # pp _ ^
103) by adding an exi stential clause ensuring ^^“ an alternative future in which the condition ^^
is conditionally obligatory do hold.
For example, for (101) we might now say
<102) V
a
(0
s
(FP/F2>> = T iff
1 ) (g) (SH(g e H
a & g e H & a < $
s Vjj(P) = T) =
(f) [3S f 3 (3y) (a < y & f e h
& V
y (Q)
= t)
& ii) (3i) (3a) (3n) (i £ H & i z H
a a
& i £ H Sr
n
a < a & a < n Sr V^(P) T
Sr V
t
"(Q) = T)
.
Given (102), if there is no history along which P holds at
a time later than a and along which Q also holds at some
time after a, then we get the appropriate result that it is
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s
.
not true to say 0
S
(FP/pq, is true for any agent
One consequence of Thomason's truth definition for
obligation sentences is that whenever A is true, OA is
also true. One way of seeing why this is so is by intro-ducing an operator L for inevitahi i ubility into the language
The semantic rule for this operator is
(103) V^(LA) T iff (g) (g e h V^(A) = T)
.
A sentence LA is true at „ if a's truth at „ is indepen _
scenarios at a. Then, as Thomason points out, A
semantically implies LA. Whatever is presently true is
presently inevitable. Furthermore, in deliberative con-
texts, LA implies OA, for if A is true in all possible
futures open at the time, A is clearly true in that sub-
set of alternative histories available at the time which
are morally acceptable. Thus, by transitivity, A implies
OA. Whatever is true is obligatory. 24 similarly, given
the proposals we are discussing, if whatever is condition-
ally obligatory is true, it is conditionally obligatory
given any possible condition.
When 0 is construed deliberatively this may seem
somewhat peculiar, for it is difficult to imagine advising
someone to see to something which is already the case.
However these odd results merely indicate that on these
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analyses past and inevitab le actions are classified as
morally acceptable in the deliberative sense. We mlght
not judge that all our past actions have coincided with
what a recording angel would deem to be obligatory for us,
but it is reasonable to discover that such a view must be'
expressed using the
.judgmental use of •'ought.” Further-
more, in deliberative contexts, obligations are deter-
mined by choosing among possible futures open at the time
of deliberation. Thus if LA is true, it is not open to
the agent to choose
.A, and so we would not wish to say
-A is obligatory (or conditionally obligatory on any con-
dition) in the deliberative sense.
There are other interesting consequences of the pro-
posals given above. If for atomic sentence letters P and
Q
' V°s (P/Q)) = T and the condition is true at a, that is,
V
a
(P) = T, then it follows from (81) and (99) by modus
ponens that
U04) (f) (aS
s
f = V^(Q) = T ) ,
and so that
(105) V (O Q) = T.
a s
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Similarly, if v (O (P/FQ)
) =ot s
ing (81) and (100) and modus
T and V
o
(P) = T then apply-
ponens it follows that
(106) (f) (aS
g
f 3 ( 3Y ) (a < y & f s Hy &
vy<Q> = t) )
,
from which we can conclude(107)
v (O FQ)
a s T.
Hence we have
(108) V
a
(°
s
-(P/Q) ) = T & v (P) = t d
V (0 Q) = Ta s
and
(109)
V
a
(O
s
(P/FQ)) = T & V (P) = T =
V (O FQ) = T.as'
If V
a ^°s
(
Fp/FQ) ) = T and V
a
(FP) = T, then we may not de-
rive (107)
,
an obligation at a for s to see to Q in the
160
future. However it will follow that if pq is obligatory
for s given PP and Fp is true
_
thafc is> p , s ^
future history, then every history is such that there is a
°n “ at WhlCh Q ^ue (earlier or later, in every
member of s's ouqht set ^5 t-f j-ugn . if the condition holds sooner
later in every future, then sooner or later in every
future there is a time at which whatever is conditionally
obligatory is true at some time in each scenario in the
agent's ought set.
sequence
.
These results.
This seems to me to be a welcome con
indicating the relationships between
certain conditional and unconditional obligations, are
not susceptible to the difficulties, pointed out by Green-
span (see Chapter I, pp . 3 ff.), which arise for a general
factual detachment rule. To return to her example, given
a general factual detachment rule, the truth of the con-
dition that I will get a ticket by the end of next month
is sufficient to allow detachment of an obligation to pay
the fine, and this is unacceptable.
Clearly, if P symbolizes "I get a ticket" and Q
symbolizes "I pay the fine" then if I get the ticket at
a, the time at which the conditional obligation holds, then
from (109) we can detach an obligation at a to pay the
fine (some time in the future)
.
161
Also, if Fp symbolizes
"I win get a ticket" and
thlS 13 3 true fUtUre statement, then in every fu_
ture history I do get a ticket; getting a ticket is in-
evitable. In such a case it will foliow that in every
history there is a time when my ought set is such that in
each of its members, I do pay the fine. This is reasonable
“ deliberative contexts since it is not possible for me
not to get a ticket.
If, on the other hand, FP symbolizes "I win get a
ticket" and this is a future contingent statement, then
V
a
(FP) will be undefined and nothing whatsoever will fol-
low about whether or not I eventually pay the fine in
alternative futures.
^
Our discussion of proposals (99) - (102) illustrates
many of the advantages of building a theory of condition-
al obligation within Thomason's indeterminist time model.
Conditional and unconditional obligations may be relativ-
ized to times, clarifying what is settled when an obliga-
n is in force. If i have already made a promise, then
that fact will be settled; any subsequent obligations or
conditional obligations will arise from future options
open to me, and not promising is not one of those. More-
over, since future alternatives open to me may vary from
time to time, obligations and conditional obligations may
also vary over time. This feature of the model makes it
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particularly appropriate for expressions of contrary-to-
dUty °bli9ati0ns
paradigm, an obligation to
repent for a sin. Finally, our discussion has shown that
analyses built on this model, unlike most dyadic analyses
of conditional obligation, may allow for acceptable factu-
al detachments of unconditional obligations from condi-
tional ones, without allowing those detachments which
cause difficulty for general factual detachment in standard
deontic logic.
But there are serious difficulties with these pro-
posals. Recognition of these problems may provide some
insight into a more appropriate way of developing a theory
of conditional obligation within the indeterminist time
model
.
Due to difficulties with (97) we proposed (99) - (loi)
as non-recursive definitions for atomic and future tense
sentences. And while many paradigm conditional obligation
sentences can be analyzed appropriately using (100) and
(101) (amended with an existential clause as in (102)),
these limited semantic rules are clearly insufficient.
In particular, it might seem that a further advantage
of the intuitive idea underlying these proposals is that
even if Q is true in every history morally acceptable for
the agent at the times when P holds, Q may not be true in
every morally acceptable history open at those times when
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' S R h° ld
- ThUS
' t0— °»r example of Chapter I(it seems that we can say, as Greenspan can not, that if
Smith charges a shirt at Macv's i<- •y s, it is conditionally obli-
gatory for him to pay for it, although given that he char-
ges it and returns it he may no longer be obligated to pay
Even if he. pays for it in every history morally
acceptable at the times when he charges it, he may not pay
for it in acceptable futures at those later times when he
charges and returns the shirt.
However to substantiate this claim we must formulate
an analysis for conditional obligation statements with
conjunctive conditions. To cover the interesting cases
we shall also need to include a future tense operator.
the analysis is to be analogous to ( 99 ) - (loi)
we must agree that for any P and R, if P and R symboli
'
e
sentences true at most once in a history, then p & r
symbolizes a sentence true at most once in a history.
Yet I see no way of providing a rule analogous to (99)
(101) for conditional obligation sentences with conjunc-
tive conditions which gives us the results we wish. For
we have agreed to let P correspond to a sentence which is
true at most once in a history. Yet this assumption pre-
vents us from allowing conditional obligations to vary when
a condition is augmented. This follows because if P & R
is true at all in a history it must be true at that time
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d . t
niSt°ry^ P iS^ times at which con .i ion P
. R holds (assuming that there are some) wiu ^
a subset of the times when condition P holds, whatever is
conditionally obligatory given P (or Fp) for , ±s ^ ^each scenario of. ought set at those times when P holds
at those times when p & r hold^ un
' and hence is conditional-
ly obligatory given P & r (or p (p s R) j
.
It is also troubling that none of (99) - (i 01) pro _
vides a suitable symbolization and analysis for a condi-
tional obligation to do Q given not-P. in Chisholm's
puzzle, for example, we wish to be able to express a man's
obligation not to tell his neighbors he is coming if he
does not go to help them. But I see no analysis analogous
to (101) for such a sentence. The condition, that he does
not go, is not one which, if ever true in a history, is
true at most once in a history. There are instead many
times in each history when it is true that he does not go.
ndeed, if his going to help his neighbors describes an
instantaneous individual event, then in each history it is
true at every time in that history, except perhaps one,
that he does not go. And it seems much too strong to re-
quire that the agent does not tell in each history in each
ought set of all those times, when the conditional obli-
gation sentence is true. Even if the English sentence "he
an event
goes to help his neighbors" is taken to describe
which is true at most once in each history, it is dim _
cult to see how "he does not go to help his neighbors"
describes an event with the same feature.
one might believe that if P is a sentence describing
an event true at most once in a history then drawing a
distinction between not doing P and refraining from P will
solve this difficulty. Por one might argue that refrain-
ing from P is an event true at most once in a possible
future, since refraining from P requires consciously con-
sidering performing P and yet purposively not doing P.
However there are at least two reasons why this strat-
egy will not solve our problem, even if a clear distinction
can be made between not doing p and refraining from P.
First, our analysis for conditional obligation sentences
with negated conditions will then be restricted to condi-
tions which are negations of acts performed by agents
rather than events in general. Second, if refraining from
P requires conscious thought and effort on the part of the
agent, then the analysis will not even apply to all condi-
tions which are negations of acts of agents. For example,
the analysis will not be applicable to failures to do P
which are instances of thoughtless negligence.
Amended versions of (99) - (101) alone are insuffi-
cient for analyzing all the conditional obligation sentences
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express and yet I see no way of developing
analogous analyses for sentences with complex conditions
Furthermore, although „e carefully formulated
, 101
,
and ( 102 ) to allow expressions of conditional obligation
sentences in which what is conditionally obligatory is to
occur prior to the condition, nevertheless it turns out
that interesting conditional obligation sentences (in par-
ticular, those sentences describing cases where fulfill-
ment of the conditional obligation is not inevitable, with
this temporal relationship will not be true given (102,
after all.
To see this, consider Chisholm's second sentence,
interpreted as expressing a certain man's conditional ob-
ligation to tell his neighbors he is coming given that
he goes to their assistance, where the telling is to occur
before the going. According to (102, this conditional ob-
ligation is true at a just in case (i> there is a history
in which after a he goes to help his neighbors and tells
them he is coming and (ii, every time B, a < 8, in a
history through a and 8, at which he goes to help his
neighbors is such that every history morally acceptable at
8 has m it a time T. a < Y < 8, at which he tells them he
is coming.
Although there are many alternative futures at a time
3, some of which are morally acceptable, there is only one
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past with respect to r t-fP “o B- If we rule out moral blind alleys
as Thomason does, and require that at ^4 -Lr every time 6 there
is at least one morally acceptable history
, ^ ^^With respect to 3 is part of that history and so is
morally acceptable at 3 .
Thus if
(98) 0 (FG/FT)
is true at a, then according to our analysis, every time
6- CX < 8, in a history through a and g at which G is
true is such that there is an earlier time y in that
history, “ < Y < B, at which T is true
. That ^ , f
the conditional obligation is true, then every history in
which he goes is a history in which he tells as well. No
history in which G is true at g^ say, is such that there
is no Yl on that history, a < Yl < 8r at which T is true.
Yet in our example it is not impossible at a to go without
telling; at a it is open to the agent to go and tell, to
go and not tell, to not go and tell, and to not go and
not tell, at a there surely are possible futures in which
he goes but does not tell. Thus 0
S , (FG/FT) is not true
at a given our analysis, although the corresponding English
sentence is true. 28
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It is natural to suggest that these difficulties
which arise for the proposals we have been discussing
could be avoided if, instead of focusing on ever^ time at
which the condition is true, „e merely look at one time at
which the condition holds. And it is natural to believe
that this latter suggestion could be developed if we
appealed again to the counterfactual conditional expres-
sion, for formulas A and B, A > OB, which would force us
to focus on a single time in a history at which condition
A is true.
It seems to me that there are three major considera-
tions which motivate the use of the counterfactual con-
ditional for expressions of conditional obligation sen-
tences, if these sentences are to be analyzed within Thoma-
son's branching time model. First, if A > OB directs us
to look at a particular time in a history at which A is
true and then determine whether or not B is true in the
agent's ought set at that time, then conditional obliga-
tion sentences in which the time of the obligation is
earlier than the time of the condition may no longer be
problematic. For even if the agent tells his neighbors
he is coming in the history before that time which the
counterfactual picks out when he goes to help them,
there may be other future times at which he goes to help
them but before which there is no time when he tells them
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he is coming. Truth of the conditional
sentence will not restrict the possible
obligation
alternative
futures
.
Second
,
our main argument in Chapter II against using
P > Oq as a general symbolization for conditional obliga-
tion sentences was that p > 0q implies p = 0q. Thus if
P > Oq expresses a true conditional obligation for q
given p and p is true, we must accept the general factual
detachment of Oq. This argument is correct. Yet if the
subjunctive conditional is built into Thomason's model
this argument will no longer apply. For even if it fol-
lows that
( 113 ) V
a
(A > OB) - T & V (A) = T d V (OB) = T,a (
x
this will not produce unwelcome results. If A is a purely
present or past tense formula, detachment of the uncondi-
tional obligation seems unproblematic. Also, if A is a
true future tense formula, FC, then C is true in every
future scenario. And when C is inevitable, detachment
seems acceptable as well. Whereas if A is a future con-
tingent statement, (A) will be undefined rather than true
and so no detachment will be possible
.
29
And third, the counterfactual conditional expression
A > OB does not imply A & C > OB . 30 No other analysis of
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conditional obligation we have evaluated, except Lewis'
c V
ll0Wed COnditi°nal °bli9atl0nS
— with augmented
And we have seen that Lewis' theory allows
certain conditional obligations to follow given conjunctive
even m cases where it seems that the added
condition actually override • •Y rrides the original conditional ob-
ligation.
tUrnS °Ut ^ taSk ° f introducing subjunctive
conditionals into the branching time model is a particular-
ly difficult one. Thomason has proposed one method in an
unpublished paper, "A Theory of Conditionals in the Con-
text of Branching Time," where he argues that if condi-
tionals are added to the theory then the basic notion of
the semantic theory, V>, should be replaced
. ^ ^
says, the theory must be able to take account not merely
of a future course of events, h, that is tentatively
designated the actual one for the moment in which we find
ourselves, but of "counterfactual actual futures" as well.
Although I shall not pursue Thomason's thoughtful and
detailed suggestions for revising the theory to include
conditionals, I shall discuss a difficulty which must be
resolved if S > OB is used within Thomason's theory to
symbolize sentences of conditional obligation. Further-
more I shall point out several consequences shared by any
theory of conditional obligation built on the indeterminist
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time model and Thomason's theory of obligation.
If A > OB is used to symbolize conditional obligation
sentences, then presumably we shall require a selection
function to pick out a particular time at which A is true
and a future scenario through that time (to evaluate the
truth of A if A contains future tense operators)
. what-
ever is true in the ought set at the selected time is
then crucial for determining the truth of the conditional
Obligation sentence. We could perhaps build selection
functions into the model structure or, as Thomason does,
treat them as valuations. But neither formal development
explains what makes the time selected a proper choice for
deontic evaluation. If „e are not going to look at all
times when the condition holds, but will choose only one,
what criteria can possibly mark off that time as the rele-
vant one for deontic purposes?
If the semantic analysis of counterfactual condition-
al statements within the branching time model is analogous
to Stalnaker's original semantic theory for the subjunctive
conditional, then it would be misleading to say that the
selected time is the nearest or closest or earliest time
at which the condition holds
.
31
For there is no ordering
of times in our model analogous to the ordering of possible
worlds based on comparative similarity posited by Stalnaker.
Perhaps the selected time is to be that time such that
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" WSre 11 "°Uld bS true But what reason dQ
we have for believing that this time win be the appropri-
ate trme to examine the ought set? Furthermore, if the
condition is a future tense statement or a negation, then
it may be true at many times in the selected history and
it is difficult to see how we can select a particular
time such that if mP or FP, for example, we^l^TIt
would be true then. Or, even if we can pick a particular
time with this feature it is difficult to see why we
should focus on a time at which FP is true rather than one
at which P is true, at least in deontic contexts, where
the time selected is the one at which we examine the
ought set to determine the truth of the conditional obli-
gation sentence. These puzzling questions must be an-
swered if A > OB, interpreted within Thomason's model, is
to serve as an acceptable symbolization for conditional
obligation statements.
Moreover, the use of truth-value gaps leads to a pe-
culiar consequence for any theory of conditional obliga-
tion built on the indeterminist time model. In providing
a symbolization for Chisholm's sentences, even if we can
develop an adequate formalization for the second and
third sentences, interpreted as statements of conditional
obligation, we may puzzle over how to symbolize the fourth
sentence
.
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Suppose we agree that
0/ we should symbolize the
puzzle as
given Thomason's analysis of
first sentence of Chisholm's
(lb) 0
s
,FG /
where s' names the man and G corresponds to "s' goes to
help his neighbors." it is consistent with the truth of
db) at a to symbolize the fourth sentence as
(4b) %G,
where (4b) is also true at a. But the truth of at a,
V
a
(-G) = T, merely tells us that s' does not go at a, and
so does not adequately capture the meaning of the English
sentence. A more natural reading of Chisholm's fourth
sentence tells us that the man will not go to help his
neighbors
.
But the alternative symbolization
(4c) F%G
does not express the English sentence either. For (4c)
is true at a just in case
(114) (h) (h e H
a
3 Gs) (6 G h &
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ot < 3 &
ThV
3
(^G) = T)
^ U14)
' th°U9h is uninteresting
. Eve„ in those
histories where there is a time later than a at which he
goes, there is a time after a at which he does not go.
Thus we might symbolize the fourth sentence as
(4d) %FG.
But if (4d) is true at a, then
(115) (h) (h e H
a = (B) (6 £ h s a < 6 3
V G > = F>),
that is, there are no future scenarios open at a in which
S' goes. And this contradicts the truth of (lb) at a,
that s' goes in the morally acceptable futures open at a.
Thus within the indeterminist time model we must interpret
the fourth sentence as asserting that the agent will not
go where this is a future contingency. in other words,
formalize the fourth sentence as
we
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( 4d) o-FG
where the value of f 4 rn =,+.^d) at a is undefined.
These symbolizations,
(lb) O .FG
s
and
( 4d) 'VFG
when valuated at a time a as true and undefined, respec-
tively, are not inconsistent. That s’ goes to help his
neighbors in all future histories that are morally accept
able at a is consistent with the truth that he goes in
some future scenarios but does not go in others open at
a. Furthermore, whatever analysis and symbolization we
provide for the second and third sentences, we can avoid
the contradiction spotted by Chisholm, since the value
of vFG is undefined, we can not detach an obligation not
to tell them he is coming.
Yet symbolizing the fourth sentence as a statement
with undefined truth value is unsettling. First, it
does not provide us with a formalization of the sentences
for which all are true when valuated at the same time.
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Second, and more worrisome, is the fact that it is
natural to believe that the first and fourth sentences
tell us that s' does go to help his neighbors in the
morally acceptable futures open at „ aa, and yet in fact hedoes not go. He does not go in the actual history; the
actual future at a. is not a member of his ought set at a
However, on Thomason's view, within the indeterminist
time model we can not express this compelling interpreta-
tion of the sentences. Given his semantic theory we can
not say that just one of the possible futures open at a
is the one which will be realized without abandoning the
point of the model. if a single possible future is the
actual one with respect to a, then it is not clear what
relation those times in the non-actual futures can bear
to a . 32
And third, although the lack of truth-value blocks
factual detachment for a deliberative ought version of
the puzzle, it is not clear how an analogous past tense
or judgmental ought version of Chisholm's paradox could
be avoided.
Two other major questions arise for any theory of
conditional obligation built on Thomason's model and
theory of obligation. First, Thomason developed his
semantics for the deliverative use of "ought" so that a
version of Kant's "ought implies can" principle does hold.
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He says, "if we rule out moral blind alleys by requiring
that for all a there is at least one h such that aSh. any
formula having the form OA =, vlva is valid." 33 If m =
^A, then M corresponds to an important use of "can,"
which Thomason suggests has these properties:
(1) if we say a thing can happen, its
subsequent happening shows that
what we said was true;
(2) the fact that in circumstances
similar to ours a certain thinghas happened is prima facie
evidence for the“claim that it
can happen (supposing it to be
in question whether it can hap-
pen)
.
34
But if the alternative future histories we are con-
sidering are those which are temporally possible, or
logically possible at a time a, then it may be argued
that the version of the "ought implies can" principle
which will hold for his concept of obligation, interpre-
ted deliberatively
,
and thus any analogous deliberative
concept of conditional obligation as well, is too broad.
Let us return to Thomason's example (quoted on page 138)
according to which it is true that I ought to give you
$50 tomorrow and so every scenario in my ought set is
such that on that scenario I do give you the money to-
morrow. Then, as Thomason aptly describes.
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S
^°mpatible With this situation
t there are also scenarios aheadof me on which, through no fault ofmine, this ought is cancelled. Forinstance, it may be a matter of chancewhether I will be hit by a car latertoday and
. spend tomorrow in a coma in
dent
h° Spital
- At a time after the acci-, on a scenario on which there issuch an accident, there will be no ~
scenarios on which I give you $50 to-
morrow, and so my ought set at the timewon t contain any such scenarious.
.It is characteristic of such a theory*(and might lead some to entertain al-ternative theories) that when I oughtto pay you $50 tomorrow it will then
also be true that I ought not to have
an accident that will prevent me frompaying you; and that I ought not tohave a heart attack; and that I ought
not to have a death in the family that
will call me out of town suddenly.
What makes these implausible is that
such matters are, to a large extent,
out of my control, and when I promise
to pay you $50 tomorrow it seems I am
not promising (or even obligating my-
self) not to have a heart attack before-
hand. The theory I'm proposing denies
this; I want to say that oughts are
risky
,
and if I ought to pay you the$50 tomorrow I ought not to have a heart
attack that will prevent me from paying
you. Nevertheless, I agree, it would be
peculiar to say "I ought not to have a
heart attack" in these circumstances
—
but that isn't because it's false. 35
Even worse for Thomason's theory than the consequences
he lists above, if there are scenarios ahead of me on
which there is a flood and I subsequently do not pay you
the $50, we will have to say that when it is true that
I ought to see to it that there is no flood. This begins
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to seem ludicrous.
It appears that Thomason's theory of obligation and
any theory of conditional obligation built upon it win
make too much obligatory in the deliberative sense. The
notion of possibility built in to the theory is too broad
What is obligatory in the sense of ought-to-do should be
possible in the sense of being in the agent's control or
power.
An attempt to restrict an agent's ought set at a time
in some way to limit what will be obligatory or condition-
ally obligatory seems impossible. However we have already
recognized that English sentences such as "I pay you Satur-
day at 3:00" can not be symbolized in Thomason's language
as it is given. Thus we have agreed to exclude sentences
with references to clock-times from the domain of sentences
which atomic statement variables may symbolize. Similarly,
we might add an informal condition to further restrict the
set of sentences which may be symbolized as atomics for
true obligation and conditional obligation sentences to be
of the form "x does P," where x names an agent and P names
an action in x's control or power, for some suitable notion
of "being in the agent's power." This limitation would be
inappropriate for purely tense theoretic contexts, and is
too restrictive if applied to conditions in conditional
obligation sentences, but it would be appropriate for
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Whatever is obligatory or conditionally obligatory.
ally, a major issue which we have pointedly
avoided discussing thus far is the question of how the
relation S
s
is to be explained. How do we determine which
histories will be in an agent s's ought set at a time a’
a formal semantics may escape the issue by pointing out
that it is a substantive ethical question. Thomason him-
self makes no proposals; he leaves the characterization
of morally acceptable histories open. But to show that
his theory of obligation and any conditional obligation
proposal built on it are non-circular we must provide an
independent specification of an agent's ought set at a
time
.
If David Lewis is correct that possible worlds can
be ranked according to some standard of goodness and that
for any obligation there is a threshold beyond which the
better and better worlds are such that whatever is obli-
gatory is true in them, then it would seem that similar
reasoning would guarantee that possible alternative
futures could be ranked according to some criterion of
goodness and for any agent's obligation there would be a
threshold beyond which the better and better histories
would all be such that he fulfills his obligation in them.
The better and better histories over the threshold would
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be in the agent's ought set at the time of comparison.
In other words, then, we might view an agent's ought set
at a time as the set of best histories open to him at that
time, where the criterion of goodness is left unspecified,
as it was for Lewis.
But Lewis' view that there is such a threshold is
exactly what we have, agreeing with Goldman and McMichael,
denied. if we are correct, then within Thomason's theory
any characterization of an agent's ought set at a time as
the set of best histories open at that time is doomed to
fail. And an alternative characterization must be provided
or other revisions imposed upon his theory to develop an
analysis of conditional obligation built within his inde-
terminist time model.
In conclusion
, careful examination of what appeared
to be a plausible intuitive idea upon which to develop a
theory of conditional obligation within Thomason's inde-
terminist time model indicated that depsite its apparent
suitability for contrary-to-duty conditionals, it could
not be formulated within the semantic theory. We dis-
covered that an analysis which focuses on a single time at
which the condition holds might fare better. In particular,
there are several reasons to pursue the investigation of
one such analysis employing the subjunctive conditional
connective built within Thomason's branching time model.
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However it is difficult to see how any
type can justify the crucial choice of
history at which the condition holds as
analysis of that
any one time in a
suitable for
deontic evaluation.
Furthermore, we have discussed several issues which
must be resolved if Thomason's analysis of obligation and
any analogous analysis of conditional obligation is to be
satisfactory. We must pursue the suggestions made in
Appendix II, since the original semantic theory provides
no way of expressing obligations and conditional obliga-
tions which are to be fulfilled at a specific time. We
must admit that within the theory Chisholm's four sen-
tences may be symbolized so that none is false, although
they can not be symbolized consistently as all true at
the same time. Moreover, we must determine whether or not
a past tense version of the paradox will arise. We must
attempt to restrict the theory or adapt it so that obliga-
tions and conditional obligations are those acts within
an agent's power, and should suggest reasonable characteri-
zations of an agent's ought set at a time.
These issues are not trivial, and their multitude
may lead many to seriously question the ultimate suitabil-
ity of the indeterminist time model for deontic contexts.
Nevertheless, our arguments have shown that it is unlikely
that an adequate theroy of conditional obligation can
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be developed without a semantic
the concept of an open future.
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APPENDIX I
Most systems of deontic logic include some form of a
basic deontic logic as a subsystem. Bengt Hansson, in "An
Analysis of Some Deontic Logics" (in Risto Hilpinnen, ed.
,
Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings), has
isolated this basic system and called it the standard
deontic logic (SDL)
. Since then SDL has been referred to
elsewhere m the literature and serves as a standard system
within which it is possible to express most of the philo-
sophical problems associated with deontic logic.
According to Hanson SDL is based on a basis logic,
BL, which may be the propositional calculus or any related
system, provided valuations and validity are defined in
the usual way and provided BL is complete, that is, every
valid formula is a theorem. What constitutes a well formed
formula and a theorem is determined in the usual way.
SDL is minimal in the sense that it is the smallest
set fulfilling the requirements that
(i) whenever f is a formula of BL then Of
is a formula of SDL,
(ii) the negation of any formula of SDL is
a formula of SDL,
and (iii) the disjunction of any formulas of SDL
is a formula of SDL.
The deontic operator 0 is read "it is obligatory that".
F, read "it is forbidden that", and P, read "it is permis-
sible that', may be defined such that
197
198
(iv) Fp = 0(^p)
and (v) Pp = %Fp = ^o(^p)
Where P is a schematic sentence letter expressing a pos-
sible act or state of affairs. Truth functional formulas
Of SDL are defined as usual but no iterated operators
(e.g., OOp) nor mixed formulas (e.g., p v Op) are allowed
in the language.
Every formula which is obtained from a theorem of
the propositional calculus by substituting formulas of
SDL for the variables is an axiom of SDL. More than one
set of deontic axioms might serve as the deontic base for
SDL. One set suggested by Hansson and used by others is:
(1) Op 3 a>0(^p)
and (2) 0(p 3 q) & Op 3 Oq (equivalently,
0 (p 3 q) 3 (Op 3 Oq) ) .
Furthermore, many authors have found it reasonable to add
(3) 0 ( t
)
,
where t is a tautology in BL, since denial of (3) excludes
only empty normative systems or those cases in which
nothing is obligatory (cf. F^llesdal and Hilpinnen, p. 13).
Hansson points out that (3) is sometimes added not as an
axiom but as an inference rule,
(R) If a formula f is provable in BL,
then Of is provable in SDL,
along with modus ponens and a suitable substitution rule.
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This system of SDL is equivalent to the original
system proposed by von Wright in '•Deontic Logic" in Mind,
1951, in which permission is the deontic primitive and the
axioms are thus formulated in terms of the deontic opera-
tor P, except that von Wright prefixed deontic operators
to names of acts and did not propose (3). Hansson suggests
that although von Wright did not propose (3), nevertheless
the system SDL as presented above, including (3) or (R)
,
is essentially what von Wright intended. Thus von Wright
truly did provide the foundation for deontic logic.
appendix II
We wish to investigate the possibility of preserving
Thomason's system and ( 1 ) providing a symbolization of
sentences in the form of (89), (2) maintaining the idea
underlying his informally stated principle (see (94)), and
(3) avoiding the difficulty presented in Chapter V on
pages 138-145. Suppose we enrich (no pun intended) his
language by adding to it a way of referring to "clock-
times" such as Saturday at 3:00, and argue that sentences
such as "I pay you Saturday at 3:00" can not be symbolized
as atomic sentences in the language. We shall then say
that although "I pay you" may be formalized as an atomic
sentence, any reference to a clock-time such as Saturday
at 3:00 must be made explicit and can not be embedded
within a symbolization for an atomic sentence. We have
discovered that clock-times such as Saturday at 3:00 can
not be symbolized in Thomason’s language as it is presented
and thus we must augment his language to enable explicit
reference to clock-times across histories.
Interestingly, in adapting his semantic analysis for
the deliberative use of "ought" to the judgmental use,
Thomason argues that a similar cross reference may be ap-
propriate. For in determining what ought to have been done
(although it is now too late to do it) one imagines that
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at some point in the past things went more
than they in fact did. Thus one in effect
as they should
transports
oneself to a (not necessarily unique) instant, a set of
counterfactual moments, if you wish, which ought to have
been realized. Thomason says,
...suppose that I've drawn up to a stop linecars at a red light and, looking in my rear
fcZ
r<
?l'
1
f
e\a Car Coming UP behind me too fast
There isVs a . chance of its stopping in time.s a sense m which the driver of the carought not to hit me. While I'm waiting there
ii th^ better to do ' 1 make this judgmentn he following way. First, I go back a few
u
b° a Poan t in time at which the driver
still had a chance of stopping safely. This, as
!
ve
,
said
» ls an act of imagination: wishfulimagination, perhaps. Then I consider a variety
of alternative scenarios in which he drives as heought. In general there is more than one ofthese... All of these scenarios are, of course
might-have-beens, since he didn't in fact drive'
as he ought. Along each of these scenarios, then,
I choose a particular instant to serve as an al-ternative for the one in which I unhappily find
myself. The most natural way of doing this in
our example is to use the metric properties of
time and take instants along the other scenarios
in which clocks show the same time they do at theinstant in which I find myself. ("Deontic Logic
as Founded on Tense Logic", p. 13)
Our interest is not in developing a semantics for the
judgmental use of "ought". However if we are to make
explicit reference to clock-times, we need a way of
choosing an instant along each future history or scenario
corresponding to, for example, Saturday at 3:00. In the
last sentence of the above quotation Thomason suggests a
natural way of doing this.
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Let us again suppose as we did in Chapter I that time,
conceived of linearly, can be partitioned into discrete
instants which we may refer to by definite descriptions,
definite descriptions of what we have been calling clock-
times. Then suppose we introduce to our language t t
,
as non-rigid designators for descriptions such as
"Saturday at 3:00", such that if i, b m n t t
3 designates Saturday
at 3:00, then for every history or scenario h there will
be a B such that the value of tj at h is «, which we may
abbreviate with a function V*(t
3
,h) = B . m other words
the non-rigid designator tj picks out in each history an
instant corresponding to Saturday at 3:00, perhaps the
instant at which clocks and calendars in the history
indicate it is Saturday at 3:00. (But see below, Appen-
dix II, pp. 204-205.)
The idea of using non-rigid designators in this way
to refer across histories or worlds is not new. Jaakko
Hintikka made a similar suggestion in "On the Logic of
Perception (in Perception and Personal Identity, N. Care
& R. Grimm, eds.. Case Western Reserve Press, 1969), to
refer to intensional objects in formalizations of certain
perceptual statements.
Although our project need not include a complete
explanation of the metric properties of clock-times, it
does seem that we will preserve the metric structure of
time if we require that for every t and t„ t. < t. if
and only if the clock-time named by t
±
is earlier than the
clock-time named by t
. . Furthermore, it seems reasonable
to require that for every t. and history h there is one
and only one 6 such that V*(t.,h) = e. On any history
there is a e designating Saturday at 3:00, for example,
and that 3 is unique.
Given this minimal explanation, we might now let
atomic sentence variables p n r 4-r r k, ... stand for sentences
like "I pay you", where no reference to a clock-time ap-
pears in the sentence, and P for "I pay you Saturday at
3:00". Then we wish to say that P is true at any timer
3m a history just in case P is true at the time corres-
ponding to Saturday at 3:00 in that history. More gener-
ally, we might formulate Thomason's principle for truth
of a formula at a clock-time as:
(1) <«><h)<v£ (A^) = T iff
h) (A) =T).
Because V*(t
i#
h) is clearly a time in history h, we may
simplify ( 1 ) to
(2) (a) (h) (V* (A
t )
= T iff V
v* (t jh) (A) = T) .
And finally, returning to the semantic rule for delibera-
tive oughts we may have
(3) (OA ) = T iff (g) (aSG = Vg (A ) =a
ot t^
And given (1) and (2) this is equivalent to
h
T.
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we now have a rich enough meta- language to give a
semantic rule for expressions of obligations in which what
is obligatory is to be brought about at a certain time.
That is, we can distinguish the time at which the obliga-
tion is said to hold and the time at which it is to be
fulfilled. (Cf. Castaneda, "Ought, Time, and the Deontic
Paradoxes", p. 782, on the importance of this distinction.)
When the obligation statement is interpreted deliberatively
we do not wish, for example, to be obligated Tuesday to do
A Monday, and we now have a language within which we can
require that
(5) V
a
(0A
t }
= T D v*(t. ,h) * a.
i 1
(Compare (2), p. 21, of Chapter I.) And we may wish to
incorporate this condition in (4) so that
(6) V
a
<OA ) = T iff (g) (aSg =V*(t.,g) * a
i 1
& V (t
i ,g)
(A) = T)
'
where, as noted in Chapter V, h is irrelevant. On this
analysis, a sentence indicating an obligation, for example,
to pay you Tuesday at 4:00 will be symbolized without the
use of a future tense operator, but with a sentence vari-
able and a non-rigid designator for Tuesday at 4:00.
There seem to me to be three main problems with this
suggestion. First, although any formula can presumably
be true at a particular moment or clock-time, t^, it is
very difficult to see how the time, t^, at which a complex
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formula (a negation or material implication, for example)
is true is related to the time or times at which its
atomic parts are true. Thus it might be best to view (1) .
(6) as principles which hold only when A is an atomic sen-
tence letter. But then we have a much more restricted
language than Thomason's and have prevented ourselves from
providing a symbolization for the sentence expressing
Jones’ obligation not to tell his neighbors he is coming,
for example.
Second, m stipulating that a non-rigid designator,
t
i /
picks out the instant in each history at which the
clocks and calendars in that history register the same
time and date, we are restricting the set of alternative
possible futures. For we can not account for possible
futures in which the clocks and calendars go haywire.
Third, if two times in different branches of the
temporal model structure are truly incomparable in the
sense that they are neither identical with each other nor
is one earlier than the other, then it would seem that
their incomparability precludes the very possibility of
choosing non-rigid designators to pick out corresponding
instants in each alternative history. If we may truly
slice across histories to find clock-times then it appears
we really are conflating our model, however covertly, to
a conception of a unique course of time in which there
206
are alternative possible courses of events. (See
Chapter V, note 1.)
To the second objection we might reply that alterna-
tive futures in which the clocks go haywire are indeed
irrelevant for the semantic evaluation of sentences ex-
pressing obligations which are to be discharged at a
particular time. And in response to the third objection
it must be pointed out that to pick out times from each
history to correspond to a definite description is not to
claim that they are identical, which would clearly violate
their incomparability
. Nor is the choice of times picked
out by a particular non-rigid designator absolute in any
sense. The semantic proposals given here merely attempt
to provide a semantic analysis for a theory countenancing
a single course of time within Thomason's more general
semantic model.


